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THE TWO  
BOOKES OF

S<sup>r</sup> FRANCIS BACON,  
OF  
THE PROFICIENCE  
and Advancement of Learning,  
DIVINE and HVMANE.

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*To the KING.*

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*Jos: Bromefield.*

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OXFORD,

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Thomas Huggins. 1633.

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


THE TWO  
BOOKS OF

S. FRANCIS BACON.

OF  
THE REFORMATION  
and Advancement of Learning.  
DIVINE AND HUMAN.

To the KING.



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Thomas Haggins. 1832.

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# THE FIRST BOOKE

of Sir *Francis Bacon*; of the pro-  
ficiency & advancement of Learn-  
*ing, Divine and Humane.*

*To the King.*



Here were vnder the Law (excellent King) both daily Sacrifices, and free will Offerings; the one proceeding vpon ordinary observance; the other vpon a devout cheerefulnesse: In like manner there belongeth to Kings from their Servants, both tribute and duty, and presents of affection: In the former of these, I hope I shall not liue to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your Maiesties employments: for the latter, I thought it more respectiue to make choyce of some oblation, which might rather referre to the propriety and excellency of your individuall Person, then to the businesse of your Crowne and State.

Wherefore representing your Maiesty many  
A 2 times



times vnto my minde, and beholding you not with the inquisitiue eye of presumption, to discouer that which the Scripture telleth me, is inscrutable; but with the observant eye of duty and admiration: leauing aside the other parts of your vertue and fortune, I haue beene touched, yea and possessed with an extreame wounder at those your vertues and faculties, which the Philosophers call intellectuall: The largenesse of your Capacity, the faithfulness of your memory, the swiftnesse of your apprehension, the penetration of your Iudgement, and the facility and order of your elocution; and I haue often thought, that of all ~~w~~ persons liuing, that I haue knowne, your Maiesty were the best instance to make a man of *Platoes* opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the minde of man by nature knoweth all things, and hath but her owne natieue and originall notions (which by the strangenesse and darkenesse of this Tabernacle of the body are sequestred) againe reuiued and restored: such a light of Nature I haue obserued in your Maiesty, and such a readinesse to take flame, and blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least sparke of anothers knowledge deliuered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest King: *That his heart was as the sands of the Sea*; which though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions: So hath God giuen your Maiesty a composition of vnderstanding admirable, being able to compasse and comprehend the greatest matters, and neuerthelesse to touch and apprehend the least, whereas



whereas it should seeme an impossibility in Nature, for the same Instrument to make it selfe fit for great and small workes. And for your gift of speech, I call to minde what *Cornelius Tacitus* saith of *Augustus Caesar*: *Augusto profluens & qua principem deceret, eloquentia fuit*. For if wee note it well, speech that is vttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that fauoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of some patterne of eloquence, though never so excellent: All this hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subiect. But your Maiesties manner of speech is indeed Prince-like, flowing as from a fountaine, and yet streaming and branching it selfe into Natures order, full of facility and felicity, imitating none and inimitable by any. And as in your civill Estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your Maiesties vertue with your fortune, a vertuous disposition with a fortunate regiment, a vertuous expectation (when time was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time; a vertuous observation of the Lawes of marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a vertuous and most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour-Princes therevnto; So likewise in these intellectuall matters, there seemeth to bee no lesse contention betweene the excellency of your Maiesties gifts of Nature, and the vniuersality and perfection of your Learning. For I am well assured, that this which



I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth: which is, that there hath not been since Christs time any King, or temporall Monarch, which hath bin so learned in all literature & erudition, divine and humane. For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the Emperours of *Rome*, of which *Cæsar* the Dictator, who lived some yeares before Christ, and *Marcus Antoninus* were the best Learned; and so descend to the Emperours of *Grecia*, or of the West, and then to the lines of *France*, *Spaine*, *England*, *Scotland*, and the rest, and hee shall finde this iudgement is truly made. For it seemeth much in a King, if by the compendious extractions of other mens Wits and Labours, he can take hold of any superficial Ornament and shewes of learning, or if hee countenance and preferre learning and learned men: But to drinke indeed of the true fountaines of learning, nay, to haue such a fountaine of learning in himselfe, in a King, and in a King borne, is almost a Miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Maiesty a rare Coniunction, as well of Divine and sacred literature, as of prophane and humane: So as your Maiesty standeth inuested of that triplicity, which in great veneration, was ascribed to the ancient *Hermes*; the power and fortune of a King; the Knowledge and illumination of a Priest; and the learning and vniversality of a Philosopher. This propriety, inherent and individuall attribute in your Maiesty, deserueth to be expressed, not only in the fame and admiration



admiration of the present time, nor in the History or tradition of the ages succeeding; but also in some solid worke, fixed memoriall, and immortall monument, bearing a Character or signature, both of the power of a King, and the difference and perfection of such a King.

Therefore I did conclude with my selfe, that I could not make vnto your Majesty a better oblation, then of some treatise tending to that end, whereof the summe will consist of these two parts: The former concerning the excellency of Learning and Knowledge, and the excellency of the merite and true glory, in the augmentation and Propagation thereof: The latter, what the particular actes and workes are, which haue beene imbraced and vnder-taken for the advancement of Learning: And againe what defects and vnder-values I finde in such particular acts: to the end, that though I cannot positively or affirmatiuely advise your Maiesty, or propound vnto you framed particulars; yet I may excite your Princely Cogitations, to visit the excellent treasure of your owne minde, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose, agreeable to your Magnanimity and wisdome.

**I**N the entrance to the former of these; to cleere the way, and as it were to make silence, to haue the true Testimonies concerning the dignity of Learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacite Obiections: I thinke good to deliver it from  
the



6      *Of the advancement of Learning.*

the discredit and disgraces which it hath receiued; all from ignorance; but Ignorance severally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeale and iealousie of Divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of Politiques, and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of Learned men themselves.

I heare the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution, that th'aspiring to over-much knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, wherevpon ensued the fall of Man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the Serpent, and therefore where it entred into a man, it makes him swell. *Scientia inflat*. That *Salomon* giues a Censure, *That there is no end of making Bookes, and that much reading is wearines of the flesh*. And againe in another place, *That in spacious knowledge, there is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge, encreaseth anxiety*: That *S. Paul* giues a Caveat, *that wee bee not spoiled through vaine Philosophy*: that experience demonstrates, how learned men, haue beene Arch-heretiques, how learned times haue beene enclined to Atheisme, and how the contemplation of second Causes doth derogate from our dependance vpon God, who is the first cause.

To discouer then the ignorance and errour of this opinion, and the mis-vnderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appeare these men doe not obserue or consider, that it was not the pure knowledge of Nature & Vniversality, a knowledge by the light  
whereof



whereof man did giue names vnto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according vnto their proprieties, which gaue the occasion to the fall; but it was the proud knowledge of good & euill, with an intent in man to giue law vnto himselfe, and to depend no more vpon Gods Commandements, which was the forme of the temptation; neither is it any quantity of knowledg how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much lesse extend the soule of man, but God, and the contemplation of God; & therefore *Salomon* speaking of the two principall senses of Inquisition, the eye, and the eare, affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the eare with hearing; & if there be no fulnesse, then is the Continent greater, then the Content: so of knowledge it selfe, and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but Reporters, hee defineth likewise in these wordes, placed after that *Kalender* or *Ephemerides*, which hee maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth thus: *GOD hath made all things beautifull or decent in the true returne of their seasons: Also hee hath placed the world in Mans heart, yet cannot Man finde out the worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end:* Declaring not obscurely, that God hath framed the minde of man as a mirrour, or glasse, capable of the Image of the vniversall world, and joyfull to receiue the impression thereof, as the

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Eye



Eye joyeth to receiue light, and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also to finde out and discerne the ordinances and decrees, which throughout all those Changes are infallibly observed. And although hee doth insinuate that the supream or summary law of Nature, which hee calleth, *The worke which GOD worketh from the beginning to the end, is not possible to bee found out by Man*; yet that doth not derogate from the capacitie of the minde; but may bee referred to the impediments as of shortnesse of life, ill coniunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other Inconueniences, wherevnto the condition of Man is subiect. For that nothing parcell of the world, is denied to Mans enquiry and invention: hee doth in another place rule over; when he saith, *The Spirit of Man is as the Lampe of God, wherewith he searcheth the inwardnesse of all secrets*. If then such be the capacitie and receit of the minde of Man, it is manifest, that there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge how large soever; least it should make it swell or out-compasse it selfe; no, but it is meerely the quality of knowledge, which bee it in quantity more or lesse, if it bee taken without the true correctiue thereof, hath in it some Nature of venome or malignity, and some effects of that venome, which is ventositie or



*The first Booke.*

9

or swelling. This correctiue spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledg so Soueraigne, is Charity, which the Apostle immediatly addeth to the former Clause, for so he saith, *Knowledge bloweth vp, but Charity buildeth vp*; not vnlike vnto that which he deliuereth in another place: *If I speake (saith he) with the tongues of Men and Angels, and had not Charity, it were but as a Tinkling Cymball*; Not but that it is an excellent thing to speake with the Tongues of Men and Angels, but because if it bee seuered from Charity, and not referred to the good of Men and Man-kinde, it hath rather a sounding and Vnworthy glory, then a meriting and substantiall Vertue. And as for that Censure of *Salomon*, concerning the excesse of Writing and Reading Bookes, and the anxiety of Spirit which redoundeth from Knowledge, and that Admonition of *Saint Paul*, *that wee bee not seduced by vaine Philosophy*; Let those places bee rightly vaderstood, and they doe indeed very excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby humane knowledge is confined and circumscribed: And yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the Vniuersall nature of things: For these limitations are three: The first, *That wee doe not so place our felicity in knowledge, as wee forget our mortality*. The second, *That wee make application of our Knowledge to giue our selues repose & contentment, & not distast or repining.*



pining. The third, that we doe not presume by the  
 contēplation of nature, to attaine to the Misteries  
 of God; for as touching the first of these, *Salomon*  
 doth excellently expound himselfe in another  
 place of the same booke, where he saith; *I saw*  
*well that knowledge recedeth as farre from igno-*  
*rance, as light doth from darknesse, and that the wise*  
*mans eyes keepewatch in his head, whereas the foole*  
*roundeth about in darknesse: But withall I learned*  
*that the same mortality involueth them both.* And  
 for the second certaine it is, there is no vexation or  
 anxiety of mind, which resulteth from knowledge  
 otherwise then meerely by accident; for all know-  
 ledge and wonder (which is the seede of know-  
 ledge) is an impression of pleasure in it selfe; but  
 when men fall to framing conclusions out of their  
 Knowledge, applying it to their particular, and  
 ministring vnto themselues thereby weake feares,  
 or vast desires, there groweth that carefulnesse  
 and trouble of mind, which is spoken of: for then  
 Knowledge is no more *Lumen siccum*, whereof  
*Heraclitus* the profound said, *Lumen siccum opti-*  
*ma anima*, but it becometh *Lumen madidum* or *ma-*  
*ceratum*, being steeped & infused in the humors of  
 the affections. And as for the third poynt, it deser-  
 ueth to be a little stood vpon, and not to be lightly  
 passed over: for if any man shall thinke by view &  
 inquiry into these sensible and materiall things to  
 attaine that light, whereby hee may reveale vnto  
 himselfe the nature or will of God: then indeed is  
 he



he spoiled by vaine Philosophy: For the contēplation of Gods Creatures & workes produce (ha-  
 uing regard to the workes & creatures thēselues)  
 knowledge, but hauing regard to God, no perfect  
 knowledg but wonder, which is broken knowledg:  
 And therefore it was most aptly said by one of  
 Platoes Schoole, *that the sense of man carrieth a re-  
 semblance of the Sun, which (as we see) openeth & re-  
 uealeth all the terrestriall Globe; but then againe it  
 obscureth & concealeth the stars & celestiaall Globe:  
 So doth the sense discover naturall things, but it  
 darkneth & shutteth vp Divine.* And hence it is  
 true, that it hath proceeded, that diuers great Lear-  
 ned men haue beene Hereticall, whil'st they haue  
 sought to fly vp to the secrets of the Deity, by the  
 waxen winges of the senses: And as for the  
 conceite that too much knowledge should in-  
 cline a man to Atheisme, and that the ignorance  
 of second causes should make a more devout  
 dependance vpon God, which is the first cause:  
 First, it is good to aske the question, which *Iob*  
 asked of his friends: *Will you lye for God, as one  
 man will doe for another, to gratifie him?* for certain  
 it is, that God worketh nothing in Nature, but by  
 second causes, & if they would haue it otherwise  
 beleeeved, it is meere imposture, as it were in fauour  
 towards God, and nothing else, but to offer to the  
 Author of Truth, the vncleane sacrifice of a lye.  
 But farther, it is an assured Truth, and a Con-  
 clusion of Experience, that a little or superficiall



knowledge of Philosophy may incline the minde of man to Atheisme, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind backe againe to Religion: For in the entrance of Philosophy; when the second Causes, which are next vnto the senses, doe offer themselves to the minde of Man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some obliuion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependance of causes, and the workes of Providence; then according to the Allegory of the Poets, hee will easily belecue that the highest Linke of Natures Chayne must needs be tyed to the foot of *Iupiters* Chayre. To Conclude therefore, let no man vpon a weake conceite of Sobriety, or an ill applied moderation thinke or maintaine, that a man can search too farre, or bee too well studied in the Booke of Gods Word, or in the Booke of Gods Workes; Divinity or Philosophy; but rather let Men endeavour an endlesse Progresse, or proficiencie in both: only let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling; to vse, and not to ostentation; and againe, that they doe not vnwisely mingle, or confound these learnings together.

And as for the disgraces which learning receiueth from Politiques, they be of this Nature; that Learning doth soften mens mindes, & makes them more vnapt for the honour & exercise of Armes; that it doth marre & pervert Mens dispositions for  
matter



matter of government and policie; in making them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading; or too peremptory or positive by strictnesse of rules and axiomes; or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatnesse of examples; or too incompatible and differing from the times, by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert mens trauels from action and businesse, & bringeth them to a loue of leasure and privatenesse; and that it doth bring into States a relaxation of discipline, whilest every Man is more ready to argue, then to obey and execute. Out of this conceit, *Cato* surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeede that ever lived, when *Carnades* the Philosopher came in Embassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flocke about him being allured with the sweetnesse and Maiesty of his eloquence and learning, gaue counsell in open Senate, that they should giue him his dispatch with all speed, least hee should infect and inchant the mindes and affections of the youth, & at vnawares bring in an alteration of the manners and Customes of the State. Out of the same conceit or humour did *Virgill*, turning his penne to the advantage of his Country, and the disadvantage of his owne profession, make a kind of separation betweene policie and gouernement, & betweene Arts & Sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to the Romanes, and leauing



leaving & yeelding the other to the Grecians, *Tu regere imperio populos Romane memeto, hæ tibi erunt artes, &c.* so likewise we see that *Anytus* the accuser of *Socrates* laid it as an Article of charge & accusation against him, that he did with the variety & power of his discourses and disputations withdraw young men from due reverence to the Lawes & Customes of their Country: & that he did professe a dangerous & pernicious science, which was to make the worse matter seeme the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech.

But these and the like imputations haue rather a countenance of gravity, then any ground of Iustice: for experience doth warrant, that both in persons & in times, there hath bin a meeting, and concurrence in learning and armes, flourishing & excelling in the same men, and the same ages. For as for men, there cannot be a better nor the like instance, as of that paire, *Alexander* the Great, and *Iulius Caesar* the Dictator, whereof the one was *Aristotles* Scholler in Philosophy, & the other was *Ciceroes* Rivall in eloquence; or if any man had rather call for schollers, that were great generals, then generals that were great Schollers; let him take *Epaminondas* the Thebane, or *Xenophon* the Athenian, whereof the one was the first that abated the power of *Sparta*; & the other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the Monarchie of *Persia*: And this concurrence is yet more visible in times then in persons, by how much an age is greater ob-  
iect



ject then a Man. For both in *Ægypt, Assyria, Persia, Grecia, & Rome* the same times that are most renowned for Armes, are likewise most admired for Learning; so that the greatest Authors & Philosophers, and the greatest Captaines & Gouvernours haue liued in the same ages: neither can it otherwise be; for as in Man, the ripenesse of strength of the body and minde commeth much about an age, saue that the strength of the body commeth somewhat the more early; So in States, Armes and Learning, whereof the one correspondeth to the body, the other to the soule of Man, haue a concurrence or neere sequence in times.

And for matter of Policy & Government, that Learning should rather hurt, then inable therevnto, is a thing very improbable: we see it is accounted an errour, to commit a naturall body to Emperique Physitions, which cōmonly haue a few pleasing receits, wherevpon they are confident and adventurous, but know neither the causes of diseales, nor the complexions of Patients, nor perill of accidents, nor the true method of Cures; We see it is a like error to rely vpon Advocates or Lawyers, which are only men of practise, and not grounded in their bookes, who are many times easily surprised, when matter falleth out besides their experience, to the preiudice of the causes they hādle: so by like reason it cānot be but a matter of doubtfull consequence, if States be managed by Empe-  
C
rique



rique Statesmen, not well mingled with mē grounded in Learning. But contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory, that ever any government was disastrous, that was in the hands of Learned Governours. For howsoever it hath bin ordinary with politique men to extenuate and disable Learned men by the names of *Pedants*: yet in the Records of time it appeareth in many particulars, that the Governments of Princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kinde of State) haue neverthelesse excelled the government of Princes of mature age, even for that reason, which they seeke to traduce, which is, that by that occasion the State hath bin in the hands of *Pedants*: for so was the State of *Rome* for the first five years, which are so much magnified, during the minority of *Nero*, in the hands of *Seneca a Pedanti*: So it was again for ten years space or more, during the minority of *Gordianus* the younger, with great applause and contention in the hands of *Mistheus a Pedanti*: so was it before that, in the minority of *Alexander Severus* in like happinesse, in hands not much vnlike, by reason of the rule of the women, who were aided by the Teachers and Preceptors. Nay, let a man looke into the government of the Bishops of *Rome*, as by name, into the government of *Pius Quintus*, and *Sextus Quintus* in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but as Pedanticall Friers, & he shall find that such Popes doe greater things, and proceed vpon truer principles



principles of Estate, then those which haue ascended to the Papacy from an education and breeding in affaires of Estate, and Courts of Princes; for although men bread in Learning, are perhaps to seek in points of convenience, and accommodating for the present which the Italians call *Ragioni di stato*, whereof the same *Pius Quintus* could not heare spoken with patience, tearing them inventions against Religion and the morall Vertues; yet on the other side to recompence that, they are perfect in those same plaine grounds of Religion, Iustice, Honour, and Morall vertue; which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will bee seldome vse of those other, no more then of Physicke in a sound or well dyeted body; neither can the experience of one mans life, furnish examples and presidents for the events of one mans life. For as it happeneth sometimes, that the Grand-child, or other descendent, resembleth the Ancestor more then the Son: So many times occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples, then with those of the latter, or immediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no more countervaille Learning, then one mans meanes can hold way with a common purse.

And as for those particular seducements, or indispositions of the minde for policy and government, which Learning is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withall, that Learning ministreth in every



of them greater strength of Medicine or Remedy then it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity: For if by a secret operation, it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by plaine precept it teacheth them when, and vpon what ground to resolve: Yea, and how to carry things in suspence without preiudice, till they resolve: If it make men positieue and regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature demonstratiue, & what are coniecturall; and aswell the vse of distinctions, and exceptions, as the latitude of principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion, or dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the force of Circumstances, the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of application: so that in all these it doth rectifie more effectually, then it can pervert. And these medicines it conueieth into mens mindes much more forceably by the quicknes & penetration of Examples: For let a man looke into the errors of *Clement* the sequent, so liuely described by *Guicciardine*, who served vnder him, or into the errors of *Cicero* painted out by his own penfill in his Epistles to *Atticus*, & he will fly a pace from being irresolute. let him look into the errors of *Phocion*, & he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of *Ixion*, & it will hold him from being vaporous or imaginatiue; let him looke into the errors of *Cato* the second, & he will never be one of the *Antipodes*, to tread opposite to the present world.

And for the conceite that learning should dispose



pose men to leasure and privatenesse, and make Men slothfull: it were a strange thing if that which accustometh the minde to a perpetuall motion and agitation, should induce slothfulnesse, whereas contrariwise it may bee truly affirmed, that no kinde of men loue businesse for it selfe, but those that are learned; for other persons loue it for profite, as an hireling that loues the worke for the wages; or for honour; as because it beareth them vp in the eyes of men, & refresheth their reputations, which otherwise would weare; or because it putteth them in minde of their fortune, & giueth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some faculty, wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good humor, and pleasing conceits toward themselves; or because it advanceth any other their ends. So that as it is said of vntrue valours, that some mens valours are in the eyes of them that looke on; so such mens industries are in the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their own designements, only learned men loue businesse, as an action according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind, as exercise is to health of body, taking pleasure in the action it selfe, & not in the purchase: So that of all men, they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any businesse that can hold or detaine their mind.

And if any man be laborious in reading & study, & yet idle in businesse & action, it groweth frō some weaknes of body, or softnes of spirit; such as *Seneca*



speaketh of: *Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse, quicquid in luce est;* & not of learning; well may it be, that such a point of a mans nature may make him giue himself to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his nature.

And that learning should take vp too much time or leasure: I answer, the most actiue or busy man that hath beene or can be, hath (no question) many vacant times of leasure, while he expecteth the tides and returnes of businesse (except he be either tedious and of no dispatch, or lightly and vnworthily ambitious, to meddle in things that may be better done by others) and then the question is, but how those spaces and times of leasure shall be filled and spent: Whether in pleasures, or in studies; as was well answered by *Demosthenes* to his adversary *Æschynes*, that was a man giuen to pleasure, and told him, *That his Orations did smell of the Lampe:* Indeed (said *Demosthenes*) *there is a great difference betweene the things that you & I doe by Lampe-light:* So as no man neede doubt, that Learning will expulse businesse, but rather it will keepe and defend the possession of the mind against idlenesse & pleasure, which other-wise, at vnawares, may enter to the preiudice of both.

Again, for that other conceit, that learning should vndermine the reverence of Lawes and Government, it is assuredly a meere depravation and calumny without all shadow of truth: for to say that a blind custome of obedience should be a surer obligation



ligation, then duty taught and vnderstood; it is to affirme that a blind mā may tread surer by a guid, then a seeing man can by a light: and it is without allcontroversie, that learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, maniable, and pliant to government, whereas Ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, & mutinous; and the evidence of time doth cleare this assertion, considering that the most barbarous, rude, and vnlearned times haue beene most subiect to tumults, seditions, and changes.

And as to the judgement of *Cato* the Censor, he was well punished for his blasphemy against Learning in the same kinde wherein hee offended; for when he was past threescore yeeres old, he was taken with an extreame desire to goe to Schoole againe, and to learne the Greeke tongue, to the end to peruse the Greeke Authors; which doth well demonstrate, that his former censure of the Grecian Learning, was rather an affected gravity, then according to the inward sense of his owne opinion. And as for *Virgils* verses, though it pleased him to braue the world in taking to the Romans the art of Empire, and leauing to others the arts of subiects: yet so much is manifest, that the Romans never ascended to that height of Empire, till the time they had ascended to the height of other Arts: For in the time of the two first *Cæsars*, which had the Art of government in greatest perfection, there liued the best Poet *Virgilius Maro*, the best Historiographer *Titus Liuius*, the best Antiquary *Marcus Varro*, and  
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the best or second Orator *Marcus Cicero*, that to the memory of man are knowne. As for the accusation of *Socrates*, the time must be remembred, when it was prosecuted; which was vnder the thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons, that haue gouerned; which revolution of state was no sooner over, but *Socrates*, whom they had made a person criminall, was made a person heroicall, & his memory accumulate with honours diuine & humane; and those discourses of his which were then tearmed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for soueraigne Medicines of the minde and manners, and so haue beene receiued ever since till this day. Let this therefore serue for answere to Politiques, which in their humerous severity, or in their fained gravity haue presumed to throw imputations vpon Learning, which redargution neuerthelesse (saue that we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not needfull for the present, in regard of the loue & reverence towards Learning, which the example & countenance of two so learned Princes, *Queene Elizabeth*, and your Maiesty; being as *Castor* and *Pollux*, *Lucida Sydera*, Starres of excellent light, and most benigne influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our Nation.

Now therefore, we come to that third sort of discredite, or diminution of credit, that groweth vnto Learning from learned men themselues, which commonly cleaueth fastest; It is either from their  
fortune,



Fortune, or frō their manners, or from the nature of their studies: for the first, it is not in their power; & the second is accidentall; the third only is proper to be handled, but because we are not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation & conceit, it is not amisse to speake somewhat of the two former. The derogations therefore, which grow to learning from the fortune or condition of learned mē, are eyther in respect of scarcity of meanes, or in respect of privatenesse of life, and meannesse of employments.

Concerning want, and that it is the case of Learned men, vsually to beginne with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre, and encrease; It were good to leaue the common place in Commendation of poverty to some Fryer to handle, to whom much was attributed by *Machiavell* in this poynt, when he said, *That the Kingdome of the Clergy had beene long before at an end, if the reputation & reverence towards the poverty of Friars had not borne out the scandall of the superfluties and exceses of Bishops and Prelates.* So a man might say, that the felicity and delicacy of Princes and great Persons, had long since turned to rudenesse & Barbarisme, if the poverty of learning had not kept vp Civility and Honor of life; But without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation, what a reverent and honoured thing poverty of fortune was, for some ages in the *Romane State*, which neverthelesse was a State without Paradoxes. For we see what *Titus Li-*



*vius* saith in his introduction. *Ceterum aut me amor negotij suscepti fallit, aut nulla unquā respublica, nec maior, nec sanctior, nec bonus exemplis ditior fuit; nec inquā tam serā avaritia luxuriāq; immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimonie honos fuerit.* We see likewise after that the state of Rome was not it selfe, but did degenerate; how that person that tooke vpon him to be counsellor to *Iulius Caesar*, after his victory, where to begin his restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most summary to take away the estimation of Wealth. *Verum hac & omnia mala pariter cum honore pecunie desinent: Si neque Magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda venalia erunt.* To conclude this point, as it was truly said, that *Rubor est virtutis color*, though sometime it come from vice: So it may be fitly said, that *Paupertas est virtutis fortuna*. Though sometimes it may proceede from mis-governement and accident. Surely *Salomon* hath pronounced it both in censure, *Qui festinat ad divitias, non erit insons;* & in precept: *Buy the truth, and sell it not: And so of wisdom and knowledge;* Iudging that meanes were to be spent vpon learning, & not learning to be applyed to meanes: And as for the privatenesse or obscurenesse (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men: It is a Theame so common, to extoll a private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloath in comparison, and to the disadvantage of a civill life, for safety, liberty, pleasure and dignity, or at least freedome from indignity;



y; as no man handleth it, but handleth it well: such a consonancy it hath to mens conceits in the expressing, and to mens consents in the allowing: this onely I will adde, that Learned Men forgotten in States, and not liuing in the eyes of men, are like the Images of *Cassius* & *Brutus* in the funerall of *Iunia*; of which not being represented, as many others were, *Tacitus* saith, *Eo ipso prafulgebant, quod non visebantur.*

And for meannesse of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt, is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them, which age; because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant, & which are conversant about youth. But how vniust this traducement is, (if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of reason) may appeare in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new Vessell, then into a vessell seasoned; and what mould they lay about a young plant, then about a Plant corroborate; so as the weakest Termes and Times of all things vse to haue the best applications and helps. And will you harken to the Hebrew *Rabines*? *Your young men shall see Visions, & your old men shall dreame dreames*, say the youth is the worthier age, for that Visions are neerer apparitions of God then dreames? And let it be noted that howsoever the conditions of life of *Pedants* haue beene scorned vpon Theators, as the Ape of Tyranny;

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and



and that the moderne loosenesse or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of Schoole-masters, & Tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did alwaies make a just complaint; that States were too busy with their Lawes, & too negligent in point of education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath beene in some sort reviued of late times, by the Colledges of the Iesuites: of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say, *Quo meliores, eo deteriores*, yet in regard of this, and some other points, concerning humane Learning, and Morall matters, I may say as *Agessilaus* said to his enemy *Farnabazus*, *Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses*. And thus much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of Learned men.

As touching the Manners of learned men, it is a thing personall & individuall, and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, of all temperatures; but yet so as it is not without truth, which is said, that *Abeunt studio in mores*, Studies haue an influence and operation, vpon the manners of those that are conversant in them.

But vpon an attentiu, and indifferent review; I for my part, cannot finde any disgrace to Learning, can proceed from the manners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault, (which was the supposed fault of *Demosthenes*, *Cicero*, *Cato* the second, *Seneca*, and many moe) that because the times they read of, are commonly better then the times they liue in; and the duties taught,  
better



better then the duties practised: they contend sometimes too farre, to bring things to perfection; and to reduce the corruption of manners, to honesty of precepts, or examples of too great height; And yet hereof they haue Caveats enough in their owne walkes: For *Solon*, when he was asked whether hee had giue his Citizens the best lawes, answered wisely, *Yea of such, as they would receiue*: and *Plato* finding that his own heart, could not agree with the corrupt manners of his Country, refused to beare place or office, saying. *That a mans Country was to bee used as his Parents were, that is, with humble perswasions, and not with contestations*. And *Cæsars* counsellor put in the same caveat, *non ad vetera instituta revocans, quam pridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt*; & *Cicero* noteth this error directly in *Cato* the second, whē he writes to his friend *Atticus*; *Cato optime sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicæ; loquitur enim tanquam in reipub. Platonis, non tanquam in sæce Romuli*; and the same *Cicero* doth excuse and expound the Philosophers for going too far, and being too exact in their precepts, when he saith; *Isti ipsi praeceptores virtutis & Magistri, videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimū animo contendissemus, ibi tamen ubi oportet, consisteremus*: and yet himselfe might haue said: *Monitis sum minor ipse meis*, for it was his owne fault, though not in so extreame a degree.

Another fault likewise much of this kinde, hath beene incident to learned men; which is that they



haue esteemed the preservation, good, & honour of their Countries or Masters before their owne fortunes or safeties. For so saith *Demosthenes* vnto the Athenians; *If it please you to note it, my counsells vnto you, are not such, whereby I should grow great amongst you, & you become little amongst the Greciās: but they be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to giue, but are alwaies good for you to follow.* And so *Seneca* after he had consecrated that *Quinquennium Neronis* to the eternall glory of learned governors, held on his honest & loyall course of good & free Counsell, after his Master grew extreemly corrupt in his goverment; neither cā this point otherwise be for learning indued mens mindes with a true sense of the frailty of their persons, the casuality of their fortunes, & the dignity of their soule & vocation; so that it is impossible for them to esteeme that any greatnes of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being & ordainment, & therefore are desirous to giue their account to God, & so likewise to their Masters vnder God (as Kings and the States that they serue) in these words; *Ecce tibi lucre feci*, and not *Ecce mihi lucre feci*: whereas the corrupter sort of meere politiques, that haue not their thoughts establiished by learning in the loue & apprehension of duty, nor never looke abroad into vniuersality, doe referre all things to themselues, and thrust themselues into the center of the world, as if all lines should meet in them & their fortunes; never caring in all tempests, what becomes of the ship of Estates,



Estates, so they may saue themselves in the Cock-boat of their owne fortune, whereas men that fee the weight of duty, & know the limits of selfe-loue, vse to make good their places and duties, though with perill. And if they stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence which many times both aduerse parts doe giue to honesty, then any versatile advantage of their own carriage. But for this point of tender sense, and fast obligation of duty, which Learning doth indue the minde withall, howsoever Fortune may taxe it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receiue an open allowance, and therefore needs the lesse disprooffe or excusation.

Another fault incident commonly to Learned men, which may be more probably defended, the truly denyed, is; that they faile sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact application ariseth from two causes: The one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine it selfe to dwell in the exquisite obseruation or examination of the Nature and customes of one person: For it is a speech for a Louer, and for a wise man: *Satis magnū alter alteri theatrum sumus*: Nevertheless I shall yeeld, that he that cannot contract the sight of his mind, as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but a rejection vpon choice and judgement. For the honest & just bounds of obseruation, by one person vpon another,



ther, extend no farther, but to vnderstand him sufficiently, whereby not to giue him offence, or whereby to be able to giue him faithfull counsell, or whereby to stand vpon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a mans selfe: But to be speculative into another man, to the end to know how to worke him, or winde him, or governe him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entyre and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of Integrity, so towards Princes or Superiors, is want of duty. For the custome of the Leuant, which is, that subiects doe forbear to gaze or fixe their eyes vpon Princes, is in the outward Ceremony barbarous; but the Morall is good: For men ought not by cunning and bent observations, to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of Kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.

There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted in learned Men, that they doe many times faile to obserue decency, and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small & ordinary points of action, so as the Vulgar sort of Capacities, doe make a Iudgement of them in greater matters, by that which they finde wanting in them, in smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceiue men, for which, I doe referre them over to that which was said by *Themistocles* arrogantly, & vncivily, being applyed to himselfe out of his owne mouth, but being applyed to the generall state of this question pertinent-  
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ly and justly; when being invited to touch a Lute, he said: *he could not fiddle, but he could make a small Towne, a great state.* So no doubt many may be well seene in the passages of Governement and Pollicy, which are to seeke in little, and punctuall occasions: I referre them also to that, which *Plato* said of his Master *Socrates*, whom he compared to the Gally-pots of Apothecaries, which on the out-side had Apes and Owles, and Antiques, but contained within soueraigne and precious liquors, and confections: acknowledging that to an externall report, he was not without superficialleuities, & deformities; but was inwardly replenished with excellent vertues & powers. And so much touching the point of manners of learned men.

But in the meane time, I haue no purpose to giue allowance to some conditions and courtes base, and vnworthy, wherein diuers professors of Learning, haue wronged themselues, and gone too farre; such as were those Trencher Philosophers, which in the latter age of the Roman State, were vsually in the houses of great persons, being little better then solemne Parasites; of which kinde, *Lucian* maketh a merry description of the Philosopher, that the great Lady tooke to ride with her in her coach, and would needs haue him carry her little Dog, which he doing officiously, and yet vncomely, the Page scoffed and said: *That he doubted, the Philosopher of a Stoike, would turne to be a Cynike.* But aboue all the rest, the grosse and palpable flattery, wherevnto

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many (not vnlearned) haue abased and abused their wits and pens, turning (as *Dubartus* saith) *Hecuba* into *Helena*, and *Faustina* into *Lucretia*, hath most diminished the price and estimation of Learning. Neither is the Morall dedications of Bookes and Writings, as to Patrons to be commended: for that Bookes (such as are worthy the name of Bookes) ought to haue no Patrons, but Truth and Reason: And the ancient custome was, to dedicate them on-ly to private and equall friends, or to intitle the Bookes with their Names, or if to Kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the Booke was fit and proper for; but these and the like Courses may deserue rather reprehension, then defence.

Not that I can taxe or condemne the morigeration or applycation of Learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that *Diogenes* made to one that asked him in mockery, *How it came to passe that Philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of Philosophers?* Hee answered soberly & yet sharply; *Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not;* And the like nature was the answer which *Aristippus* made when hauing a petition to *Dionysius*, and no eare giuen to him, he fell downe at his feete, wherevpon *Dionysius* staied, and gaue him the hearing, and granted it, and afterward some person tender on the behalfe of Philosophy, reprooued *Aristippus*, that hee would offer the profession of Philosophy such an indignity,



ty, as for a private Suit to fall at a Tyrants feet: But he answered; *It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that he had his eares in his feet.* Neither was it accounted weaknesse, but discretion in him that would not dispute his best with *Adrianus Caesar*; excusing himselfe, *that it was reason to yeeld to him, that commanded thirty Legions.* These and the like applications & stooping to points of necessity and convenience cannot be disallowed: for although they may haue some outward basenesse; yet in a Iudgement truly made, they are to be accounted submissions to the occasion, and not to the person.

Now I proceed to those errors and vanities, which haue interveyned amongst the studies themselves of the Learned; which is that which is principall and proper to the present argument, wherein my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation of the errors, to make a iustification of that which is good & sound; and to deliver that from the aspersions of the other: For we see, that it is the manner of men, to scandalize and depraue that which retaineth the State, and vertue, by taking advantage vpon that which is corrupt and degenerate; as the Heathens in the Primitive Church vsed to blemish and taint the Christians, with the faults and corruptions of Heretiques: But neverthelesse, I haue no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of the errors and impediments in matters of Learning, which are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion; but



only to speake vnto such as doe fall vnder, or neere vnto, a popular observation.

There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby Learning hath beene most traduced: For those things wee doe esteeme vaine, which are either false or frivolous, those which either haue no truth, or no vse: & those persons we esteem vain, which are either credulous or curious, & curiosity is either in matter or words; so that in reason, as well as in experience there fall out to be these 3 distēpers (as I may term them) of learning; the first fantastical learning: the second contentious learning, & the last delicate learning, vaine imaginations, vaine Altercations, and vaine affectations; & with the last I will begin, *Martin Luther* conducted no doubt) by an higher providence, but in discourse of reason, finding what a Province he had vndertaken against the Bishop of *Rome*, and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his owne solitude being no waies aided by the opinions of his owne time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his succours, to make a party against the present time: so that the ancient Authors, both in Divinity and in Humanity, which hath long time slept in Libraries, began generally to be read and revolued. This by consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travaile in the language originall, wherein those authors did write: For the better vnderstanding of those Authors, and the better advantage of pressing and applying their words: And thereof grew againe



again, a delight in their manner of stile and phrase, and an admiration of that kinde of writing; which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition, that the propounders of those (primitive, but seeming new opinions) had against the Schoole-men: who were generally of the contrary part: and whose writings were altogether in a differing Stile and Forme, taking liberty to coyne, & frame new termes of Art, to expresse their owne sense, and to avoid circuity of speech, without regard to the purenesse, pleasantnesse, and (as I may call it) lawfulnessse of the Phrase, or Word: And againe, because the great labour then was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say: *Execrabilis ista turba quæ non novit legē*) for the winning and perswading of them, they grew of necessity in chiefe price, and request, eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest accessse into the capacity of the vulgar sort: so that these foure causes concurring, the admiration of ancient Authors, the hate of Schoole men, the exact study of Languages: and the efficacy of Preaching did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence, and copy of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excesse: for men began to hunt more after wordes, then matter, and more after the choysenesse of the Phrase, and the round and cleane composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the claules, and the varying and illustration of their workes with tropes and figures:



then after the weight of matter, worth of subiect, soundnesse of argument, life of invention, or depth of Iudgement. Then grew the flowing, and watry vaine of *Oforius* the Portugall Bishop, to bee in price: Then did *Sturmius* spend such infinite, and curious paines vpon *Cicero* the Orator, and *Hermogenes* the Rhetorician, besides his owne Bookes of Periods, and imitation, and the like: Then did *Car* of *Cambridge*, and *Ascham* with their Lectures and Writings, almost deifie *Cicero* and *Demosthenes*, and allure all young men that were studious vnto that delicate and polished kind of Learning: Then did *Erasmus* take occasion to make the scoffing Eccho: *Decem annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone*: and the Eccho answered in Greeke, *Ὁρα, Ἀσινε*. Then grew the Learning of the Schoole-men to be vtterly despised as barbarous. In summe, the whole inclination and bent of those times, was rather towards copy, then weight.

Here therefore the first distemper of Learning, when men study words, and not matter: Whereof though I haue represented an example of late times: yet it hath beene, & will bee *Secundum maius & minus* in all time. And how it is possible, but this should haue an operation to discredit Learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned mens workes like the first letter of a Patent, or limmed Booke: which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter. It seemes to me that *Pigmaleons* frenzy is a good embleme or portraiture of this vanity: for



for wordes are but the images of matter, and except they haue life of reason and invention: to fall in loue with them, is all one, as to fall in loue with a picture.

But yet notwithstanding, it is a thing not hastily to bee condemned, to cloath and adorne the obscurity, euen of Philosophy it selfe, with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof wee haue great examples in *Xenophon*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, *Plutarch*, and of *Plato* also in some degree, and hereof likewise there is great vse: For surely, to the severe inquisition of truth, and the deepe progresse into Philosophy, it is some hindrance; because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of farther search, before wee come to a iust period. But then if a man be to haue any vse of such knowledge in ciuill occasions, of conference, counsell, perswasion, discourse, or the like: Then shall he finde it prepared to his hands in those Authors, which write in that manner. But the excesse of this is so iustly contemptible, that as *Hercules*, when hee saw the Image of *Adonis*, *Venus* *Migmon* in a Temple, said in disdaine, *Nil sacri es*. So there is none of *Hercules* followers in learning, that is, the more severe, and laborious sort of Enquirers into truth, but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as indeede capable of no diuinenesse. And thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning.

The second which followeth is in nature worse then the former: For as substance of matter is better



better then beauty of wordes: so contrary-wise vain matter is worse, then vaine words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of Saint *Paul*, was not onely proper for those times, but propheticall for the times following, and not only respectiue to Divinity, but extensiuē to all knowledge. *Devita prophanas vocum novitates & oppositiones falsi nominis scientia.* For he assigneth two Markes and Badges of suspected and falsified science: The one, the novelty and strangenesse of tearmes; the other, the strictnesse of positions which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely like as many substances in nature which are solid, doe putrifie and corrupt into wormes: So it is the property of good and sound knowledge, to putrifie and dissolue into a number of subtle, idle, vnwhollsome, and (as I may tearme them) Vermiculate questions; which haue indeed a kinde of quicknesse, and life of spirite, but no soundnesse of matter, or goodnesse of quality. This kinde of degenerate Learning did chiefly raigne amongst the Schoole-men, who hauing sharpe and strong Wits, and aboundance of leasure, and small variety of reading; but their wits being shut vp in the Cels of a few Authors (chiefly *Aristotle* their Dictator) as their persons were shut vp in the Cels of Monasteries and Colledges and knowing little History, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of Wit, spin out vnto vs those laborious webs of Learning, which are extant in their

Bookes



Bookes. For the wit & mind of man, if it worke vpon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuffe, and is limited thereby; but if it worke vpon it selfe, as the Spider worketh his webbe, then it is endlesse and brings forth indeed Cobwebs of learning, admirable for the finenesse of thread & worke, but of no substance or profit.

This same vnprofitable subtilty or curiosity is of two sorts: either in the subiect it selfe that they handle, when it is a fruitlesse speculation or controverſie, (whereof there are no small number both in Divinity and Philosophy) or in the manner or method of handling of a knowledge; which amongst them was this; vpon every particular positiō or assertion to frame obiections, & to those obiections, solutions: which solutions were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions: whereas indeed the strength of all sciences, is as the strength of the old mans faggot in the bond. For the harmony of a science supporting each part the other, is and ought to be the true and briefe confutation and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections: but on the other side, if you take out every Axiome, as the sticks of the faggot one by one, you may quarrell with them, and bend them and breake them at your pleasure: so that as was said of *Seneca*: *Verborum minutijs rerum frangit pondera*. So a man may truly say of the Schoole-men, *Questionum minutijs Scientiarum frangunt soliditatem*. For were it not better

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for a man in a faire roome, to set vp one great light, or braunching candlesticke of lights, then to goe about with a small watch-candle into every corner: and such is their method, that rests not so much vpon euidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, as vpon particular confutations and solutions of euery scruple, cauillation and obiection: breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solueth another; even as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you darken the rest: so that the Fable and fiction of *Scylla* seemeth to be a liuely Image of this kind of Philosophy or knowledge, which was transformed into a comely Virgin for the vpper parts; but then, *Candida succinctam, latrantibus inguina monstribus*: So the generalities of the Schoolemen are for a while good and proportionable; but then when you descend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitfull wombe, for the vse and benefit of mans life; they end in monstrous altercations and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge must fall vnder popular contempt, the people being apt to contemne truth vpon occasion of Controversies and altercations, and to thinke they are all out of their way which never meete, and when they see such digladiations about subtilties, & matter of no vse nor moment, they easily fall vpon that judgement of *Dionysius* of *Syracusa*, *Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum*.

Notwithstanding certaine it is, that if those  
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Schoole-men to their great thirst of Truth, and un-  
wearied travaile of wit, had joyned variety and uni-  
versality of Reading and Contemplation, they had  
proued excellent Lights, to the great advance-  
ment of all learning and knowledge; but as they are,  
they are great vndertakers indeed, and fierce with  
darke keeping. But as in the inquiry of the diuine  
Truth, their pride enclined to leaue the Oracle of  
Gods word, and to vanish in the mixture of their  
owne inventions: So in the inquisition of Nature,  
they ever left the Oracle of Gods workes, and ado-  
red the deceiuing and deformed Images, which the  
vnequall mirrour of their owne mindes, or a few  
receiued Authors or principles, did represent vnto  
them. And thus much for the second disease of  
Learning.

For the third vice or disease of Learning, which  
concerneth deceit or vntruth, it is of all the rest the  
foulest; as that which doth destroy the essentiall  
forme of Knowledge; which is nothing but a re-  
presentation of truth; for the truth of being, & the  
truth of knowing are one, differing no more then  
the direct beame, and the beame reflected. This  
vice therefore brauncheth it selfe into two sorts; de-  
light in deceiuing, and aptnesse to be deceiued, im-  
posture, & credulity: which although they appeare  
to be of a diuers nature, the one seeming to pro-  
ceede of cunning, and the other of simplicity; yet  
certainely they doe for the most part concurre: for  
as the Verse noteth



*Percontatorem fugito, nam Garrulus idem est;*

An inquisitiue man is a pratler: so vpon the like reason, a credulous man is a deceiuer: as wee see it in fame, that hee that will easily beleeeue rumors, will as easily augment rumors, and adde somewhat to them of his owne, which *Tacitus* wisely noteth, when he saith: *Fingunt simul creduntq;*, so great an affinity hath fiction and beleefe.

This facility of credit, and accepting or admitting thinges weakely authorized or warranted, is of two kindes, according to the subiect: For it is either a beleefe of History, (or as the Lawyers speake, matter of fact:) or else of matter of art and opinion: As to the former, wee see the experience and inconvenience of this errour in Ecclesiasticall History, which hath too easily receiued and registred reports and narrations of Miracles wrought by Martyrs, Hermits, or Monkes of the desert, and other Holy men; and their reliques, Shrines, Chappels, and Images: Which though they had a passage for time, by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious simplicity of some, and the politike tolleration of others, holding them but as diuine poesies: yet after a period of time, when the mist began to cleare vp, they grew to bee esteemed, but as old-wiues fables, impostures of the Cleargy, illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great scandall and detriment of Religion.

So in naturall History, wee see there hath not  
beene



beene that choyse and iudgement vsed, as ought to haue beene, as may appeare in the Writings of *Plinius*, *Cardanus*, *Albertus*, and diuers of the *Arabians*, being fraught with much Fabulous matter, a great part, not onely vntryed, but notoriously vntrue, to the great derogation of the credite of naturall Phylosophy, which the graue and sober kind of wits; wherein the wisdome and integrity of *Aristotle* is worthy to be obserued, that hauing made so diligent and exquisite a history of liuing Creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vaine or fained matter, and yet on th'other sake, hath cast all prodigious Narrations, which he thought worthy the Recording into one Booke: excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such where-vpon observation and rule was to be built, was not to be mingled or weakned with matter of doubtfull credit: and yet againe that rarities and reports, that seeme vncredible, are not to bee suppressed or denied to the memory of men.

And as for the facility of credit which is yeelded to Artes and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds, eyther when too much beleefe is attributed to the Arts themselues, or to certaine Authors in any Art. The sciences themselues which haue had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man, then with his reason, are three in number; Astrology, Naturall Magicke, & Alcumy: of which Sciences neuerthelesse the ends or pretences are noble. For Astrology pretendeth to discouer that



correspondence, or concatenation, which is between the superior globe and the inferiour. Naturall Magicke pretendeth to call & reduce naturall Philosophy frō variety of speculations to the magnitude of workes; and *Alcummy* pretendeth to make separation of all the vnlike parts of bodies, which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories, and in the practises are full of Errours and vanity; which the great Professors themselves haue sought to vaile over and conceale by enigmaticall writings, and referring themselves to auricular traditions, and such other devices, to saue the credite of Impostures; and yet surely to *Alcummy* this right is due, that it may be compared to the Husband-man, whereof *Æsop* makes the fable; that when hee dyed, told his sonnes, that he had left vnto them gold, buried vnder ground in his Vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, and gold they found none, but by reason of their stirring and digging the mold about the rootes of their Vines, they had a great Vintage the yeare following: so assuredly the search and stirre to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitfull inventions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of Nature; as for the vse of mans life.

And as for the overmuch credite that hath beene giuen vnto Authors in Sciences, in making them Dictators, that their wordes should stand, and not Consuls to giue advice; the damage is infinite that  
 Sciences



Sciences haue receiued thereby, as the principall cause that hath kept them low, at a stay without growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts Mechanicall, the first deviser comes shortest, & time addeth and perfecteth: but in Sciences the first Author goeth farthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see, Artillery, sayling, Printing and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time accommodated and refined: but contrarywise the Philosophies and Sciences of *Aristotle*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, *Hypocrites*, *Euclides*, *Archimedes*, of most vigor at the first, and by time degenerate and imbased, whereof the reason is no other, but that in the former many wits and industries haue contributed in one; & in the latter many wits & industries haue beene spent about the wit of some one; whom many times they haue rather depraued then illustrated. For as water will not ascend higher, then the leuell of the first spring head, from whence it descendeth: so knowledge deriued from *Aristotle*, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise againe higher, then the knowledge of *Aristotle*. And therefore although the position be good: *Oportet discipulum credere*: yet it must bee coupled with this *Oportet edoctum iudicare*; for Disciples doe owe vnto Masters only a temporary beleefe, & a suspension of their owne judgement, till they bee fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation, or perpetuall captiuitie: and therefore to conclude this point, I will say no more, but; so great Authors  
haue



haue their due, as time which is the Author of Authors be not deprivied of his due, which is farther & farther to discouer truth. Thus haue I gone ouer these three diseases of learning, besides the which there are some other rather peccant humors, then formed diseases, which neuertheles are not so secret and intrinsicke, but that they fall vnder a popular observation and traducement; and therefore are not to be passed ouer.

The first of these is the extreame affecting of two extremities; The one Antiquity; the other Novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of time doe take after the nature and malice of the father. For as hee deuoureth his children; so one of them seeketh to deuoure and suppress the other, while Antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty; cannot be content to adde, but it must deface; Surely the advice of the Prophet is the true direction in this matter, *State super vias antiquas, & videte quanam sit via recta & bona, & ambulate in ea*. Antiquity deserueth that reverence, that men should make a stand therevpon, and discouer what is the best way, but when the discouery is well taken then to make progression. And to speake truly, *Antiquitas seculi Inventus Mundi*. These times are the ancient times when the world is auncient, and not those which we count ancient *Ordine retrogrado*, by a computation backward from our selues.

Another error induced by the former is a distrust that any thing should bee now to bee found out  
which



which the World should haue missed and passed ouer so long time, as if the same obiection were to be made to time, that *Lucian* maketh to *Iupiter*, and other the heathen Gods, of which hee wondreth, that they begot so many Children in old time, and begot none in his time, and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether the Lawe *Pappia* made against old mens marriages had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt, least time is become past children and Generation; wherein contrariwise, wee see commonly the levity and vnconstancy of mens judgements, which till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as soone as it is done, wonder againe that it was no sooner done, as we see in the expedition of *Alexander* into *Asia*, which at first was prejudged as a vast & impossible enterprize; and yet afterwards it pleaseth *Liuy* to make no more of it, then this, *Nil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere*. And the same hapned to *Columbus* in the Westerne Navigation. But in intellectuall matters, it is much more common; as may be seene in most of the propositions of *Euclide*, which till they be demonstrate, they seeme strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the Lawyers speak) as if we had knowne them before.

Another Errour that hath also some affinity with the former, is a cōceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination, the best hath still prevailed; and suppressed the rest: So as if a

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man should beginne the labour of a new search; hee were but like to light vpon somewhat formerly reiected; and by reiection, brought into obliuion; as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitudes sake, were not ready to giue passage, rather to that which is popular and superficiall, then to that which is substantiall and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth to bee of the nature of a River, or streame, which carryeth downe to vs that which is light and blowne vp; and sinketh, and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.

Another error of a diuers nature from all the former, is the over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into Arts and Methods: from which time, commonly Sciences receiue small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, doe seldome grow to a farther stature: so knowledge, while it is in Aphorismes and observations, it is in growth: but when it once is comprehended in exact Methods; it may perchance be farther polished and illustrated, and accommodated for vse and practise; but it encreaseth no more in bulke and substance.

Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned, is that after the distribution of particular Arts and Sciences, men haue abandoned vniuersality, or *Philosophia prima*; which cannot but cease, and stoppe all progression. For no perfect discouery can bee made vpon a flat, or a leuell:  
Neither



Neither is it possible to discover the more remote, and deeper parts of any Science, if you stand but vpon the leuell of the same Science, and ascend not to a higher science.

Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kinde of adoration of the mind and vnderstanding of man: by meanes whereof, men haue with-drawne themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, & the observations of experience: and haue tumbled vp and downe in their owne reason and conceits: vpon these Intellectualists which are notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime & diuine Philosophers, *Heraclitus* gaue a just censure, saying: *Men sought truth in their owne little worlds, and not in the great and common world:* for they disdain to spell, & so by degrees to read in the volume of Gods workes, and contrary-wise by continuall meditation and agitation of wit, doe vrge, and as it were invoke their owne spirits, to diuine, and giue Oracles vnto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.

Another Error that hath some connexion with this latter, is, that men haue vsed to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with some conceits which they haue most admired, or some Sciences which they haue most applyed; and giuen all things else a tincture according to them, vtterly vntrue and vnproper. So hath *Plato* intermingled his Philosophy with Theology, and *Aristotle* with Logicke, and the second Schoole of *Plato*,



*Proclus*, and the rest, with the Mathematicques. For these were the Arts which had a kinde of *Primo geniture* with them severally. So haue the Alchymists made a Philosophy out of a few experiments of the Furnace; and *Gilbertus* our Country-man hath made a Phylosophy out of the observations of a Load-stone. So *Cicero*, when reciting the severall opinions of the nature of the soule, he found a Musitian, that held the soule was but a Harmony, saith pleasantly: *Hic ab arte sua non recessit, &c.* But of these conceits *Aristotle* speaketh seriously & wisely, when he saith: *Qui respiciunt ad pauca, de facili pronunciant.*

Another Errour is an impatience of doubt, and hast to assertion without due and mature suspension of judgement. For the two waies of contemplation are not vnlike the two waies of action, commonly spoken of by the Ancients. The one plaine & smooth in the beginning and in the end impassable: the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while faire and even, so it is in contemplation, if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to beginne with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

Another Errour is in the manner of the tradition and deliury of knowledge, which is for the most part Magistrall and peremptory; and not ingenuous and faithfull, in a sort, as may be soonest beleued; and not easilest examined. It is true that in compendious Treatises for practise, that forme is  
not



not to be disallowed. But in the true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall either on the one side into the Veyne of *Velleius* the Epicurean: *Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur*: Nor on the other side, into *Socrates* his irronicall doubting of all things, but to propound things sincerely, with more or lesse asseveration: as they stand in a mans owne iudgement, proued more or lesse.

Other Errours there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, wherevnto they bend their endeavours: For whereas the more constant & devoute kind of Professors of any science ought to propound to themselves, to make some additions to their Science; they convert their labours to aspire to certaine second prizes; as to be a profound Interpreter or Commenter; to be a sharpe Champion or Defender; to be a methodicall Compounder or Abridger; and so the Patrimony of knowledge cometh to bee sometimes improved; but seldome augmented.

But the greatest Errour of all the rest, is the mistaking or mis-placing of the last or farthest end of knowledge: for men haue entred into a desire of Learning and Knowledge, sometimes vpon a naturall curiosity, and inquisitiue appetite; sometimes to entertaine their mindes with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to inable them to victory of wit and contradiction, and most times for lucre and profession, and seldome sincerely to giue a true account of their



guift of reason, to the benefit and vse of men: As if there were sought in knowledge a Cowch, wherevpon to rest a searching & restless spirit; or a tarrasse for a wandring and variable mind, to walke vp and downe with a faire prospect: or a Tower of State for a proud minde to raise it selfe vpon; or a Fort or commaunding ground for strife & contention, or a Shoppe for profite or sale; and not a rich Store-house for the glory of the Creator, & the reliefe of mans estate. But this is that, which will indeed dignifie and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more neerely and straightly conioyned and vnited together, then they haue beene; a Coniunction like vnto that of the two highest Planets, *Saturne* the Planet of rest and contemplation; and *Iupiter* the Planet of civill society and action. Howbeit, I doe not meane when I speake of vse and action, that end before mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lucre and profession; For I am not ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge; like vnto the golden ball throwne before *Atalanta*, which while shee goeth aside, and stoopeth to take vp, the race is hindred,

*Declinat cursus, aurumq; volubile tollit:*

Neither is my meaning as was spoken of *Socrates*, to call Philosophy downe from heauen to conuerse vpon the earth, that is, to leaue naturall Philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy.



politic. But as both heauen and earth doe conspire & contribute to the vse and benefite of man: So the end ought to be from both Philosophies, to separate and reiect vaine speculations, and whatsoeuer is empty and voyd, and to preserue and augment whatsoeuer is solide and fruitfull: that knowledge may not bee as a Curtezan for pleasure, and vanity only, or as a bond-woman to acquire & gaine to her Masters vse, but as a Spouse, for generation, fruit, & comfort.

Thus haue I described and opened as by a kinde of dissection, those peccant humors (the principall of them) which hath not only giuen impediment to the proficience of Learning, but haue giuen also occasion, to the traduement thereof: wherein if I haue beene too plaine it must be remembered;

*Fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis.*

This I thinke I haue gained, that I ought to be the better beleued, in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation: because I haue proceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet I haue no purpose to enter into a lauditiue of Learning, or to make a Hymne to the Muses (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duely celebrated) but my intent is without varnish or amplification, justly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the ballance with other things and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments diuine, and humane.

First therefore, let vs seeke the dignity of knowledge



ledge in the Arch-type or first plat-forme, which is in the attributes and acts of God, as farre as they are revealed to man, & may be obserued with sobriety, wherein we may not seeke it by the name of Learning, for all learning is knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is originall. And therefore wee must looke for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures call it.

It is so then, that in the worke of the Creation, we see a double emanatiō of vertue from God: the one referring more properly to power, the other to wisdom, the one expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the forme. This being supposed, it is to be obserued, that for any thing which appeareth in the History of the Creation, the confused Masse, and matter of Heauen and earth was made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that *Chaos* or Masse, was the Worke of sixe dayes, such a note of difference it pleased God to put vpon the Workes of power, and the workes of Wisdom: wherewith concurreth that in the former, it is not set downe, that God said, *Let there be Heauen and Earth*, as it is set downe of the workes following, but actually, that God made Heauen and Earth: the one carrying the stile of a Manufacture, and the other of a Law, Decree, or Councell.

To proceede to that which is next in order from God to spirits: We finde as farre as credit is to be giuen to the celestiall Hierarchy, of that supposed

*Dionysius*



*Dionysius* the Senator of Athens the first place or degree is giuen to the Angels of loue, which are tearmed *Seraphim*; the second to the Angels of light, which are tearmed *Cherubim*; and the third, and so following places to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all Angels of power and ministry; so as the Angels of knowledge and illumination, are placed before the Angels of office and domination.

To descend from spirits & intellectuall formes, to sensible and materiall formes, wee read the first forme that was created, was Light, which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporall things, to knowledge in Spirits and incorporall things.

So in the distribution of daies, wee see the day wherein God did rest, and contemplate his owne workes, was blessed aboue all the daies, wherein he did effect and accomplish them.

After the creation was finished, it is set downe vnto vs, that Man was placed in the Garden to worke therein, which worke so appointed to him, could be no other then worke of contemplation, that is, when the end of worke is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity, for there being then no reluctance of the Creature, nor sweat of the brow, mans employment must of consequence haue beene matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the vse. Againe, the first Acts which man performed in Paradise,

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consisted of the two summary parts of Knowledge, the view of Creatures, and the imposition of names. As for the Knowledg which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the naturall Knowledge of Creatures, but the morall Knowledge of good and evill, where in the supposition was, that Gods Commandements or prohibitions were not the originalls of good and evill, but that they had other beginnings which man aspired to know, to the end, to make a totall defection from God, and to depend wholly vpon himselfe.

To passe on, in the first event or occurrence after the fall of Man; wee see as the Scriptures haue infinite Mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the Story or letter) an Image of the two Estates, the Contemplatiue State, and the Actiue State, figured in the two persons of *Abel* and *Cain*, and in the two simplest and most primitiue Trades of life: that of The Shepheard (who by reason of his leasure, rest in a place, and liuing in view of heauen, is a liuely Image of a contemplatiue life) and that of the Husbandman; where wee see againe, the fauour and election of God went to the Shepheard, and not to the tiller of the ground.

So in the age before the flood, the holy Records within those few memorials, which are there entered and registred, haue vouchsafed to mention, and honour the name of the Inventors and Authors of Musique, and workes in mettall. In the age after the Flood, the first great iudgement of God vpon the ambition



ambition of man, was the confusion of Tongues; whereby the open Trade and intercourse of Learning and knowledge, was chiefly imbarred.

To descend to *Moyse* the Law-giuer, and Gods first penne; hee is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition, and commendation: *That he was seene in all the Learning of the Egyptians*; which Nation we know was one of the most auncient Schooles of the world: for, so *Plato* brings in the Egyptiā Priest, saying vnto *Solon*: *you Grecians are ever Children, you haue no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowledge*. Take a view of the ceremoniall Law of *Moyse*; you shall find besides the prefiguratiō of Christ, the badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and impressiō of obedience, and other diuine vses and fruits thereof, that some of the most learned *Rabines* haue travailed profitably, and profoundly to obserue, some of them a naturall, some of them a morall sense, or reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances: As in the law of the Leprousie, where it is said: *If the whitenesse haue ouerspread the flesh, the patient may passe abroad for cleane; But if there be any whole flesh remaining, hee is to be shut vp for vncleane*: One of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity then after: And another noteth a position of morall Philosophy, that men abandoned to vice doe not so much corrupt manners as those that are halfe good, and halfe euill, so, in this and very many other places in that Lawe; there



is to be found besides the Theologicall sense, much asperision of Philosophy.

So likewise in that excellent booke of *Iob*, if it be revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant, and swelling with naturall Philosophy, as for example, Cosmography, and the roundnesse of the World: *Qui extendit aquilonē super vacuum, & appendit terram super nihilum*: wherein the pensilenesse of the Earth, the pole of the North, and the finitenesse, or convexity of Heauen are manifestly touched. So againe matter of Astronomy; *Spiritus eius ornavit Cælos & obstetricante manu eius eductus est coluber tortuosus*: And in another place, *Nunquid coniungere valebis micantes stellas pleyadas, aut gyrum arcturi poteris dissipare?* Where the fixing of the starres, ever standing at equall distance, is with greatelegancy noted: And in another place, *Qui facit arcturum, & oriona, & hyadas, & interiora austru*, where againe he takes knowledge of the depression of the Southerne Pole, calling it the secrets of the South, becaule the Southerne Starres were in that climate vnseene. Matter of generation, *Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, & sicut caseum coagulasti me, &c.* Matter of Minerals, *Habet argentum venerum suarum principia: & auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, & lapis solutus calore in as vertitur*: and so forwards in that Chapter.

So likewise in the person of *Salomon* the King, wee see the gift or endowment of Wisdome and Learning both in *Salomons* petition, and in Gods



Gods assent therevnto preferred before all other terrene and temporall felicity. By vertue of which grant or donatiue of God, *Salomon* became inabled, not only to write those excellent Parables, or Aphorismes concerning Divine and Morall Philosophy; but also to compile a naturall History of all verdor, from the Cedar vpon the Mountaine, to the Mousse vpon the wall, (which is but a rudiment betweene putrefaction, and an hearbe) and also of all things, that breath or mooue. Nay the same *Salomon* the King, although hee excelled in the glory of Treasure and magnificent buildings of shipping and Navigation, of seruice and attendance, of fame and renowne, and the like; yet hee maketh no claime to any of those glories; but onely to the glory of Inquisition of Truth: for so he saith expressly: *The glory of God is to conceale a thing, But the glory of the King is to finde it out*, as it according to the innocent play of Children the diuine Maiesty tooke delight to hide his workes, to the end to haue them found out, and as if Kings could not obtaine a greater honour, then to bee Gods play-fellowes in that game, considering the great commandement of wits and meanes, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himselfe did first shew his power to subdue ignorance, by his conference with the Priests and Doctors of the Law; before he shewed his power



to subdue nature by his miracles. And the coming of the holy spirit, was chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues; which are but *Vehicula scientia*.

So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to use for the plantation of the Faith, notwithstanding, that at the first hee did employ persons altogether vnlearned, otherwise then by inspiration, more evidently to declare his immediate working, and to abase all humane Wisdome or Knowledge, yet neverthelesse, that Counsell of his was no sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession, he did send his divine truth into the world, waited on with other Learnings, as with Servants or Handmaides. For so wee see Saint *Paul*, who was only learned amongst the Apostles had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the New Testament.

So againe we finde that many of the ancient Bishops and Fathers of the Church, were excellently read and studied in all the learning of the Heathen, in so much, that the Ediēt of the Emperour *Iulianus* (whereby it was interdicted vnto Christians to bee admitted into Schooles, Lectures, or exercises of Learning) was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the Christian faith; then were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his Predecessors, Neither could the emulation and Iealousy of *Gregory* the first of that name, Bishop of *Rome*, ever obtaine the opinion of piety or devotion



devotion: but contrary-wise receiued the censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men: in that he designeth to obliterate and extinguish the memory of Heathen antiquity and Authors. But contrari-wise it was the Christian Church, which amidst the invndations of the *Scythians*, on the one side from the Northwest: and the *Saracens* from the East, did preferue in the sacred lappe and bosome thereof, the pretious Reliques, euen of Heathen Learning, which otherwise had beene extinguished, as if no such thing had ever beene.

And we see before our eyes, that in the age of our selues, and our Fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account, for their degenerate manners and ceremonies: and sundry doctrines, obnoxious, and framed to vphold the same abuses: At one and the same time, it was ordained by the diuine providence, that there should attend withall a renovation, & new spring of all other knowledges: And on the other side, we see the Iesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation and prouocation of their example, haue much quickned and strengthened the state of learning: wee see (I say) what notable service and reparation they haue done to the Romane Sea.

Wherefore to conclude this part, let it bee obserued, that there be two principall duties and seruices besides ornament and illustration, which Philosophy and humane Learning doe performe to  
faith.



faith and Religion. The one, because they are an effectuall inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God. For as the Psalmes, & other Scriptures doe often invite vs to consider, and magnify the great and wonderfull workes of God, so if wee should rest onely in the contemplation of the exterior of them, as they first offer themselues to our senses; wee should doe alike iniury vnto the Maiesty of God, as if wee should iudge or construe of the store of some excellent Jeweller, by that only which is set out toward the streete in his shoppe. The other, because they minister a singular helpe and preservative against vnbeleefe and error, For our Saviour saith. *You erre not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God:* laying before vs two bookes or volumes to study, if we will be secured from errour: first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God; and then the creatures expressing his power; whereof the latter is a key vnto the former; not only opening our vnderstanding to conceaue the true sense of the Scriptures, by the generall notions of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our beleefe, in drawing vs into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly signed and ingraued vpon his workes. Thus much therefore for divine testimony and evidence, concerning the true dignity and value of Learning.

As for humane proofes, it is so large a field, as in a discourse of this nature and brevity, it is fit rather to vse choice of those things, which we shall produce,



duce, than to embrace the variety of thē. First therefore in the degrees of humane honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest, to obtaine to a veneration and adoration as a God. This vnto the Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speake now separately of humane testimony; according to which that which the Grecians call Apotheosis, & the Latines, *Relatio inter diuos*, was the supream honour, Which man could attribute vnto man; specially when it was giuen, not by a formall decree or Act of State, as it was vsed amongst the Roman Emperours; but by an inward assent & beleefe, which honour being so high, had also a degree or middle Tearme: For there were reckoned aboue humane honours, honour Heroicall and Diuine: In the attribution, and distribution of which honours; wee see Antiquity made this difference: That Whereas founders and Vnivers of States and Cities, Law-giuers, extirpers of Tyrants, Fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in ciuill merite, were honoured; but with the Titles of worthies or Demy-Gods: such as were *Hercules, Theseus, Minos, Romulus*, & the like: on the other side, such as were inuentors and Authors of new Arts, endowments, and commodities towards mans life, were euer consecrated amongst the Gods themselues, as was *Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo*, and others, and iustly: for the merite of the former is confined within the Circle of an age, or a nation: And is like fruitfull showres, which though they be profitable and good: Yet serue but for that

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season, and for a latitude of ground where they fall: But the other is indeede like the benefits of Heaven, which are permanent and vniuersall. The former againe is mixt with strife and perturbation; but the latter hath the true Character of Diuine presence; commonly in *aura leni*, without noyse or agitation.

Neyther is certainly that other merite of learning, in repressing the inconueniences which grow from man to man; much inferiour to the former, of releeuing the necessities which arise from nature; which merite was liuely set forth by the antients in that fained Relation of *Orpheus* Theater; where all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their seuerall appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of quarrell, stood all sociably together listening vnto the ayres and accords of the Harpe; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some lowder noyse; but euery beast returned to his owne nature, wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men; who are full of sauage, and vnreclaymed desires, of profite, of lust, of Reuenge: which as long as they giue eare to precepts, to lawes, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and perswasion of Bookes, of sermons, of haranges: so long is societie and peace maintained: but if these instruments bee silent: or that sedition and tumult make them not audible: all things dissolue into Anarchy and Confusion.

But this appeareth more manifestly, when Kings themselves, or persons of authority vnder them, or  
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other Gouvernours in Common-wealths, and popular Estates, are endued with learning. For although he might be thought partiall to his owne profession, that said, *Then should people & estates be happy, when eyther Kings were Phylosophers, or Phylosophers Kings*: Yet so much is verified by experience; that vnder wise & learned Princes & Gouvernours, there hath beene euer the best times; for howsoeuer Kings may haue their imperfections in their passions & Customes, yet if they be illuminate by learning, they haue those Notions of religion, policy, & morality: which doe preserue them, & refraine them from all ruinous & peremptory errors & excesses; whispering euermore in their eares, when Counsellors and seruants stand mute and silent: and Senators, or Counsellors likewise, which be learned doe proceede vpon more safe and substantiall principles; then Counsellours which are onely men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers a farre off: whereas the other discover them not, till they come neere hand; and then trust to the agility of their wit, to ward or auoid them.

which felicity of times, vnder learned Princes, (to keepe still the Law of breuity; by vsing the most eminent and selected examples) doth best appeare in the age, which passed from the death of *Domitianus* the Emperour vntill the Raigne of *Commodus*: Comprehending a succession of six Princes, all Learned or singular Fauorers and Aduancers of Learning: which age for temporall respects, was



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the most happy and flourishing, that euer the Roman Empire, (which then was a modell of the World) enioyed: a matter reuealed and prefigured vnto *Domitian* in a Dreame, the night before he was flaine: for he thought there was growne behinde vpon his shoulders, a necke and a head of Gold, which came accordingly to passe, in those golden times which succeeded: of which Princes, wee Will make some commemoration: wherein although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for a Declamation, then agreeable to a Treatise infolded as this is: yet because it is pertinent to the poynt in hand, *Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*, and to name them onely were too naked and curiosity, I will not omit it altogether. The first was *Nerua*, the excellent temper of whose gouernment, is by a glance in *Cornelius Tacitus* touched to the life: *Postquam diuus Nerua res olim infociabiles miscuisset, imperium & libertatem*: And in token of his Learning, the last Act of his short Raigne left to memory, was a missiue to his adopted sonne *Traian*, proceeding vpon some inward discontent, at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a Verse of *Homers*:

*Telis Phæbe, tuis Lachrymas ulciscere nostras.*

*Traian*, who succeeded, was for his person not Learned: But if we will hearken, to the speech of our Sauour, that saith, *Hee that receiueth a Prophet in the name of a Prophet, shall haue a Prophets reward*, hee deserueth to be placed amongst the most learned Princes: for there Was not a greater  
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admirer of Learning, or Benefactor of Learning, a founder of famous Libraries, perpetuall aduancer of Learned men to office, and a familiar conuerſer with learned Profeſſors and Preceptors, who were noted to haue then moſt credite in Court. On the otherſide, how much *Traians* vertue and Gouvernment was admired & renowned, ſurely no testimony of graue & faithfull Hiſtory doth more liuely ſet forth, then that legend tale of *Gregorius magnus*, Biſhop of *Rome*, who was noted for the extreame enuy he bare towards all heathen excellency: & yet he is reported out of the loue & eſtimation of *Traians* morall vertues, to haue made vnto God, paſſionate and feruent prayers, for the deliuey of his ſoule out of hell: and to haue obtained it with a *Caueat* that he ſhould make no more ſuch Petitions. In this Princes time alſo, the perſecutions againſt the Chriſtians receiued intermiſſion, vpon the certificate of *Plinius ſecundus*, a man of excellent Learning, and by *Traian* aduanced.

*Adrian* his ſucceſſor, was the moſt curious man that liued, & the moſt vniuerſall enquirer: inſomuch as it was noted for an errour in his mind that hee deſired to comprehend all things, and not to reſtue himſelfe for the wortheieſt things, falling into the like humor that was long before noted in *Phillip* of *Macedon*, who when hee would needes ouer-rule and put downe an excellent Muſitian, in an argument touching Muſique was well answered by him agayne, *God forbid ſir* (ſaith hee)



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that your fortune should be so bad, as to know these things better then I: It pleased God likewise to vse the curiosity of this Emperour, as an inducement to the peace of his Church in those dayes: For hauing Christ in veneration, not as a God or Sauour, but as a wonder or nouelty: & hauing his Picture in his Gallery, matched with *Apollonius* (with whom in his vaine imagination, he thought he had some conformity) yet it serued the turne to allay the bitter hatred of those times agaynst the Christian name: so as the Church had peace during his time, and for his gouernement ciuill, although he did not attayne to that of *Traians*, in the glory of Armes, or perfection of Iustice: yet in deseruing of the weale of the Subiect, he did exceede him. For *Traian* erected many famous Monuments and buildings, in so much as *Constantine* the Great, in emulation was Wont to call him *Parietaria*, Wall-flower, because his name was vpon so many Walls: But his buildings and workes were more of glory and tryumph, then vse and necessity: But *Adrian* spent his whole Raigne, which was peaceable in a perambulation, or Suruey of the Romane Empire, giueing order, and making assignation, where he went for reedifying of Cities, Townes and Forts decayed: and for cutting of Ri- uers and streames: and for making Bridges and passages, and for pollishing of Cities, and Commonal- ties, with new ordinances and Constitutions: and graunting new Franchises and incorporations: so that his whole time was a very restauration of all the lapses



lapses and decayes of former times.

*Antonius Pius*, who succeeded him, was a Prince excellently learned; and had the patient and subtile Wit of a Schoole-man: Insomuch as in common speech, (which leaues no vertue vntaxed) hee was called *Cymini Sector*, a Caruer, or a diuider of *Comine* seede, which is one of the least seedes: such a patience hee had and settled spirit, to enter into the least & most exact differences of causes: a fruite no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity, and serenity of his minde: which being no wayes charged or incumbred, eyther with feares, remorse, or scruples, but hauing beene noted for a man of the purest goodnesse, without all fiction, or affectation, that hath raigned or liued: made his minde continually present and entyre: hee likewise approached a degree neerer vnto Christianity, and became as *Agrippa* said vnto *St. Paul*, *Halfe a Christian*; holding their Religion and Law in good opinion; and not onely ceasing persecution, but giuing way to the advancement of Christians.

There succeeded him the first *Diui fratres*, the two adoptiue brethren, *Lucius Commodus verus*, Sonne to *Elius Verus*; who delighted much in the softer kind of Learning: & was wont to call the Poet *Martiall* his *Virgil*: & *Marcus Aurelius Antonius*, whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague & suruiued him long, was named the Philosopher: who as he excelled all the rest in Learning, so hee excelled them likewise in perfection of all Royall virtues.



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tues : infomuch as *Julianus* the Emperour in his Booke intituled, *Casares*, being as a Pasquill or Satyre, to deride all his Predecessors, fayned that they were all inuited to a Banquet of the Gods, & *Silenus*, the Iester sate at the neither end of the Table, & bestowed a scoffe on euery one as they came in, but when *Marcus Phylosophus* came in, *Silenus* was grauelled, and out of Countenance, not knowing where to sarpe at him, saue at the last, he gaue a glance at his patience towards his wife. And the vertue of this Prince continued with that of his Predecessor made the name of *Antonius* so sacred in the world, that though it were extreamely dishonoured in *Commodus*, *Carocolla*, & *Haliogabalus*, who all bare the name, yet when *Alexander Seuerus* refused the name, because he was a stranger to the Family, the Senate with one Acclamation said, *Quomodo Augustus sic & Antonius*. In such renowne & veneratiō, was the name of these two Princes in those dayes, that they would haue had it as a perpetuall addition in all the Emperours stile. In this Emperours time also, the Church for the most part was in peace, so as in this sequence of sixe Princes, wee doe see the blessed effects of Learning in soueraignty, paynted forth in the greatest Table of the world.

But for a Tablet or Picture of smaller volume (not presumeing to speake of your Maiesty that liueth, in my Iudgement the most excellent, is that of Queene *Elizabeth*, your immediate Predecessor in this part of *Brittaine*, a Prince, that if *Plutarch* were  
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now alieue to write lines by parallels would trouble him I think, to finde for her a parallell amongst women. This Lady was indued with learning in her sexe singular and rare euen amongst masculine Princes; whether we speake of Learning; or Language or of science, moderne, or ancient; Divinity or Humanity. And vnto the very last yeare of her life, she accustomed to appoint set houres for reading, scarcely any young student in any Vniuersity, more dayly, or more dully. As for her government, I assure my selfe, I shall not exceed, if I doe affirme, that this part of the Iland never had 45. yeares of better times: and yet not through the calmenesse of the season; but through the wisdome of her regiment.

For if there be considered of the one side, the truth of Religion established; the constant peace and security; the good administration of Iustice, the temperate vse of the perogative, not slackned, nor much strayned; the flourishing state of Learning, sortable to so excellent a Patronesse; the convenient estate of wealth and meanes, both of Crowne and Subiect; the habite of obedience, & the moderation of discontent: and there be considered on the other side, the differences of Religion, the troubles of Neighbour countries, the ambition of *Spaine*, and opposition of *Rome*, and then, that she was solatary, and of her selfe: those things I say considered: as I could not haue chosen an instance so recent and so proper: so, I suppose, I could not haue chosen one more remarkable, or eminent, to the purpose now



in hand; which is concerning the coniunction of learning in the Prince, with felicity in the people.

Neither hath Learning an influence & operation only vpon civill merit and morall vertue; and the Arts or temperature of peace, & peaceable gouernement; but likewise it hath no lesse power and efficacy in inablement towards martiall and military vertue and prowesse; as may be notably represented in the examples of *Alexander* the great, and *Cesar* the Dictator mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed, of whose vertues and Acts in warre, there needes no note or recitall, hauing beene the wonders of time in that kinde. But of their affections towards learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat.

*Alexander* was bred and taught vnder *Aristotle* the great Philosopher; who dedicated diuers of his Bookes of Philosophy vnto him; hee was attended with *Calisthenes* and diuerse other learned persons that followed him in Campe, throughout his Iourneyes and Conquests: what price and estimation he had learning in, doth notably appeare in these three particulars: First, in the envy hee vsed to expresse, that he bare towards *Achilles*, in this, that he had so good a Trumpet of his prayses as *Homers* verses: Secondly, in the iudgement or solution hee gaue touching that pretious cabinet of *Darius* which was found among his jewels, whereof question was made, what things were worthy to be put into it, & he gaue his opinion for *Homers* workes. Thirdly, in  
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his letter to *Aristotle* after hee had set forth his books of nature; wherein he expostulateth with him for publishing the secrets or Mysteries of Philosophy, and gaue him to vnderstand that himselfe esteemed it more to excell other men in Learning and knowledge, then in power and Empire. And what vse he had of learning, doth appeare, or rather shine in all his speeches & answeres, being full of science and vse of science, and that in all variety.

And herein againe, it may seeme a thing scholasticall and somewhat idle to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument I handle leadeth mee thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceiue I am as willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an *Alexander* or a *Cesar*, or an *Antonius*, that are dead many hundred yeares since, as any that now liueth: for it is the displaying of the glory of Learning in soueraignty that I propound to my selfe, and not an humour of declaiming in any mans praises. Obserue then the speech hee vsed of *Diogenes*, and see if it tend not to the true estate of one of the greatest questions of morall Philosophy; whether the enioying of outward things, or the contemning of them be the greatest happinesse: for when he saw *Diogenes* so perfectly contented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition; *Were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.* But *Seneca* inverteth it, and saith; *Plus erat, quod hic nollet accipere, quam quod ille posset dare.* There were more things which *Diogenes* would haue refused, then



those were which Alexander could haue giue or enioyed.

Obserue againe that speech which was vsuall with him, That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, *Sleepe and Lust*: and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of naturall Philosophy, and liker to haue comen out of the mouth of *Aristotle*, or *Democritus*, then from *Alexander*.

See againe that speech of Humanity and poesy: whē vpō the bleeding of his wounds, he called vnto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him diuine honor, & said, *Looke, this is very blood: this is not such liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus hand, whē it was pierced by Diomedes.*

See likewise his readinesse in reprehension of Logique, in the speech he vsed to *Cassander*, vpon a complaint that was made against his father *Antipater*: for when *Alexander* happed to say: *Do you thinke these men would haue come from so farre to complaine, except they had iust cause of grieve?* and *Cassander* answered, *Yea: that was the matter, because they thought they should not be disprooued;* said *Alexander* laughing: *See the subtilties of Aristotle, to take a matter both waies, Pro & contra, &c.*

But note againe how well he could vse the same Art, which he reprehended to serue his owne humor, when bearing a secret grudge to *Callisthenes*, because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration: feasting one night, where the same *Callisthenes* was at the table: it was moued by some after supper, for entertainment sake, that *Callisthenes* who  
was



was an eloquent man, might speake of some theame or purpose at his own choise, which *Callisthenes* did; chusing the praise of the Macedonian Nation for his discourse, & performing the same with so good manner, as the hearers were much ravished: wherevpon *Alexander* nothing pleased, said: *It was easy to be eloquent vpon so good a subiect*: But saith he, *Turne your stile, & let vs heare what you can say against vs*: which *Callisthenes* presently vndertooke, and did with that stinging and life; that *Alexander* interrupted him, and said: *The goodnesse of the cause made him eloquent before, and despiight made him eloquent then againe.*

Consider farther, for troopes of Rhetorique, that excellent vse of a Metaphor or translation, where-with he taxed *Antipater*, who was an imperious and tyrannous Governour: for when one of *Antipaters* friends cōmended him to *Alexander* for his moderation; that he did not degenerate (as his other Lief tenants did) into the Persian pride, in vse of purple; but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of blacke; *True* (saith *Alexander*) *but Antipater is all purple within.* Or that other, when *Parmenio* came to him in the plaine of *Arbella*, and shewed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies, especially as they appeared by the infinite number of lights; as it had beene a new firmament of starres; & therevpon aduised him to assaile them by night: wherevpon hee answered, *That he would not steale the Victory.*

For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction so much in all ages embraced, that he made be-



tweene his two friends *Ephestion* & *Craterus*, when he said, *that the one loued Alexander, and the other loued the King*; describing the principall difference of Princes best servants, that some in affection loue their person, and other in duty loue their crowne.

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an Errour ordinary with Councillors of Princes, that they councill their Masters according to the modell of their owne mind and fortune, and not of their Masters, when vpon *Darius* great offers *Parmenio* had said: *Surely, I would accept these offers were I as Alexander*, saith *Alexander*: *so would I, were I as Parmenio*.

Lastly, weigh that quicke and acute reply, which he made when he gaue so large gifts to his friends, and servants, and was asked what he did reserue for himselfe, & he answered, *Hope*: weigh as I say, whether he had not cast vp his account aright, because *Hope* must be the portion of all that resolute vpon great enterprises. For this was *Cæsars* portion, when he went first into *Gaule*, his estate being then vtterly overthrowne with Largeesses: and this was likewise the portion of that noble Prince, howsoever transported with ambition, *Henry* Duke of *Guise*, of whom it was vsually said: that he was the greatest Usurer in *France*, because hee had turned all his estate into obligations.

To conclude therefore, as certaine *Critiques* are vsed to say hyperbolically: *That if all Sciences were lost, they might be found in Virgill*: So certainly this may be said truly; there are the prints, and footesteps



steps of Learning in those few speeches, which are reported of this Prince. The admiration of whom, when I consider him, not as *Alexander* the Great, but as *Aristotles* Scholler, hath carried me too farre.

As for *Iulius Caesar*, the excellency of his learning, needeth not to be argued from his education, or his company, or his speeches: but in a farther degree doth declare it selfe in his writings & workes, whereof some are extant, and permanent, and some vnfortunately perished: For first we see there is left vnto vs that excellent history of his owne warres, which hee entituled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times haue admired the solid weight of matter; & the reall passages, and liuely Images of actions, and persons expressed in the greatest propriety of words, and perspicuity of Narration that euer was: which that it was not the effect of naturall giift, but of Learning and precept, is well witnessed by that worke of his, entituled *De Analogia*, being a grammaticall Philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same *Vox ad placitum*, to become *Vox ad licitum*: and to reduce custome of speech, to congruity of speech, and tooke as it were the picture of wordes, from the life of reason.

So wee receiue from him as a Monument, both of his power and Learning, the then reformed computation of the yeare, well expressing, that he tooke it to be as great a glory to himselte, to obserue and know the law of the Heauens, as to giue law to men vpon earth.

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So likewise in that booke of his *Anticato*, it may easily appeare that he did aspire as well to victory of wit, as victory of warre: vndertaking therein a conflict against the greatest Châpion with the pen that then liued, *Cicero* the Orator.

So againe in this booke of *Apothegmes*, which hee collected, we see that hee esteemed it more honour to make himselfe, but a paire of Tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others, then to haue every word of his owne to be made an Apothegme, or an Oracle; as vaine Princes, by custome of flattery, pretend to doe. And yet if I should enumerate diuers of his speeches; as I did those of *Alexander*, they are truly such as *Salomon* noteth, when he saith; *Verba sapientum tanquam aculei, et tanquam clau in altum defixi*, whereof I will onely recite three not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigor and efficacy.

As first, it is reason he be thought a Master of words, that could with one word appease a mutiny in his Army; which was thus. The Romanes when their generalls did speake in their Army, did vse the word *Milites*; but when the Magistrates spake to the people, they did vse the word, *Quirites*: The Soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to bee cassiered: not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof, to drawe *Cesar* to other Conditions; wherein he being resolute, not to giue way, after some silence, he began his speech, *Ego Quirites*, which did admit them already cassiered; where-  
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with they were so surprized, crossed & confused, as they would not suffer him to goe on in his speech, but relinquished their demaunds, and made it their suit, to be againe called by the name of *Milites*.

The second speech was thus: *Caesar* did extreame-ly affect the name of King; and some were set on as he passed by, in popular acclamation to salute him King; wherevpon finding the cry weake and poore; he put it off thus, in a kind of Iest, as if they had mistaken his surname; *Non Rex sum, sed Caesar*, a speech, that if it be searched, the life and fulnesse of it, can scarce be expressed: For first it was a refusall of the name, but yet not serious: againe it did signifie an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if hee presumed *Caesar* was the greater Title; as by his worthinesse, it is come to passe till this day; but chiefly, it was a speech of great allurements toward his owne purpose: as if the State did strive with him, but for a name; whereof meane families were vested: for *Rex* was a surname with the *Romanes*, as well as *King* is with vs.

The last speech, which I will mention, was vsed to *Metellus*: when *Caesar*, after Warre declared, did possesse himselfe of the Citty of *Rome*, at which time entring into the inner Treasury, to take the mony there accumulate, *Metellus* being Tribune forbad him: Whereto *Caesar* said, *That if hee did not desist, hee would lay him dead in the place*: And presently taking himselfe vp, hee added: *Young man it is harder for mee to speake it,*

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then to doe it: *Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere, quàm facere.* A speech compounded of the greatest terrour, and greatest clemency, that could proceed out of the mouth of man.

But to returne and Conclude with him, it is evident himfelfe knew well his owne perfection in learning, and tooke it vpon him; as appeared when vpon occasion, that some spake, what a strange resolution it was in *Lucius Sylla*, to resigne his Dictature: he scoffing at him, to his owne advantage answered: *That Sylla could not skill of Letters, & therefore knew not how to Dictate.*

And here it were fit to leaue this point, touching the concurrence of military Vertue and Learning: (for what example should come with any grace, after those two, of *Alexander* and *Cæsar*) were it not in regard of the rarenesse of Circumstance, that I finde in one other particular; as that which did so suddainly passe, from extreame scorne, to extreame wonder: and it is of *Xenophon* the Phylosopher, who went from *Socrates* Schoole into *Asia*, in the expedition of *Cyrus* the younger, against King *Artaxerxes*: This *Xenophon* at that time, was very young, and never had seene the Wars before: neyther had any commaund in the Army, but onely followed the War, as a Voluntary, for the loue and conuersation of *Proxenus* his Friend: hee was present when *Falinus* came in message from the great King, to the *Grecians*; after that *Cyrus* was slaine in the field; and they a handfull of men left to themselves  
in



in the midst of the Kings Territories, cut off from their Country by many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles: The message imported, that they should deliver vp their Armes, and submit themselves to the Kings mercy: to which Message before answer was made, divers of the Army conferred familiarly with *Falinus*; and amongst the rest *Xenophō* hapned to say: *why Falinus, we haue now but these two things left; our Armes, and our Vertue; and if wee yeeld vp our Armes, how shall we make vse of our Vertue?* Where to *Falinus* smiling on him, said; *If I be not deceiued, young Gentleman, you are an Athenian; & I beleene, you study Philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are much abused, if you thinke your vertue can withstand the Kings power:* Here was the scorne; the wonder followed, which was, that this young Scholler, or Philosopher, after all the Captaines were murthered in parly by Treason, Conducted those ten Thousand foote, through the heart of all the Kings high Countries from *Babylon* to *Grecia* in safety, in despight of all the Kings forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding, to make invasion vpon the Kings of *Persia*; as was after purposed by *Iason* the Thessalian; attempted by *Agessilaus* the Spartan, and atchieued by *Alexander* the Macedonian; all, vpon the ground of the act of that young Scholler.

To proceede now from Imperiall and Military vertue, to Morall and private vertue; first, it is an as-



fured truth, which is contained in the Verses:

*Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,*

*Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.*

It taketh away the wildenesse, & Barbarisme & fiercenesse of mens minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon, *fideliter*. For a little superficial learning doth rather worke a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency; by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the minde to ballance reasons on both sides, and to turne backe the first offers and conceits of the minde, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vaine admiration of anything, which is the roote of all weakenesse. For all things are admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation throughly, but will finde that printed in his heart, *Nil novi super terram*: Neither can any man marvaile at the play of Puppets, that goeth behinde the Curtaine, and adviseth well of the Motion. And for Magnitude, as *Alexander* the great, after that he was vsed to great Armies, and the great Conquests of the spacious Provinces in *Asia*; when hee receiued letters out of *Greece*, of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage, or a Fort, or some walled Towne at the most, he said: *It seemed to him, that hee was advertised of the Battailles of the Frogs, and the Mise, that the old tales went of.*



So certainly, if a man meditate vpon the Univerfall frame of Nature, the earth with men vpon it (the Divinenesse of foules except) will not seeme much other, then an Ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corne, and some carry their young: and some goe empty, and all too and fro, a little heape of Dust. It taketh away, or mitigateth feare of Death, or aduersfortune: which is one of the greatest impediments of Vertue, and imperfections of manners. For if a mans minde bee deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mortality. and corruptible nature of things, he will easily concurre with *Epicetus*, who went forth one day, and saw a Woman weeping for her Pitcher of earth, that was broken; and went forth the next day, and saw a Woman weeping for her Sonne that was Dead, and therevpon said: *Heri, vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori*. And therefore *Virgil* did excellently, and profoundly couple the Knowledge of cause, and the conquest of all feares, together, as *Concomitantia*.

*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,  
Quiq; metus omnes, & inexorabile fatum  
Subiecit pedibus, strepitumq; Acherontis auari.*

It were too long to goe over the particular remedies, which Learning doth Minister, to all the diseases of the mind, sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping Digestion, sometimes encreasing



appetite, sometimes healing the woundes and exultations thereof, and the like; and therefore I will Conclude with that which hath *Rationem totius*; which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the mind, not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof; but still to be capable, and susceptible of growth and Reformation. For the vnlearned man knowes not, what it is to descend into himselfe, or to call himselfe to account, nor the pleasure of that *Suavissima vita, indies sentire se fieri meliorem*: The good parts he hath, he will learne to shew to the full, & vse them dexterously, but not much to encrease them: The faults he hath, hee will learne how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill Mower, that mowes on still, and never whets his Syth: whereas, with the learned man, it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his minde, with the vse and employment thereof: Nay farther in generall and in sum: certaine it is, that *Veritas & Bonitas* differ, but as the Seale and the Print: for Truth prints Goodnesse, and they be the clouds of Errour, which descend in the stormes of passions and perturbations.

For Morall vertue, let vs passe on to matter of power and commandement, and consider whether in right Reason, there be any comparable with that, where-with Knowledge investeth and Crowneth mans nature. We see the dignity of the Commandement, is according to the dignity of the Commaunded: to haue commaundement over Beasts, as  
Heard-



Heard-men haue, is a thing contemptible : to haue commandement ouer Children, as Schoole-masters haue, is a matter of small honor : to haue commandment ouer Gally-flaues, is a disparagement, rather then an honour. Neither is the commaundement of Tyrants, much better over people, which haue put off the Generosity of their mindes: And therefore it was ever holden, that honours in free Monarchies and common-wealthes, had a sweetnesse more then in Tyrannies, because the commandement extendeth more over the wils of men, and not onely ouer their deeds and services. And therefore when *Virgil* putteth himselfe forth to attribute to *Augustus Caesar* the best of humane honours, he doth it in these words:

*Victorq; volentes*

*Per populos, dat iura, viamq; affectat Olympo:*

But yet the commaundement of Knowledge, is yet higher, then the commaundement over the will: for it is a commaundement ouer the reason, beleefe, and vnderstanding of man, which is the highest part of the minde, and giueth law to the will it selfe. For there is no power on earth, which setteth a Throne or Chayre of Estate in the spirits and soules of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beleefes; but Knowledge and Learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreame pleasure, that Arch-heretiques, and false Prophets, and Impostors are transported with, when they once finde in themselves, that they haue a superiority in the faith  
and



and Conscience of men; so great, as if they haue once tasted of it, it is seldome seene; that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it. But as this is that which the Author of the Revelation, calleth the depth or profoundnesse of Sathan: so by argument of contraries, the just and lawfull soveraignty over mens vnderstanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth neereſt to the ſimilitude of the Divine rule.

As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning, is not ſo confined to giue fortune onely to States and Common-wealths: as it doth not likewise giue Fortune to particular persons. For it was well noted long agoe, that *Homer* hath given more men their livings, then either *Sylla* or *Cesar*, or *Augustus* ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses, and donatiues, and distributions of Lands to ſo many legions. And no doubt, it is hard to ſay, whether armes or learning haue advanced greater numbers. And in caſe of Soueraignty, we ſee that if armes or deſcent haue carried away the Kingdome: yet learning hath carried the Priest-hood, which ever haue beene in ſome competition with Empire.

Againe, for the pleaſure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far ſurpaſſeth all other in nature: for ſhall the pleaſures of the affections ſo exceed the pleaſures of the ſenſes, as much as the obtaining of deſire or victory, exceedeth a ſong, or a dinner? and muſt not of conſequence, the pleaſures of the intellect



lect or vnderstanding exceede the pleasures of the affections? wee see in all other pleasures, there is a faciety; and after they be vsed, their verdour departeth, which sheweth well, they bee but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And therefore we see, that voluptuous men turne Friars; and ambitious Princes turne melancholy. But of knowledge there is no faciety, but satisfaction and appetite, are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth to be good in it selfe simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacy, and contentment to the minde of man, which the Poet *Lucretius* describeth elegantly.

*Suaue mari magno, turbantibus equor aventis, &c.*

*It is a view of delight (saith he) to stand or walke vpon the shoare side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest vpon the sea; or to be in a fortified Tower, and to see two Battailles ioyne vpon a plaine. But it is a pleasure incomparable for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry & behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings vpon and downe of other men.*

Lastly, leauing the vulgar arguments, that by learning, man excelleth man in that, wherein man excelleth beasts; that by Learning man ascendeth to the heauens and their motions; where in body hee cannot come, and the like; Let vs conclude with the dignity and excellency of Knowledge & Learning, in that wherevnto mans nature doth most aspire;

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which



which is immortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this tendeth buildings, foundations, & monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the strength of all other humane desires; we see then how farre the monuments of wit and learning, are more durable then the monuments of power, or of the hands. For haue not the Verles of *Homer* continued 25. hundred yeares, or more, without the losse of a syllable, or letter: during which time, infinite Pallaces, Temples, Castles, Citties haue beene decayed, & demolished? It is not possible to haue the true pictures or statuaes of *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Cesar*, no nor of the Kings, or great Personages of much latter yeares: For the originals cannot last; and the Copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the Images of mens wits and knowledges remaine in Bookes, exempted from the wrong of time, and capable of perpetuall renovation: Neither are they fitly to be called Images, because they generate still, and cast their seedes in the mindes of others, provoking and causing infinite actions & opinions, in succeeding ages. So that if the invention of the Shippe was thought so noble, which carryeth riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote Regions in participation of their Fruits: how much more are letters to bee magnified, which as Shippes passe through the vast Seas of time, and make ages so distant, to participate of the wisdome,  
illumi



illuminations and inventions the one of the other: Nay farther wee see, some of the Philosophers which were least divine, and most immerced in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the soule; yet came to this point, that whatsoeuer motions the spirit of man could act, and performe without the Organs of the body, they thought might remaine after death; which were only those of the vnderstanding, and not of the affection; so immortall and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seeme vnto them to be: But we that know by diuine Revelation, that not onely the vnderstanding, but the affections purified, not only the spirit, but the body changed shall be advanced to immortality, doe disclaime in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be remembred, both in this last poynt, and so it may likewise be needfull in other places, that in probation of the dignity of Knowledge, or Learning, I did in the beginning separate Divine testimony from humane; which Method I haue pursued, and so handled them both a part.

Neuerthelesse, I doe not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for me by any Pleading of mine, to reuerse the Iudgement, either of *Æsops* Cocke, that preferred the Barly-corne, before the Gemme; or of *Midas*, that being chosen Iudge, betweene *Apollo* President of the Muses, and *Pan* God of the Flockes, iudged for plenty: or of *Paris*, that iudged for beauty, and loue against Wisdome and Power: Or of *Agrippina*, *Occidat matrem, modo im-*



peret: that preferred Empire with any condition ne-  
 ver so detestable; or of *Vlysses*, *Qui vetulam prætulit*  
*immortalitati*, being a figure of those which prefer  
 Custome and Habite before all excellency; or of a  
 number of the like popular Iudgements. For these  
 things must continue, as they haue beene: but  
 so will that also continue, wherevpon Lear-  
 ning hath ever relied, and which fail-  
 eth not: *Iustificata est sapien-*  
*tia à filiis suis.*

THE





# THE SECOND BOOKE

of Sir *Francis Bacon*, of the pro-  
ficiency and Advancement of  
*Learning, Divine and Humane.*

To the KING.

**I**T might seeme to haue more conue-  
nience, though it come often other-  
wise to passe, (Excellent King) that  
those which are fruitfull in their ge-  
nerations, and haue in themselues the  
foresight of immortality, in their de-  
scendents, should likewise bee more carefull of the  
good estate of future times; vnto which they know  
they must transmitte and commend ouer their dea-  
rest pledges. Queene *Elizabeth* was a sojourner in  
the World in respect of her vnmarried life: and was  
a blessing to her owne times; & yet so as the impres-  
sion of her good Government, besides her happy  
M 3 memory,



memory, is not without some effect, which doth surviue her. But to your Maieſty, whom God hath already blessed with ſo much Royall iſſue, worthy to continue and repreſent you for ever : and whoſe youthfull and fruitfull bedde doth yet promiſe many the like renovations: It is proper and agreeable to be conuerſant, not only in the tranſitory part of good gouernment but in thoſe acts alſo, which are in their nature permanent and perpetuall. Amongſt the which (if affliction doe not tranſport me) there is not any more worthy, then the farther endowment of the world with ſound and fruitfull knowledge: for why ſhould a few receiued Authors ſtand vp like *Hercules Columnes*; beyond which there ſhould be no ſailing, or diſcouering, ſince wee haue ſo bright & benigne a ſtarre, as your Maieſty, to conſider and prosper vs? To returne therefore where we left, it remaineth to conſider of what kind thoſe acts are which haue beene vndertaken, & performed by Kings and others, for the increaſe & advancement of learning, wherein I purpoſe to ſpeake actiuelly without digreſſing or dilating.

Let this ground therefore be laid, that all workes are overcome by amplitude of reward, by ſoundneſſe of direction, & by the coniunction of labours. The firſt multiplieth endeavour, the ſecond preventeth error, & the third ſupplyeth the frailty of man. But the principall of theſe is direction: For *Claudus in via, antevertit curſorem extra viam*: and *Salomon* excellently ſetteth it downe, *if the Iron be not ſharpe,*  
it



*it requireth more strength: but wisdom is that which prevaileth:* signifying that the Invention or election of the Meane, is more effectually then any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speake; for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that haue beene deseruers towards the State of Learning) I doe obserue neuerthelesse, that their workes and Acts are rather matters of Magnificence and Memory, then of progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the masse of Learning in the multitude of Learned men, then to rectify or raise the Sciences themselves.

The Workes or Acts of merit towards Learning are conversant about three objects, the Places of Learning; the Bookes of Learning; and the Persons of the Learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of Heauen, or the springs of the Earth, doth scatter & leese it selfe in the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle, where it may by vnion, comfort and sustaine it selfe: And for that cause the Industry of man hath made and framed Spring-heads, Conduits, Cesternes, and Pooles, which men haue accustomed likewise to beautify and adorne with accomplishments of Magnificence and state, as well as of vse and necessity: So this excellent liquor of Knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration, or spring from humane sense, would soone perish and vanish to obliuion, if it were not preserved in Bookes, Traditions, Conferences, and  
Places



Places appointed, as Vniversities, Colledges, and Schooles, for the receipt & comforting of the same.

The workes which concerne the Seats and Places of learning, are foure; Foundations, and Buildings, Endowments with Revenewes, Endowments with Franchizes and Priviledges, Institutions and Ordinances for gouernment, all tending to quietnesse and privatenesse of life, and discharge of cares and troubles, much like the stations, which *Virgil* prescribeth for the hiuing of Bees.

*Principio sedes Apibus, statioq<sup>ue</sup> petenda:*

*Quo neq<sup>ue</sup> sit ventis aditus, &c.*

The workes touching bookes are two: First Libraries, which are as the Shrynes, where all the reliques of the antient Saints, full of true vertue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved, and reposed; Secondly, New Editions of Authors, with more correct impressions, more faithfull translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent Annotations, and the like.

The workes pertaining to the persons of Learned men (besides the advancement and countenancing of them in generall) are two: The reward and designation of Readers in Sciences already extant and invented: and the reward and designation of Writers and Enquirers, concerning any parts of Learning, not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

These are summarily the Workes and Acts, wherein the merits of many excellent Princes, and other worthy Personages haue beene conversant.



fant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to minde what *Cicero* said, when hee gaue generall thanks. *Difficile non aliquem; in gratum quenquam praterire*: Let vs rather according to the Scriptures, looke vnto that part of the Race, which is before vs: then looke backe to that which is already attained.

First therefore amongst so many great Foundations of Colledges in *Europe*, I finde strange that they are all dedicated to Professions, and none left free to Artes and Science at large. For if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they iudge well: but in this they fall into the Errour described in the ancient Fable: in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomache had beene idle, because it neither performed the office of Motion, as the limmes doe, nor of Sense, as the head doth: But yet notwithstanding it is the stomache, that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: So if any man thinke Philosophy and Vniuersality to bee idle studies: hee doth not consider that all Professions are from thence serued, and supplied. And this I take to bee a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these Fundamentall knowledges haue beene studied but in passage. For if you will haue a Tree beare more fruite then it hath vsed to doe: it is not any thing you can doe to the boughes, but it is the stirring of the earth, & putting new mould about the Rootes, that must worke it. Neyther is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating

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of Foundations and Dotations to profeffory Learning, hath not onely had a maligne aspect and influence vpon the growth of Sciences, but hath also beene preiudiciall to States and governments. For hence it proceedeth that Princes finde a solitude in regard of able men to serue them in causes of estate, because there is no education collegiate, which is free; where such as were so disposed, mought giue themselues to Histories, moderne Languages, Bookes of pollicy and ciuill Discourse, and other the like inablements vnto service of estate.

And because Founders of Colledges doe plant, and Founders of Lectures doe water: It followeth well in order to speak of the defect, which is in publique Lectures: Namely, in the smalnesse & meane-nesse of the salary or reward, which in most places is assigned vnto them: whether they be Lectures of Arts or of Professions. For it is necessary to the progression of Sciences, that Readers be of the most able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating, and propagating of Sciences, and not for transitory vse. This cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such, as may content the ablest man, to appropriate his whole labour, and continue his whole age in that function and attendance, and therefore must haue a proportion answerable to that mediocrity, or competency of advancement, which may be expected from a Profession, or the Practize of a Profession: So as, if you will haue Sciences flourish, you must obserue *Dauids* military



military law, which was, *That those which staid with the Carriage, should haue equall part with those which were in the Action*: else will the carriages be ill attended: So Readers in Sciences are indeed the Gardians of the stores, and provisions of Sciences, whence men in actiue courses are furnished, and therefore ought to haue equall entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers in Sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill maintained.

*Et Patrum invalidi referent ieiunia nati.*

Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some Alchymist to helpe me, who call vpon men to sell their Bookes, and to build Furnaces, quitting and forsaking *Minerva*, and the *Muses*, as barren Virgines, and relying vpon *Vulcan*. But certaine it is, that vnto the deepe, fruitfull, and operative study of many Sciences, specially Naturall Philosophy, and Physicke, Bookes be not onely the Instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath not beene altogether wanting: For wee see, Spheares, Globes, Astrolabes, Maps, and the like, haue beene provided, as appurtenances to Astronomy & Cosmography, as well as Bookes: We see likewise, that some places instituted for Physicke, haue annexed the commodity of Gardens for Simples of all sorts, & doe likewise command the vse of dead Bodies for Anatomies. But these doe respect but a few things. In generall, there will hardly be any Maine proficiencie in the disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expences about experimēts;



whether they be experiments appertaining to *Vulcanus* or *Dedalus*, Furnace or Engine, or any other kind; And therefore as Secretaries, and Spyalls of Princes and States bring in Bills for Intelligence; so you must allow the Spyalls and Intelligencers of Nature; to bring in their Bills, or else you shall be ill advertised.

And if *Alexander* made such a liberal assignation to *Aristotle* of treasure for the allowāce of Hunters, Fowlers, Fishers and the like, that he mought compile an History of Nature, much better doe they deserve it that travailes in Arts of Nature.

Another defect which I note, is an intermission, or neglect in those which are Gouvernours in Universities, of Consultation, & in Princes or Superior persons of Visitation: To enter into account and consideration, whether the Readings, exercises, and other customes appertaining vnto Learning, anciently begunne, and since continued, bee well instituted or no, and therevpon to ground an amendment, or reformation in that which shall bee found inconvenient. For it is one of your Maiesties owne most wise and Princely Maximes, *That in all vsages and Presidents, the times be considered wherein they first began, which if they were weake or ignorant, it derogateth from the Authority of the Vsage, and leaveth it for suspect.* And therefore in as much, as most of the vsages & orders of the Universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will giue an  
instance



instance or two for example sake, of things that are the most obuious and familiar: The one is a matter which though it be ancient and generall, yet I hold to be an error, which is, that Schollers in Vniuersities come too soone, and too vnripe to Logick and Rhetorick; Arts fitter for Graduates then Children, & Novices: For these two rightly taken, are the grauest of Sciences, being the Art of Arts, the one for Iudgment, the other for ornament: And they be the Rules and Directions, how to set forth and dispose matter; & therefore for minds empty & vnfraught with matter, & which haue not gathered that which *Cicero* calleth *Sylua* & *Supellex*, stufte and variety to beginne with those Arts (as if one should learne to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the Winde) doth work but this effect: that the wisdom of those Arts which is great and vniuersall, is almost made contemptible, & is degenerate into childish Sophistry, & ridiculous affectation. And further, the vntimely learning of them hath drawne on by consequence, the superficiall & vnprofitable teaching & writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of childrē: Another, is a lacke I find in the exercises, vsed in the Vniuersities, which do make too great a divorce between Invention & Memory: for their speeches are either premeditate in *Verbis conceptis*, where nothing is left to Invention, or meerly *Extemporall*, where little is left to Memory: whereas in life & action, there is least vse of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and Inuention: Notes and



Memory. So as the exercise fitteth not the practise, nor the Image the life; and it is euer a true Rule in exercises, that they be framed as neere as may be to the life of practise, for otherwise they doe pervert the motions and faculties of the minde, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when Schollers come to the practises of professions, or other actions of civill life, which when they set into, this want is soone found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part touching the amendment of the Institutions and orders of Vniversities. I will conclude with the clause of *Cæsars* letter to *Oppius* and *Balbus*, *Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt: de his rebus rogo vos, ut cogitationem suscipiatis.*

Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher then the precedent. For as the proficiencie of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of Vniversities, in the same states & kingdomes: So it would bee yet more aduanced, if there were more Intelligence mutuall between the Vniversities of *Europe*, then now there is. We see, there be many Orders and Foundations, which though they be divided vnder severall soueraignties & territories, yet they take themselves to haue a kind of contract, fraternity and correspondence, one with the other, in so much as they haue Provincials and Generals. And surely as Nature createth Brother-hood in Families, & Arts Mechanical contract Brother-hoods in Communalties, and the Anoyntment of God super-



super-induceth a Brother-hood in Kings and Bishops: So in like manner there cannot but bee a fraternitie in learning and illumination, relating to that Paternity, which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.

The last defect which I wil note, is, that there hath not beene, or very rarely beene, any publique Designation of Writers or Enquirers, concerning such parts of knowledge, as may appeare not to haue bin already sufficiently laboured or vndertaken, vnto which point it is an Inducement; to enter into a view and examination, what parts of learning haue beene prosecuted, and what omitted: For the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes of want; and the great quantity of Bookes maketh a shew rather of superfluity then lacke, which surcharge neverthelesse is not to be remedied by making no more Bookes, but by making more good books, which are as the serpent of *Moses*, might devour the serpents of the incantors. The remouing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the last, & of the actiue part also of the last (which is the designation of Writers) are *Opera Basilica*; towards which the endeouours of a private man may be, but as an Image in a crosse way; that may point at the way, but cannot goe it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey of Learning,) may bee set forward by private travaile: Wherefore I will now attempt to make a generall & faithfull perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lye fresh & waft,



wast, and not improved and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory, may both minister light to any publique designation: and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours; wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this time, to note onely omissions and deficiencies; and not to make any redargution of errors, or incomplete prosecutions: For it is one thing to set forth what ground lyeth unmanured; & another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

In the handling and vndertaking of which work, I am not ignorant, what it is, that I doe now moue and attempt, nor insensible of mine owne weaknesse. to sustaine my purpose: But my hope is, that if my extreame loue to Learning carry me too farre, I may obtaine the excuse of affection; for that *It is not granted to man to loue, and to be wise.* But I know well I can vse no other liberty of Iudgement, then I must leaue to others, & I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to performe my selfe, or accept from another, that duty of humanity: *Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c.* I doe fore-see likewise, that of those things, which I shall enter and Register as Deficiencies and Omissions: Many will conceiue and censure, that some of them are already done & extant: Others to bee but curiosities, and things of no great vse: and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility to bee compassed and effected: But for the two first, I referre my selfe to the



the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible, which may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may be done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in succession of ages, though not within the narrow glasse of one mans life: and which may be done by publique designation, though not by private endeavour.

But notwithstanding, if any Man will take to himselfe rather that of *Salomon*, *Dicit piger, Leo est in via*, then that of *Virgil*, *Possunt, quia posse videntur*: I shall be content that my labours be esteemed, but as the better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some Knowledge to demaund a question, not impertinent; so it requireth some sense, to make a wish not absurd.

**T**He *Parts* of humane learning haue reference to the three parts of Mans vnderstanding, which is the seat of Learning: *History* to his *Memory*, *Poesy* to his *Imagination*, and *Philosophy* to his *Reason*: Divine Learning receiue the same distribution, for the Spirit of Man is the same: though the Revelation of Oracle and Sense be diverse: So as Theology consisteth also of *History* of the Church; of *Parables*, which is Divine *Poesie*: and of holy *Doctrine* or *Precept*. For as for that part, which seemeth supernumerary, which is *Trophecie*: it is but Divine History: which hath that prerogative over humane, as the Narration

O

may



may be before the fact, as well as after.

*Historia Literaria.*

*History* is *Naturall*, *Civile*, *Ecclesiasticall* and *Literary*, whereof the three first I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath propounded to himselfe the generall state of Learning to be described and represented from age to age, as many haue done the workes of Nature, and the State Civile and Ecclesiasticall; without which the History of the World seemeth to me, to bee as the *Statua* of *Polyphemus* with his eye out, that part being wanting, which doth most shew the spirit and life of the person: And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the Iuriconsults, the Mathematicians, the Rhetoricians, the Philosophers, there are set downe some small memorials of the Schooles, Authors, and Bookes: and so likewise some barren relations touching the Invention of Arts, or vsages.

But a iust story of Learning, containing the Antiquities and originals of Knowledges, and their Sects; their Inventions, their Traditions; their diuerse Administrations, and Managings; their Flourishings, their Oppositions, Decayes, Depressions, Oblivions, Remoues; with the causes, and occasions of them, and all other events concerning Learning, through the ages of the World; I may truly affirme to be wanting.

The vse and end of which worke, I doe not so much designe for curiosity, or satisfaction of those that are the louers of Learning; but chiefly for a  
more



more serious, and graue purpose, which is this in few wordes, that it will make Learned men wise, in the vse and administration of Learning. For it is not Saint *Augustines*, nor Saint *Ambrose* workes that will make so wise a Divine, as Ecclesiasticall History, throughly read and obserued: and the same reason is of Learning.

*History of Nature* is of three sorts: of *Nature in Course*; of *Nature Erring*, or *Varying*; and of *Nature Altered* or wrought, that is *History of Creatures*, *History of Marvailes*, and *History of Arts*.

The first of these, no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection: The two latter are handled so weakly and vnprofitably, as I am moued to note them as deficient.

For I find no sufficient, or competent Collection of the Workes of Nature, which haue a Digression, and Deflexion, from the ordinary course of Generations, Productions, and Motions, whether they bee singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet vnknowne proprieties, or the instances of exceptions to generall kindes: It is true, I finde a number of bookes of fabulous Experiments, and Secrets, and frivolous Impostures for pleasure and strangenesse.

*Historia Nature Errantis.*

But a substantiall and severe Collection of *Heteroclitics*, or *Irregulars* of *Nature*, well examined and described I finde not: specially not with due reiection of fables, and popular Errours: For, as



things are, if any vntruth in Nature bee once on foote, what by reason of the neglect of examination, and countenance of Antiquity, and what by reason of the vse of the opinion in similitudes, and ornaments of speech, it is never called downe.

The vse of this worke, honoured with a president in *Aristotle*, is nothing lesse, then to giue contentment to the appetite of Curious and vaine Wittes, as the manner of *Mirabilaries* is to doe: But for two Reasons, both of great waight: The one to correct the partiality of Axioms, and Opinions: which are commonly framed onely vpon common and familiar examples: The other, because from the Wonders of Nature, is the neereff Intelligence and passage towards the Wonders of Art: For it is no more, but by following, and as it were, hounding Nature in her wandrings, to bee able to lead her afterwarde to the same place againe.

Neither am I of opinion in this *History* of *Marvales*, that superstitious Narrations of Sorceries, Witch-crafts, Dreames, Divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance, and cleere evidence of the fact, bee altogether excluded. For it is not yet knowne in what cases, and how farre, effects attributed to superstition, doe participate of Naturall causes: and therefore howsoeuer the practise of such things is to be condemned, yet from the Speculation and consideration  
of



of them, light may be taken, not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the farther disclosing of Nature: Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of Truth, as your Maiesty hath shewed in your example: who with the two cleere eyes of Religion and naturall Philosophy, haue looked deeply and wisely into these shadowes, and yet proved your selfe to be of the Nature of the Sunne, which passeth through pollutions, and it selfe remaines as pure as before.

But this I hold fit, that these Narrations, which haue mixture with superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with the Narrations, which are meerely and sincerely naturall.

But as for the Narrations touching the Prodigies and Miracles of Religions, they are either not true, or not Naturall; and therefore impertinent for the story of Nature.

For *History of Nature wrought, or Mechanicall*, I finde some Collections Made of Agriculture, and likewise of Manuall Artes, but commonly with a reiection of experiments familiar and vulgar.

For it is esteemed a kinde of dishonour vnto Learning, to descend to enquiry or Meditation vpon Matters Mechanicall; except they bee such as may bee thought secrets, rarities, and speciall subtilties: which humour of vaine and su-



percilious Arrogancy, is justly derided in *Plato*: where he brings in *Hippias* a vaunting *Sophist*, disputing with *Socrates* a true and vnfaigned inquisitor of Truth; where the subiect being touching beauty, *Socrates*, after his wandring manner of Inductions, put first an example of a faire Virgine, and then of a faire Horse, and then of a faire Pot well glazed, whereat *Hippias* was offended; and said; *More then for curtesies sake, hee did thinke much to dispute with any, that did alledge such base & Sordid instances*, wherevnto *Socrates* answered; *you haue reason and it becomes you well, being a man so trimme in your vestiments, &c.* And so goeth on in an Irony.

But the truth is, they be not the highest instances, that giue the securest information; as may bee well expressed in the tale so common of the Philosopher, that while he gazed vpwads to the Starres, fell into the water: for if he had looked downe hee might haue seene the starres in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in the Starres: So it cometh often to passe, that meane and small things discover great, better then great can discover the small: and therefore *Aristotle* noteth well, *That the nature of every thing is best seene in his smalest portions*, and for that cause hee enquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a Family, & the Simple Coniugations of Man and Wife; Parent & Child, Master & servant, which are in every cottage;  
Even



Even so likewise the nature of this great Citty of the World and the policy thereof, must be first sought in meane concordances, and small portions: So wee see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of Iron, touched with the Load-stone, towards the North, was found out in needles of Iron, not in barres of Iron.

But if my judgement bee of any waight, the vse of *History Mechanicall*, is of all others the most radicall, and fundamentall towardes Naturall Philosophy, such Naturall Philosophy, as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall bee operative to the endowment, and benefite of Mans life: For it will not onely minister and suggest for the present, Many ingenious practises in all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the obseruations of one Art, to the vse of another, when the experiences of severall mysteries shall fall vnder the consideration of one mans minde: But farther, it will giue a more true, and reall illumination concerning Causes and Axiomes, then is hitherto attained.

For like as a Mans disposition is never well knowne, till he be crossed, nor *Proteus* ever changed shapes, till he was staightned and held fast: so the passages and variations of Nature cannot appeare so fully in the liberty of Nature, as in the trials and vexations of Art.

For



**F**Or *Civile History*, it is of three kinds, not vnfitly to be compared with the three kinds of Pictures or Images: for of Pictures or Images, we see some are Vnfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced: So of Histories, we may finde three kinds, *Memorials*, perfect *Histories*, and *Antiquities*: for *Memorials* are Histories vnfinished, or the first, or rough daughters of History, and *Antiquities* are Histories defaced, or some remnants of History, which haue casually escaped the shipwracke of time.

*Memorials*, or *Preparatory Historie*, are of two sorts, whereof the one may bee tearmed *Commentaries*, and the other *Registers*: *Commentaries* are they which set downe a continuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives or designs, the Counsels, the Speeches, the pretexts, the occasions, and other passages of action: for this is the true nature of a Commentary (though *Cæsar* in modesty mixt with greatnesse, did for his pleasure apply the name of a Commentarie to the best History of the World) *Registers* are collections of Publique Acts, as Decrees of Counsell, Iudiciall proceedings, Declarations and Letters of Estate, Orations, and the like, without a perfect continuance, or contexture of the threed of the Narration.

*Antiquities*, or Remnants of History, are



as was said, *Tanquam Tabula Naufragii*, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of Monuments, Names, Wordes, Proverbes, Traditions, Private Recordes, and Evidences, Fragments of Stories, Passages of Bookes, that concerne not Story, and the like, doe saue and recouer somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kindes of vnperfect Histories I doe assigne no deficiency, for they are *tanquam imperfecte Mistæ*, and therefore any deficiency in them is but their nature.

As for the Corruptions and Mothes of History, which are *Epitomes*, the vse of them deserueth to bee banisht, as all men of sound Iudgement haue confessed, as those that haue fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent Histories, and wrought them into base and vnprofitable dreggs.

History which may bee called *Iust* and *Perfect* History, is of three kindes, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a *Time*, or a *Person*, or an *Action*. The first wee call *Chronicles*; The second *Liues*; and the third *Narrations*, or *Relations*.

Of these although the first bee the most compleate and absolute kinde of History, and hath most estimation and glory: Yet the second excelleth it in profit and vse, and the third in verity  
P and



and sincerity. For *History of Times* representeth the magnitude of Actions, and the publique faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller passages and Motions of men and Matters.

But such being the worke-man-ship of God, as he doth hang the greatest weight vpon the smallest Wyars, *Maxima è Minimis suspendens*, it comes therefore to passe, that such Histories doe rather set forth the pompe of businesse, then the true and inward resorts thereof. But *Liues* if they bee well Written, propounding to themselues a person to represent, in whom actions both greater and smaller, publique and private haue a commixture; must of necessity containe a more true, natieue, and liuely representation: So againe Narrations, and Relations of actions, as the Warre of *Peloponnesus*, the Expedition of *Cyrus Minor*, the Conspiracy of *Catiline*, cannot be but more pure and exactly true, then *Histories of Times*, because they may choose an Argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the Writer: whereas hee that vnder-taketh the Story of a Time, specially of any length, cannot but meete with many blankes, and spaces, which he must be forced to fill vp, out of his owne wit and coniecture.

For the *History of Times*, (I meane of ciuill History,) the providence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordaine and illustrate two exemplar States of the World,  
for



for Armes, Learning, Morall Vertue, Policy and Lawes.

The *State of Grecia*, and the *State of Rome*: The Histories whereof occupying the *Middle part* of time, haue more ancient to them, Histories which may by one common name, bee tearmed the *Antiquities* of the *World*; and after them, Histories which may be likewise called by the name of *Moderne History*.

Now to speake of the deficiencies: As to the *Heathen Antiquities* of the *World*, it is in vaine to note them for deficient: Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of Fables and fragments; but the deficiency cannot bee holden: for Antiquity is like Fame, *Caput inter nubila condit*, her head is muffled from our sight: For the *History* of the *Exemplar States*, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were a perfect Course of History for *Grecia* from *Theseus* to *Philopamen*, (what time the *Affaires* of *Grecia* drowned and extinguished in the affaires of *Rome*) and for *Rome*, from *Romulus* to *Iustinianus*, who may bee truly said to be *Vltimus Romanorum*. In which sequences of Story the Text of *Thucidides* and *Xenophon* in the one, and the Texts of *Linus*, *Polybus*, *Salustius*, *Cesar*, *Appionus*, *Tacitus*, *Herodianus* in the other to be kept intire without any diminution at all, and only to bee supplied and continued. But this is Matter of Magnificence, rather to bee commended then required: and wee speake now of parts of



Learning supplementall, and not of supererrogation.

But for *Moderne Histories*, whereof there are some few very worthy, but the greatest part beneath *Mediocrity*, leauing the care of Forraigne stories to Forraigne States, because I will not bee *Curiosus in aliena Republica*, I cannot faile to represent to your Maiesty, the vnworthinesse of the History of *England* in the Maine continuance thereof, and the partiality, and obliquity of that of *Scotland*, in the latest and largest Author that I haue seene; supposing that it would bee honour for your Maiesty, and a worke very memorable, if this Iland of Great *Brittany*, as it is now ioyned in Monarchy for the ages to come: So were ioyned in one History for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred History, which draweth downe the Story of the Ten Tribes, and of the Two Tribes, as Twinnes together. And if it shall seeme that the greatnesse of this Worke may make it lesse exactly performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compasse of time, as to the Story of *England*, that is to say, from the Vniting of the Roses, to the vniting of the Kingdomes: a portion of time, wherein, to my vnderstanding, there hath bin the rarest varieties, that in like number of successions of any hereditary Monarchy hath bin known: For it beginneth with the mixt Adeption of a Crowne, by Armes and Title: An entry by Battayle, an Establishment by Mariage; and therefore  
times



times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity of Storme; but well passed through by the wisdom of the *Pilote*, being one of the most sufficient Kings of all the number.

Then followeth the Raigne of a King, whose actions howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with the affaires of *Europe*: balancing and inclining them variably, in whose time also began that great alteration in the State Ecclesiasticall, an action which seldom cometh vpon the Stage: Then the Raigne of a Minor, then an offer of an vsurpation, (though it was but as *Febris Ephemera*.) Then the Raigne of a Queene matched with a Forrainer: Then of a Queene that liued solitary, and vnmarried, and yet her government so masculine, as it had greater impression, and operation vpon the States abroad, then it any waies receiued from thence: and now last, this most happy and glorious euent, that this Island of *Britany* devided from all the World, should bee Vnited in it selfe: And that Oracle of Rest giuent to *Aeneas*, *Antiquam inquire Matrem*, should now bee performed and fulfilled vpon the Nations of *England* and *Scotland*, being now revnited in the Ancient Mother name of *Britany*, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations: So that as it cometh to passe in Masseiue bodies, that they haue certaine trepidations and wauerings before they fixe and settle: So it seemeth, that by the providence of God, this Monarchy be-



fore it was to settle in your Maieſty, and your generations, (in which I hope it is now eſtabliſhed for euer,) it had theſe preluſiue changes and varieties.

For *Liues*, I doe finde ſtrange that theſe times haue ſo little eſteemed the vertues of the times, as that the *Writings of Liues* ſhould be no more frequent. For although there be not many Soueraigne Princes or abſolute commanders, & that States are moſt collected into Monarchies; yet are there many worthy perſonages, that deſerue better then diſperſed Report, or barren *Elogies*: For herein the invention of one of the late Poets is proper, & doth well enrich the ancient fiction; for he ſaigneth, that at the end of the threed or Web of every mans life, there was a little *Medall* containing the Perſons name, and that Time waiteth vpon the ſheeres, and aſſoone as the threed was cut, caught the Medals, & carried them to the Riuer of *Lethe*, and about the banke there were many Birdes flying vp and downe, that would get the Medals and carry them in their beake a little while, and then let them fall into the River. Onely there were a few Swans, which if they got a Name, would carry it to a Temple, where it was Conſecrate.

And although many men more mortall in their affections, then in their bodies, doe eſteeme deſire of name and memory, but as a vanity and ventocity:

*Animi nil magna laudis egentes.*

Which



Which opinion cometh from the Roote, *Non prius laudes contempsimus, quàm laudanda facere desivimus*: yet that will not alter *Salomons* iudgement, *Memoria Iusticū laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescit*: the one flourisheth: the other either consumeth to present obliuion, or turneth to an ill odor.

And therefore in that stile or addition, which is and hath beene long well receiued, and brought in vse, *Felicitis memoria, pia memoria, bona memoria*, we doe acknowledge that which *Cicero* saith, borrowing it from *Demosthenes*, that *Bona Fama propria possessio defunctorum*, which possession I cannot but note, that in our times it lieth much wast and that therein there is a Deficience.

For *Narrations & Relations* of particular actions, there were also to bee wished a greater diligence therein, for there is no great action but hath some good penne which attends it.

And because it is an ability not commonly to Write a good History, as may well appeare by the small number of them: yet if particularity of actions memorable, were but tolerably reported as they passe, the compiling of a compleat History of times mought bee the better expected, when a Writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations might bee as a Nursery garden, whereby to plant a faire and stately garden, when time should serue.

There is yet another 'portion of History which *Cornelius Tacitus* maketh, which is not to be forgotten



ten specially with that application, which hee accoupleth it withall, *Annals* and *Journals*, appropriating to the former, Matters of estate, to the latter, Acts and Accidents of a meaner nature. For giuing but a touch of certaine Magnificent buildings, he addeth, *Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis Actis mandare*. So as there is a kinde of contemplatiue Heraldry, as well as Civill.

And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more then confusion of degrees: So it doth not a little imbase the Authority of an History, to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of Ceremony, or matters of Novelty, with matters of State: But the vse of a *Iournall* hath not onely bin in the History of Time, but likewise in the History of Persons, and chiefly of actions; for Princes in ancient time had vpon poynt of honour and policy both, *Journals* kept, was passed day by day: For we see the Chronicle which was read before *Ahasuerus*, when he could not take rest, contained matter of affaires indeed, but such as had passed in his owne time, and very lately before: But the *Iournall* of *Alexanders* House expressed every small particularity, euen concerning his Person and Court; and it is yet an vse well receiued in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of War, Navigations, & the like, to keepe *Dyaries* of that which passeth continually.

I cannot likewise bee ignorant of a forme of Writing, which some graue and Wise men haue vsed,



vsed, containing a scattered History of those actions, which they haue thought worthy of memory, with politique Discourse and obseruation therevpon; not incorporate into the History, but separately, and as the more principall in their intention: which kinde of *Ruminated History*, I thinke more fit to place amongst bookes of Policy, whereof wee shall hereafter speake, then amongst Bookes of History: for it is the true office of History to represent the events themselues, together with the Counsels, and to leaue the observations and conclusions therevpon, to the liberty & faculty of every mans iudgement: But Mixtures, are things irregular, whereof no man can define.

So also is there another kinde of History many-foldly mixt, and that is *History of Cosmography*, being compounded of Naturall History in respect of the Regions themselues, of History ciuill, in respect of the Habitations, Regiments & Manners of the people; and the *Mathematiques* in respect of the Climats, and configurations towards the Heauens, which part of Learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most Proficiency. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in a vertuous emulation with Antiquity, that this great Building of the world, had neuer *through lights* made in it, till the age of vs and our Fathers: For although they had knowledge of the *Antipodes*.

*Nosq, ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis:*

2

*Illis*



*Illic fera rubens accendit lumina vesper:*

Yet that might bee by demonstration, and not in fact, and if by Travaile, it requireth the Voyage but of halfe the Globe. But to circle the earth, as the Heauenly bodies doe, was not done, nor enterprised, till these latter times: And therefore these times may iustly beare in their word, not only *Plus ultra* in precedence of the ancient *Non ultra*, and *Imitabile fulmen*, in precedence of the ancient:

*Non imitabile fulmen,*

*Demens qui nymbos & non imitabile fulmen, &c.*

--- *Imitabile Cælum:*

But likewise, in respect of the many memorable Voyages after the manner of Heauen, about the Globe of the earth.

And this Proficiency in Navigation, and Discoveries, may plant also an expectation of the further proficiency, and augmentation of all Sciences, because it may seeme they are ordained by God to bee *Coevals*, that is, to meete in one Age.

For so the Prophet *Daniel* speaking of the latter times, fore-telleth: *Plurimi pertransibunt, & Multiplex erit Scientia*, as if the opennesse and through passage of the World, and the encrease of Knowledge were appointed to bee in the same ages, as we see it is already performed in great part, the Learning of these latter times not much giuing place to the former two Periods or Returnes of Learning, the one of the *Græcians*, the other of the *Romanes*.

*History*



**H**istory Ecclesiasticall, receiveth the same divisions with History Civill, but farther in the propriety thereof may bee divided into History of the Church, by a generall name. History of Prophecy, and History of Providence: The first describeth the times of the militant Church; whether it be fluctuant, as the Arke of Noah, or moueable, as the Arke in the Wildernesse: Or at rest, as the Arke in the Temple: that is, the state of the Church in Persecution, in Remooue, and in Peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient, only I would the vertue and sincerity of it, were according to the masse, and quantity. But I am now in hand with censures, but with omissions.

The second, which is History of Prophecy, consisteth of two Relatiues, the Prophecie, & the accomplishment; & therefore the nature of such a worke ought to be, that every Prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same, throughout the ages of the world, both for the better confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination of the Church, touching those parts of Prophecies, which are yet vnfulfilled: allowing neverthelesse that Latitude, which is agreeable & familiar vnto Divine Prophecies, being of the nature of the Author, with whom a thousand yeares are but as one day, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually, at once, but haue springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many Ages, though the height or fulnesse of them may referre to some one Age:



*Of the advancement of Learning,*

This is a worke which I finde deficient, but is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reuerence, or not at all.

The third, which is *History of Providence*, containeth that excellent correspondence, which is betweene Gods revealed will, and his secret will: Which though it bee so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the Naturall man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the Tabernacle: Yet at some times it pleaseth God for our better establishment, and the confuting of those which are as without God in the World; to write it in such Text and Capitall Letters, that, as the Prophet saith, *hee that runneth by, may read it*, that is, meere sensuall persons, which hasten by Gods iudgements and never bend or fixe their cogitations vpon them, are neverthelesse in their passage & Race virged to discerne it.

Such are the notable events and examples of Gods iudgements, chastizements, deliuerances and blessings: And this is a worke which hath passed through the labours of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

There are also other parts of Learning which are *Appendices to History*, for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of Wordes and deeds: whereof History doth properly receiue and retaine in Memory the Deedes, and it in wordes, yet but as Inducements and passages to Deedes: So are there other Bookes and Writings, which are appropriat to  
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the custody, and receite of Wordes only: which likewise are of three sorts: *Orationes*, *Letters*, and *Briefe speeches*, or *Sayings*: *Orationes* are Pleadings, Speeches of Counsell; Laudatives, Invectives, Apologies, Reprehensions: *Orationes* of Formality, or Ceremony, and the like: *Letters* are according to all the variety of occasions; Advertisements, Advices, Directions, Propositions, Petitions, Commendatory, Expostulatory, Satisfactory, of Complement, of pleasure, of Discourse, and all other passages of Action.

And such as are written for Wise men, are of all the words of Man, in my iudgement the best, for they are more Naturall then *Orationes*, and publike speeches, and more advised then conferences, or present speeches: So againe *Letters* of Affaires from such as Manage them, or are priuy to them, are of all others the best instructions for History, and to a diligent reader, the best Histories in themselves. For *Apothegmes*: It is a great losse of that Booke of *Cæsars*; for as his History, and those few *Letters* of his which wee haue, and those *Apothegmes* which were of his owne, excell all mens else: So I suppose would his Collection of *Apothegmes* haue done; for as for those which are Collected by others, either I haue no tast in such Matters, or else their choice hath not beene happy. But vpon these three kindes of Writings I doe not insist, because I haue no deficiencies to propound concerning them.



Thus much therefore concerning History, which is that part of Learning, which answereth to one of the Cells, *Domiciles*, or offices of the mind of Man; which is that of the Memory.

**P**oesy is a part of Learning in measure of Wordes for the most part restrained; but in all other points extreamely licensed; and doth truly referre to the Imagination: Which being not tied to the Lawes of Matter; may at pleasure ioyne that which Nature hath severed; and seuer that which Nature hath joyned, and so make vnlawfull Matches and Divorces of things: *Pictoribus atq; Toetis, &c.* It is taken in two senses in respect of Wordes or Matter: In the first sense it is but a *Character* of stile, and belongeth to Artes of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In the latter, it is (as hath beene said) one of the principall portions of Learning; and is nothing else but *Fained History*, which may be stiled as well in Prose as in Verse.

The Vse of this *Fained Historie*, hath beene to giue some shadowe of satisfaction to the mind of Man in those points, wherein the Nature of things doth deny it, the World being in proportion inferiour to the soule: By reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of Man, a more ample Greatnesse, a more exact Goodnesse; and a more absolute variety then can bee found in the Nature of things. Therefore, because the acts  
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or events of true *History*, haue not that Magnitude, which satisfieth the mind of Man, *Poesy* fayneth Acts and Events Greater and more Heroicall; because true *History* propoundeth the succesles and issues of actions, not so agreeable to the merits of Vertue and Vice, therefore *Poesy* faines them more iust in retribution, and more according to Revealed prouidence, because true *History* representeth Actions and Events, more ordinary and lesse inter-changed, therefore *Poesy* endueth them with more Rarenesse, and more vnexpected, and alternatiue Variations. So as it appeareth that *Poesy* serueth and conferreth to Magnanimity, Morality, and to Delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to haue some participation of Diuinesse, because it doth raise and erect the Mind, by submitting the shewes of things to the desires of the Minde; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the minde vnto the Nature of things.

And we see that by these insinuations and congruities with mans nature and pleasure, ioyned also with the agreement and confort it hath with Musicke, it hath had accesse and estimation in rude times, and barbarous Regions, where other Learning stood exclvded.

The diuision of *Poesy* which is aptest in the propriety thereof (besides those diuisions which are commō vnto it with history: as fained Chronicles, fayned Liues, and the Appendices of History, as fained Epistles, fained Orations, and the rest) is into *Poesy*,  
*Narra-*



*Narrations*; *Representative*, and *Allusive*. The *Narrative* is a meere imitation of History with the excesses before remembred; choosing for subject commonly Wars, and love; rarely State, and sometimes Pleasure or Mirth.

*Representative* is as a visible History, and is an Image of Actions as if they were present as History is of actions, in nature as they are, (that is) past *Allusive* or *Parabolicall*, is a *Narration* applyed only to expresse some speciall purpose or conceit. Which latter kinde of *Parabolicall* wisdom was much more in vse in the ancient times; as by the Fables of *Aesope*, and the briefe sentences of the seauen, and the vse of *Hieroglyphiks* may appeare.

And the cause was for that then of necessity to expresse any point of reason, which was more sharpe or subtile then the vulgar in that manner, because men in those times wanted both variety of examples, and subtilty of Conceite: And as *Hieroglyphikes* were before Letters, so Parables were before arguments: And neuerthelesse now, and at all times they doe retaine much life and vigor, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.

But there remaineth yet another vse of *Poesy Parabolicall*, opposite to that which wee last mentioned: For that tendeth to demonstrate, and illustrate that which is taught or deliuered, and this other to retire and obscure it: That is when the Secrets and Misteries of Religion, Policy, or Philosophy,



phy, are involed in Fables and Parables.

Of this in Divine Poesy, wee see the vse is authorised. In Heathen Poesy, wee see the exposition of Fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity, as in the Fable that the Gyants being overthrowne in their Warre against the Gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame.

*Illam terra Parens ira irritata Deorum,  
Extremam, ut perhibent, Cæo Enceladoq, Sororem  
Progenuit.*

Expounded that when Princes and Monarches haue suppressed actuall and open Rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of Rebellion) doth bring forth Libels and slaunders, and taxations of the States, which is of the same kinde with Rebellion, but more Feminine: So in the Fable that the rest of the Gods hauing conspired to binde *Iupiter*, *Pallas* called *Briareus* with his hundred hands to his aide, expounded, that Monarchies neede not feare any courbing of their absolutenesse by Mighty Subiects, as long as by Wisdome they keepe the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on their side: So in the Fable, that *Achilles* was brought vp vnder *Chiron* the *Centaure*, who was part a Man, and part a Beast, Expounded Ingeniously, but corruptly by Machiauell, that it belongeth to the education and disci-

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pline of Princes, to know as well how to play the part of the Lyon in violence, and the Foxe in guile, as of the Man in vertue and Iustice.

Neverthelesse in many the like incounters, I doe rather thinke that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, then that the Morall was first, and therevpon the Fable framed. For I find it was an auncient vanity, in *Chrisippus*, that troubled himselfe with great contention to fasten the assertions of the *Stoickes* vpon the fictions of the auncient Poets: But yet that all the Fables and fictions of the Poets, were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion.

Surely of those Poets which are now extant, even *Homer* himselfe, (notwithstanding hee was made a kinde of Scripture, by the latter schooles of the *Grecians*) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce, that his Fables had no such inwardnesse in his owne meaning: But what they may haue vpon a more originall tradition, is not easy to affirme, for he was not the inventor of many of them.

In this third part of Learning which is Poesie, I can report no deficiency. For being as a plant that commeth to the lust of the earth, without a formall seede, it hath sprung vp, and spread abroad, more then any other kinde: But to ascribe vnto it that which is due for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions and customes, we are beholding to Poets, more then to the Philosophers workes, and for Wit and Eloquence, not much lesse then  
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to Orators harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the Theater: Let vs now passe on to the Iudiciall Place or Pallace of the Minde, which wee are to approach and view, with more reverence and attention.

**T**He Knowledge of Man is as the waters, some descending from aboue, and some springing from beneath, the one informed by the light of Nature, the other inspired by divine revelation.

The light of Nature consisteth, in the Notions of the mind, and the Reports of the Senses, for as for Knowledge which man receiueth by teaching, it is Cumulatiue, and not Originall, as in a water, that besides his owne spring-head is fed with other Springs and Streames. So then according to these two differing Illuminations, or Originals, Knowledge is first of all divided into *Divinity* and *Philosophy*.

In *Philosophy*, the contemplations of Man doe either penetrate *unto God*, or are circumferred to *Nature*, or are reflected or reverted vpon himselfe. Out of which seuerall inquiries, there doe arise three Knowledges, *Divine Philosophy*, *Naturall Philosophy*, and *Humane Philosophy*, or *Humanity*. For all things are marked & stamped with this triple Character of the power of God, the difference of nature, & the vse of Man. But because the distributions and partitions of Knowledge, are not like seuerall lines that meete in one Angle, & so touch but in a point,



but are like braunches of a Tree, that meete in a stemme; which hath a dimension and quantity of entirenesse and continuance, before it come to discontinue and breake it selfe into Armes and boughes, therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute one vniverfall Science, by the name of *Philosophia Prima*, *Primitiue* or *Summarie Philosophie*, as the Maine and common way, before we come where the waies part, and divide themselues, which Science, whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtfull.

For I finde a certaine Rapsody of *Naturall Theologie*, and of diuerse parts of *Logicke*: And of that other part of *Naturall Philosophy*, which concerneth the *Principles*, and of that other part of *Naturall Philosophy*, which concerneth the *Soule* or *Spirit*, all these strangely commixt and confused: but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other Sciences, advanced and exalted vnto some height of tearmes, then any thing solid or substantiue of it selfe.

Neverthelesse I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is currant, that the same things are handled but in seuerall respects: As for example, that *Logicke* consisteth of many things as they are in Notion: and this *Philosophy*, as they are in Nature: the one in Appearance, the other in Existence: But I finde this difference better made then pursued; For if they had considered *Quantility*,  
*Simi-*



*Similitude, Diversity*, and the rest of those *Externe Characters* of things, as *Philosophers*, and in nature: their inquiries must of force haue beene of a farre other kinde then they are.

For doth any of them in handling *Quantity*, speake of the force of *Vnion*, how, and how farre it multiplyeth *Vertue*? Doth any giue the reason, why some things in Nature are so common and in so great masse, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any in handling *Similitude* and *Diversity*, assigne the cause why Iron should not moue to Iron, which is more like, but moue to the Load-stone which is lesse like? Why in all *Diversities* of things there should bee certaine *Participles* in Nature, which are almost ambiguous, to which kinde they should be referred? But there is a meere and deepe silence, touching the Nature and operation of those *Common adiuncts* of things, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and vse of them, in speech or argument.

Therefore because in a Writing of this Nature, I avoide all subtilty: My meaning touching this Originall or Vniuersall Philosophy, is thus in a plaine and grosse description by Negatiue: *That it be a Receptacle for all such profitable observations and Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any of the Speciall parts of Philosophy, or Sciences; but are more common, and of a higher stage.*

Now that there are many of that kinde need



not to be doubted: for example; Is not the rule,  
*Si inequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inequalia?*

And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive Justice, and Arithmetical and Geometrical proportion? An Axiome as well of Justice, as of the Mathematiques? Is not that other rule, *Qua in eodē tertio conveniunt, & inter se conveniunt*, a Rule taken from the Mathematiques, but so potent in Logicke as all Syllogismes are built vpon it? Is not the observation, *Omnia mutantur, nil interit*, a contemplation in Philosophy thus, that the *Quantum* of nature is eternall, in Naturall Theology thus, that it requireth the same Omnipotency to make somewhat Nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat, according to the Scripture, *Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum, non possumus eis quicquam addere, nec auferre.*

Is not the ground which *Machiavell* wisely and largely discourseth concerning Governements, that the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce them *ad Principia*; a rule in Religion and Nature, as well as in Ciuill administration? was not the *Persian* Magicke a reduction or correspondence of the Principles & Architectures of Nature, to the rules and policy of Governements? Is not the precept of a Musitian to fall from a discord or harsh accord, vpon a concord, or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the Trope of Musicke, to avoide or slide from the close of Cadence, common with the  
Trope



Trope of Rhetoricke, of deceiuing expectation? Is not the delight of the Quavering vpon a stop in' Musicke, the same with the playing of Light vpon the water?

----*Splendet tremulo sub Lumine Pontus.*

Are not the Organs of the senses of one kinde with the Organs of Reflection, the eye with a glasse, the Eare with a Caue or Straight determined and bounded? Neither are these onely similitudes, as men of narrow obseruation may conceiue them to bee; but the same foot-steps of Nature, treading or printing vpon seuerall Subiects or Matters.

This Science therefore, (as I vnderstand it,) I may iustly report as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of Wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a Bucket of water out of this well, for their present vse: But the spring-head thereof seemeth to mee, not to haue bene visited; being of so excellent vse, both for the disclosing of Nature, and the abridgement of Art.

This Science being therefore first placed as a common parent, like vnto *Berecinthia*, which had so much Heauenly issue, *Omnes Cælicolas, omnes supra alta tenentes*, we may returne to the former distribution of the three Philosophies; Divine, Naturall, and Humane.

And as concerning *Divine Philosophy*, or *Naturall Theology*, It is that Knowledge or Rudiment



ment of Knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his Creatures: which Knowledge may be truly tearmed Divine, in respect of the object; and Naturall in respect of the Light.

The bounds of this Knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince Atheisme; but not to informe Religion: And therefore there was never Miracle wrought by God to convert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might haue lead him to confesse a God: but Miracles haue beene wrought to convert Idolaters, and the superstitious, because no light of Nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God.

For as all workes doe shew forth the power and skill of the workeman, and not his Image: So it is of the workes of God; which doe shew the Omnipotency and Wisdome of the Maker, but not his Image: And therefore therein the Heathen opinion differeth from the Sacred truth: For they supposed the World to be the Image of God, and Man to be an extract or compendious Image of the world: But the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour as to be the Image of God: But only *The worke of his hands*; Neither doe they speake of any other Image of God, but Man: wherefore by the contemplation of Nature, to induce and inforce the acknowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodnesse, is an excellent argument, and hath



hath beene excellently handled by diverse.

But on the other side, out of the contemplation of Nature, or ground of Humane Knowledges, to induce any verity, or perswasion concerning the points of Faith, is in my judgement, not safe: *Da fidei, quæ fidei sunt*. For the Heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and Diuine fable of the Golden Chayne: *That men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter downe to the Earth, but contrariwise, Iupiter was able to draw them vpto Heaven.*

So as we ought not to attempt to draw downe or submit the Mysteries of God to our Reason: but contrariwise, to raise and advance our Reason to the Divine Truth. So as in this part of Knowledge, touching Divine Philosophy: I am so farre from noting any deficiency, as I rather note an excessse: wherevnto I haue digressed, because of the extreame prejudice, which both Religion and Philosophy hath receiued, & may receiue by being commixed together; as that which vndoubtedly will make an Hereticall Religion; and an Imaginary and fabulous Philosophy.

Otherwise it is of the Nature of Angels and Spirits, which is an Appendix of Theology, both Divine and naturall; and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted: For although the Scripture saith, *Let no man deceiue you in sublime discourse touching the worship of Angels, pressing into that hee knoweth not, &c.* Yet notwithstanding if you obserue well

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that precept, it may appeare thereby, that there be two things only forbidden, Adoration of them, and Opinion Fantastickall of them, either to extoll them, farther then appertaineth to the degree of a Creature, or to extoll a mans Knowledge of them, farther then he hath ground.

But the sober and grounded inquiry which may arise out of the passages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations of Nature is not restrained: So of degenerate and revolted spirits; the conversing with them, or the imployment of them is prohibited; much more any veneration towards them. But the contemplation or Science of their Nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spirituall Wisdome. For so the Apostle saith, *wee are not ignorant of his Stratagems*: And it is no more vnlawfull to enquire the Nature of evill spirits, then to enquire the force of poysons in Nature, or the Nature of sinne and vice in Morality; But this part touching Angels and Spirits, I cannot note as deficient, for many haue occupied themselves in it: I may rather challenge it in many of the Writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastickall.

Leauing therefore *Divine Philosophy*, or *Naturall Theology*, (not *Divinity* or *Inspired Theologie*, which we reserue for the last of all, as the Hauen and Sabbath of all Mans contemplations) wee will now proceede to *Naturall Philosophy*: If then it bee true that *Democritus* said, *That the Truth*  
of



of Nature lieth hid in certaine deepe Mines and Caves.

And if it be true likewise, that the *Alchimists* doe so much inculcate, That *Vulcan* is a second Nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which Nature worketh by ambages, and length of time, it were good to divide Naturall Philosophy into the Mine and the Furnace, and to make two professions or occupations of Naturall Philosophers, some to bee Pyoners, and some Smithes, some to digge, and some to refine, and Hammer: And surely I doe best allow of a division of that kinde, though in more familiar and Scholasticall tearmes: Namely that these be the two parts of Naturall Philosophy, the *Inquisition of Causes*, and the *Production of Effects*: *speculative*, and *Operative*, *Naturall Science*, and *Naturall Prudence*.

For as in Civile matters there is a Wisdome of discourse, and a Wisdome of direction: So is it in Naturall: And here I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revieve and reintegrate the mis-applied and abused Name of *Naturall Magicke*, which in the true sense, is but *Naturall Wisdome*, or *Naturall Prudence*: taken according to the auncient acception, purged from vanity and superstition.

Now although it bee true, and I know it well, that there is an entercoarse betweene *Causes* and



Effects, so as both these Knowledges *Speculative* & *Operative*, haue a great connexion betweene themselves: yet because all true and fruitfull *Naturall Philosophy*, hath *A double Scale or Ladder*, *Ascendent* and *Descendent*, ascending from experiments to the *Invention of causes*, and descending from causes, to the *Invention of new experiments*; Therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts bee severally considered and handled.

*Naturall Science* or *Theory* is divided into *Physicke* and *Metaphisicke*, wherein I desire, it may be conceiued, that I vse the word *Metaphisicke*, in a differing sence, from that, that is receiued: And in like manner I doubt not, but it will easily appeare to men of judgement, that in this and other particulars, wheresoeuer my conception and Notion may differ from the Auncient, yet I am studious to keepe the Auncient Tearmes.

For hoping well to deliuer my selfe from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I doe propound: I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from Antiquity, either in tearmes or opinions, as may stand with truth, and the proficiencie of Knowledge.

And herein I cannot a little marvaile at the Philosopher *Aristotle*: that did proceede in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all Antiquity, vndertaking not only to frame new wordes of Science at pleasure: but to confound and extinguish all auncient wisdom; in so much as hee  
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neuer nameth or mentioneth an auncient Author or opinion, but to confute and reprove: wherein for glory, and drawing followers & disciples, he tooke the right course.

For certainly there cometh to passe, and hath place in humane truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: *Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis Me, Si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipitis.* But in this divine Aphorisme (considering, to whom it was applied, Namely to *Antichrist*, the highest deceiuer,) we may discern well, that the *comming in a mans owne name*, without regard of *Antiquity*, or *paternity*; is no good signe of truth; although it bee ioyned with the fortune and successe of an *Eum recipietis*.

But for this excellent person *Aristotle*, I will thinke of him, that he learned that humour of his Scholler; with whom, it seemeth, hee did emulate, the one to conquer all Opinions, as the other to conquer all Nations. Wherein neverthelesse it may be, hee may at some mens hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his Scholler did.

*Felix terrarum Prado, non utile mundo*  
*Editus exemplum, &c. So*  
*Felix doctrina Prado.*

But to me on the other side that doe desire as much as lyeth in my penne, to ground a sociable enter-  
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course betweene Antiquity and Proficiency, it seemeth best, to keepe way with Antiquity *vsq; ad aras*; And therefore to retaine the ancient tearmes, though I sometimes alter the vses and definitions, according to the Moderne proceeding in Civill Government; where although there bee some alteration, yet that holdeth which *Tacitus* wisely noteth,

*Eadem Magistratum vocabula.*

To returne therefore to the vse and acception of the tearme *Metaphisicke*, as I doe now vnderstand the Word; It appeareth by that which hath beene already said, that I intend, *Philosophia Prima: Summary Philosophy*, and *Metaphisicke*, which heretofore haue beene confounded as one, to bee two distinct things.

For the one, I haue made as a parent, or common Ancestor to all knowledge; And the other I haue now brought in, as a Braunch or descendent of *Naturall Science*; it appeareth likewise that I haue assigned to *Summary Philosophy* the common principles and Axioms, which are promiscuous and indifferent to severall Sciences: I haue assigned vnto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the *Relative and Adventive Characters of Essences*, as *Quantity, Similitude, Diversity, Possibility*, and the rest: with this distinction, and provision: that they be handled as they haue efficacy in Nature, and not Logically. It appeareth likewise, that *Naturall Theology* which heretofore hath beene handled  
confusedly



confusedly with *Metaphysicke*, I haue inclosed and bounded by it selfe.

It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining for *Metaphysicke*: wherein I may without preiudice preferue thus much of the conceite of Antiquity; that *Phisicke* should contemplate that which is inherent in Matter, and therefore transitory, and *Metaphysicke*, that which is abstracted and fixed.

And againe that *Phisicke* should handle that which supposeth in Nature only a being and moving, and *Metaphysicke* should handle that which supposeth farther in Nature, a reason, vnderstanding, and platforme. But the difference perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible.

For as wee divided *Naturall Philosophy* in *General* into the *Enquirie of Causes*, and *Productions of Effects*: So that part which concerneth the *Enquiry of Causes*, wee doe subdivide, according to the receiued and sound diuision of *Causes*; The one part which is *Phisicke* enquireth and handleth the *Materiall* and *Efficient Causes* and the other which is *Metaphysicke* handleth the *Formall* and *Finall Causes*.

*Phisicke*, (taking it according to the derivations, and not according to our Idiome, for *Medicine*) is situated in a middle tearme or distance betweene *Naturall History* and *Metaphysicke*. For *Naturall History* describeth the *variety of things*:  
*Phisicke*



*Phisicke* the Causes, but *Variable* or *Respective* Causes; and *Metaphisicke* the *Fixed* and *Constant* Causes.

*Limus ut hic durescit, hic & ut Cera liquescit,  
Vno eodemq; igni.*

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective clay: Fire is the cause of colliquation but respective to Wax. But fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation: So then the Phisicall causes are but the Efficiency and the Matter.

*Phisicke* hath three parts, whereof two respect Nature *Vnited* or *collected*, the third contemplateth Nature *diffused* or *distributed*. Nature is either into one entyre *Totall*, or else into the same *Principall* or *Seedes*. So as the first doctrine is *Touching* the *Contexture* or *Configuration* of *Things*, as *De Mundo, de universitate Rerum*.

The second is the Doctrine *Concerning* the *Principles* or *Originals* of *Times*; The third is the Doctrine *Concerning* all *Variety* and *Particularity* of *Things*: whether it bee of the differing substances, their differing qualities and Natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration; this part being but as a *Glosse* or *Paraphrase* that ascendeth vpon the Text of *Naturall History*.

Of these three I cannot report any as deficient, In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any Iudgement: But they are



are parts of Knowledge not deserted by the Labour of Man.

For *Metaphisicke*, wee haue assigned vnto it the Enquiry of *Formall*, and *Finall Causes*, which assignation, as to the former of them may seeme to bee Nugatory and voide, because of the receiued and inveterate Opinions, that the inquisition of man, is not competent to finde out *Essentiall formes*, or *True differences*; of which Opinion wee take this holde: That the Invention of *Formes* is of all other parts of Knowledge the worthiest to bee sought, if it bee possible to bee found.

As for the possibility, they are ill Discouerers, that thinke there is no Land, when they can see nothing but Sea.

But it is manifest, that *Plato* in his Opinion of *Idea's*, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as vpon a Cliffe, did delcry, *that formes were the true object of knowledge*, but lost the reall fruite of his opinion by considering of formes, as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion vpon *Theology*, wherewith all his Naturall Philosophy is infected.

But if any man shall keepe a continuall, watchfull, and severe eye vpon action, operation, and the vse of Knowledge, hee may advise and take Notice, what are the *Formes*, the disclosures whereof are fruitfull and important to the state

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of



of man. For as to the *formes* of substances (Man only except,) of whom it is said, *Formavit hominem de limo terra, & spiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vite*, and not as of all other Creatures, *Producant aqua, producat terra*, the *formes* of substances; I say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be enquired. No more then it were either possible or to purpose, to seeke in grosse *The formes of those sounds which make wordes*, which by composition and transposition of Letters are infinite.

But on the other side, to enquire the *forme of those Sounds or Voices, which make simple Letters*, is easily comprehensible, and being knowne, induceth and manifesteth *the formes of wordes*, which consist, and are compounded of them, in the same manner to enquire *the forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold: Nay of Water, of Ayre*, is a vaine pursuite: But to enquire *the formes of Sense, of voluntary Motion, of Vegetation, of Colours, of Gravity and Levity, of Density, of Tenuity, of Heate, of Cold, and all other Natures and qualities, which like an Alphabet are not many, and of which the essences (upheld by Matter) of all Creatures doe consist*: To enquire, I say *the true formes* of these, is that part of *Metaphisicke*, which wee now define of.

Not but that *Phisicke* doth make enquiry, and take consideration of the same Natures, but how



how? Onely as to the *materiall & sufficient causes* of them, and not as to the *formes*. For example, if the *cause of whitenesse* of Snow or Froth be inquired, and it be rendred thus: *That the subtile intermixture of Ayre and water is the cause*, it is well rendred, but neverthelesse is this *the forme of whitenesse*? No, but it is the *efficient*, which is ever but *vehiculum formæ*.

This part of *Metaphisicke*: I doe not finde laboured and performed, whereat I marvaile not. Because I hold it not possible to bee invented by that course of invention which hath beene vsed, in regard that men (which is the Roote of all error) have made too vntimely a departure, and too remote a recessse from particulars.

*Metaphisica  
sive de formis  
& Finibus re-  
rum.*

But the vse of this part of *Metaphisicke* which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: The one because it is the duty and vertue of all Knowledge to abridge the infinite of individuall experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of *vita brevis, ars longa*, which is performed by vniting the Notions and Conceptions of Sciences: For Knowledges are as *Pyramides*, whereof *History* is the *Basis*: So of *Naturall Philosophy*, the *Basis* is *Naturall History*: The Stage next the *Basis* is *Phisicke*: The Stage next the *Verticall point* is *Metaphisicke*: As for the *Verticall Point*: *Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usq; ad finem*, the *Summary Law of Nature*, we know not whether



Mans enquiry can attaine vnto it. But these three bee the true *Stages* of Knowledge, and are to them that are depraued, no better then the Giants Hills.

*Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam:*

*Scilicet atq; Ossa frondosum involvere Olimum.*

But to those which referre all things to the Glory of COD, they are as the three acclamations: *Sancte, Sancte, Sancte*: holy in the description, or dilation of his workes, holy in the connexion, or concatenation of them, and holy in the vnion of them in a perpetuall and vniforme loue.

And therefore the speculation was excellent in *Parmenides* and *Plato*, although but a speculation in them, That all things by scale did ascend to vnity. So then alwaies that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be *Metaphisicke*, as that which considereth *the simple formes or differences of things*, which are few in number, and *the degrees and co-ordinations* whereof, maketh all this variety.

The second respect which valueth & commendeth this part of *Metaphisicke* is, that it doth enfranchise the power of Man vnto the greatest liberty, & possibility of workes and effects. For Phisicke carrieth men in narrow and restrained waies, subiect to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary



nary flexuous courses of Nature; But *Lata undique sunt sapientibus viae*: To sapience (which was anciently defined to bee *Rerum divinarum, & humanarum scientia*) there is ever choise of Meanes. For *Phisicall causes* giue light to new invention in *Simili materia*. But whosoever knoweth any forme knoweth the vtmost possibility of *super-inducing* that Nature vpon any variety of matter, and so is lesse restrained in operation, either to the Basis of the Matter, or the condition of the efficient: which kinde of knowledge *Salomon* likewise, though in a more Divine sort elegantly describeth, *Non ardeabuntur gressus tui, & currens non habebis offendiculum*. The waies of sapience are not much liable; either to particularity or chance.

The second part of *Metaphisicke* is the enquiry of *Finall Causes*, which I am mooued to report, not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speake of it. For order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of Sciences: But this misplacing hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the Sciences themselues. For the handling of *finall causes* mixed with the rest in *Phisicall Enquiries*, hath intercepted the severe and diligent enquiry of all *Reall and Phisicall causes*, and giuen men the occasion, to stay vpon these *satisfactory and specious causes*, to the great arrest and prejudice of farther Discouery.

For this I finde done not only by *Plato*, who



ever ancreth vpon that shoare, but by *Aristotle*, *Galen*, and others, which doe vsually likewise fall vpon these flats of *discoursing causes*: For to say that the haire of the *Eye-liddes* are for a quicke set and fence about the sight: Or, that the firmenesse of the *Skinnes and Hides* of *liuing Creatures* is to defend them from the extremities of heate, or colde: Or, that the bones are for the *Columes or Beames*, where-vpon the frame of the bodies of *liuing Creatures* are built: Or, that the leaues of *Trees* are for the protecting of the *Fruite*: Or, that the *Clouds* are for watering of the *Earth*: Or, that the solidnesse of the *Earth* is for the station and mansion of *liuing Creatures*: And the like, is well enquired and Collected in *Metaphisicke*, but in *Phisicke* they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but *Remoraes* and hinderances to stay and slugge the Shippe from farther sailing, and haue brought this to passe, that the search of the *Phisicall causes* hath beene neglected, and passed in silence.

And therefore the naturall Philosophy of *Democritus*, & some others, who did not suppose a *minde* or *Reason* in the frame of things, but attributed the forme thereof able to maintaine it selfe to infinite *essaies or proofes* of *Nature*, which they tearme *Fortune*; seemeth to mee (as farre as I can iudge by the recitall and fragments which remaine vnto vs) in particularities of *Phisicall causes* more reall & better enquired then that of *Aristotle* & *Plato*, whereof both intermingled *finall causes*, the one as a part of  
*Theology*,



Theology, and the other as a part of Logicke, which were the *favorite studies* respectiue of both those persons.

Not because those *finall causes* are not true, and worthy to be enquired being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of *Phisicall causes*, hath bred a vastnesse and solitude in that Tract. For otherwise keeping their precincts and Borders, men are extreameley deceiued if they think there is an Enmity, or repugnancy at all betweene them. For the cause rendred that *The Haires about the eye-liddes, are for the safe-gard of the sight*, doth not impugne the cause rendred, *That Pilosity is incident to Orifices of Moisture: Muscosi fontes, &c.* Nor the cause rendred that *the firmenes of Hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold*: doth not impugne the cause rendred, *That contradiction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts; in regard of their adiacence to forraigne or unlike bodies; and so of the rest;* both Causes being true and Compatible, the one declaring an *Intention*, the other a *Consequence* onely.

Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from Diuine Prouidence, but highly confirme and exalt it. For as in ciuill actions he is the greater and deeper politique, that can make other men the Instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose: So as they shall doe it, and yet not know what they doe, then he  
that



that imparteth his meaning to those hee employeth: So is the wisdom of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one Thing, and Providence draweth forth another; then if hee had communicated to particular Creatures and Motions the Characters and Impressions of his Providence; and thus much for *Metaphisicke*, the latter part whereof, I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper place.

Neuerthelesse there remaineth yet another part of *Naturall Philosophy*, which is commonly made a principall part; and holdeth ranke with *Phisicke* speciall, & *Metaphisicke*: Which is *Mathematike*, but I thinke it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of *Metaphisicke*: For the subiect of it being *Quantity*, not *Quantity indefinite*: which is but a *Relatine*, and belongeth to *Philosophia prima* (as hath beene said,) but *Quantity determined, or proportionable*, it appeareth to be one of the *essentiall formes* of things; as that, that is causative in nature of a number of effects, insomuch as wee see in the Schooles both of *Democritus*: and of *Pythagoras*, that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the principalls and originalls of things: And it is true also that of all other formes (as wee vnderstand formes) it is the most abstracted, and separable from matter and therefore most proper to *Metaphisicke*; which hath



hath likewise beene the cause, why it hath beene better laboured, and enquired, then any of the other *formes*, which are more immersed into Matter.

For it being the Nature of the Minde of Man (to the extreame preiudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a champion Region; and not in the inclosures of particularity: the *Mathematickes* of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfie that appetite.

But for the placing of the Sciences, it is not much materiall; only wee haue endeavoured in these our Partitions to obserue a kinde of perspective, that one part may cast light vpon another.

The *Mathematickes* are either *Pure*, or *Mixt*: To the pure *Mathematickes* are those Sciences belonging, which handle *Quantity determinate* meere-ly seuered from any Axiomes of *Naturall Philosophy*: and these are two, *Geometry* and *Arithmetike*, The one handling *Quantity continued*, and the other disseuered.

*Mixt* hath for subiect some Axiomes or parts of *Naturall Philosophy*: and considereth *Quantity determin'd*, as it is auxiliary and incident vnto them.

For many parts of Nature can never bee in-vented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated



1, 2      *Of the advancement of Learning.*

vnto vse with sufficient dexterity, without the aide and interveining of the Mathematickes : of which sort are *Perspectiue*, *Musicke*, *Astronomy*, *Cosmography*, *Architecture*, *Inginary*, and diuerse others.

In the *Mathematickes*, I can report no deficiency, except it be that men doe not sufficiently vnderstand the excellent vse of *the pure Mathematickes*, in that they doe remedy and cure many defects in the Wit, and Faculties Intellectuall. For if the Wit bee dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fixe it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that, as Tennis is a game of no vse in it selfe, but of great vse, in respect it maketh a quicke eye, and a body ready to put it selfe into all postures: So in the Mathematickes, that vse which is collaterall and intervenient, is no lesse worthy, then that which is principall and intended.

And as for the *Mixt Mathematickes*, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot faile to bee more kindes of them, as Nature growes farther disclosed.

Thus much of *Naturall Science*, or the part of *Naturall Spheculatiue*.

For *Naturall Prudence*, or the part *Operatiue* of *Naturall Philosophy*, wee will divide it into three parts, *Experimentall*, *Philosophicall*, and *Magicall*, which three parts *Actiue*, haue a correspondence & Analogy with the three parts *Spheculatiue*: *Naturall*



*rall History*, *Phisicke*, and *Metaphisicke*: For many operations haue beene invented sometime by a casuall incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment: and of those which haue beene found by any intentionall experiment, some haue beene found out by varying, or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding diuerse experiments the one into the other, which kinde of invention an Empericke may manage.

Againe, by the knowledge of Phisicall causes, there cannot faile to follow, many indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keepe one eye vpon vse & practise. But these are but Coastings along the shore, *Premendolittus iniquum*, For it seemeth to mee, there can hardly bee Discouered any radicall or fundamentall alterations, and innovations in Nature, either by the fortune and Essaies of experiments, or by the light and direction of Phisicall causes.

If therefore wee haue reported *Metaphisicke* deficient, it must follow, that wee doe the like of *Naturall Magicke*, which hath relation thereunto. For as for the *Naturall Magicke* whereof now there is mention in Bookes, containing certaine credulous and superstitious Conceits and Observations of *Sympathies*, and *Antipathies*, & *hidden Proprieties*, & some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement, then in themselves: It is as

*Naturalis. Magia siue Phisica Operatina Maior.*



farre differing in truth of Nature, from such a knowledge as wee require, as the Story of King *Arthur* of *Brittaine*; or *Hugh* of *Burdeaux*, differs from *Cæsars* Commentaries in truth of Story. For it is manifest that *Cæsar* did greater things *de vero*, then those *Imaginary Heroes* were fained to doe. But hee did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kinde of Learning the Fable of *Ixion* was a figure: who designed to enioy *Iuno* the Goddesse of power; and in stead of her, had Copulation with a Cloud: of which mixture were begotten *Centaures*, and *Chymeraes*.

So whosoever shall entertaine high and vaporous imaginations, in stead of a laborious and sober enquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beleeves of strange and impossible shapes. And therefore we may note in these Sciences, which holde so much of imagination and beleeve, as this degenerate Naturall Magicke, Alchimy, Astrology, and the like; that in their propositions, the description of the meanes, is evermore monstrous, then the pretence or end.

For it is a thing more probable, that hee that knoweth well the Natures of *Weight*, of *Colour*, of *Pliant*, and *Fragile* in respect of the Hammer, of *Volatile* & *fixed* in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce vpon some Mettle the nature and forme of Gold by such *Mechanicke* as longeth to the production of the Natures afore rehearsed, then that some graines of the Medicine projected, should in



a few Moments of time, turne a Sea of Quicke-siluer or other Materiall into Gold. So it is more probable, that he that knoweth the Nature of *Acresation*; the Nature of *Assimilation*, of nourishment to the thing nourished; the manner of *encrease*, and *clearing of spirits*: the manner of the *depredations*, which *Spirits make upon the humors and solide parts*: shall, by Ambages of diets, bathings, annointings, medicines, motion and the like, prolong life, or restore some degrees of youth or viuacity, then that it can be done with the vse of a few drops, or scruples of a liquor or receite. To conclude therefore, the true *Naturall Magicke*, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation, which dependeth vpon the knowledge of *formes*, I may report deficient, as the Relatiue thereof is: To which part if we be serious and incline not to vanities and plausible Discourse, besides the deriuing and deducing the Operations themselues from *Metaphisicke*, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution: the first is, that there be made a *Kalender resembling an Inventory* of the estate of man, containing all the inventions, (being the workes or fruits of Nature or Arte) which are now extant, and whereof man is already possessed, out of which doth naturally result a Note, what things are yet held impossible, or not invented, which *Kalender* will bee the more artificiall and serviceable, if to every *reputed impossibility*, you adde what thing is extant, which

*Inventarium  
Opum humana-  
rum.*



commeth the neereſt in degree to that *Impoſſibility*; to the end, that by theſe *Optatiues & Potentials*, Mans inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of workes from the ſpeculation of cauſes; And ſecondly, that thoſe *experiments* be not onely eſteemed which haue an immediate and preſent uſe, but thoſe principally which are of moſt Vniuerſall conſequence for invention of other experiments, and thoſe which giue moſt light to the Invention of cauſes; for the Invention of the Marriners Needle, which giueth the direction, is of no leſſe benefit for Navigation, then the invention of the Sayles which giue the motion.

Thus haue I paſſed through *Naturall Philoſophy*, and the deficiencies thereof; wherein If I haue differed from the ancient, and receiued Doctrines, and thereby ſhall moue contradiction; for my part, as I affect not to diſſent, ſo I purpoſe not to contend: If it be truth.

--- *Non canimus ſurdis reſpondent omnia ſyluæ:*

The Voyce of Nature will conſent, whether the voice of man doe or no. And as *Alexander Bergia* was wont to ſay of the expedition of the French for *Naples*, that they came with Chaulke in their hands to marke vp their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight: So I like better that entry of truth which commeth peaceably with Chaulke, to marke vp thoſe Mindes, which are capable to lodge and harbour it, then that which commeth with pugnacity and contention.

But



But there remaineth a division of Naturall Philosophy according to the *Report of the enquiry*, and nothing concerning the Matter or subiect, and that is *Positive* and *Considerative*: when the enquiry reporteth either an *Affertion*, or a *Doubt*: These doubts or *Non Liquets*, are of two sorts, *Particular* and *Total*. For the first, wee see a good example thereof in *Aristotles* Problemes, which deserued to haue had a better continuance, but so neuerthelesse, as there is one poynt, whereof warning is to bee giuen and taken: The Registering of doubts hath two excellent vses: The one that it saueth Phylosophy from errors and falshoods: when that which is not fully appearing, is not collected into affertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserued in doubt. The other that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges, to draw vse of Knowledge, insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never haue advised, but passed it ouer without note, by the suggestion & solicitation of doubts is made to bee attended and applied. But both these commodities doe scarcely countervaille an inconvenience, which will intrud it selfe if it be not debarred, which is that when a doubt is once receiued, men labour rather how to keepe it a doubt still, then how to solue it, and accordingly bend their Wits. Of this we see the familiar example in Lawyers and Schollers, both which if they haue once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after Authorized for a doubt. But that vse of Wit and Knowledge is to be  
allowed



*Continuatio  
Problematum  
in Natura.*

*Catalogus Fal-  
sitarum gra-  
fantium in Hi-  
storia Nature.*

allowed which laboureth to make doubtfull things certaine, and not those which labour to make certaine things doubtfull. Therefore these *Kalenders of doubts*, I commended as excellent things, so that there be this caution vsed, that when they bee thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thence forth omitted, decarded, & not continued to cherish, and encourage men in doubting. To which *Kalender* of doubts or Problems, I advise be annexed another *Kalender* as much or more materiall, which is a *Kalender of Popular Errors*, I mean chie fly, in naturall History such as passe in speech and conceite, and are neuerthelesse apparantly detected and conuicted of vntruth, that Mans knowledge bee not weakened nor imbased by such drosse and vanity.

As for the *Doubts or Non liquets general or in Total*, I vnderstand those differences of opinions touching the principles of Nature, & the fundamentall poynts of the same, which haue caused the diuerfity of Sects, Schooles, and Phylosophies; as that of *Empedocles*, *Pythagoras*, *Democritus*, *Parmenides*, & the rest. For although *Aristotle* as though he had bin of the Race of the *Ottomans*, thought hee could not Raigne, except the first thing he did he killed all his Brethren; yet to those that seeke *Truth* and not *Magistrality*, it cannot but seeme a matter of great profit, to see before thē the seuerall opinions touching the foundations of Nature, not for any exact Truth that can be expected in those Theories: For as the  
same



same *Phenomena* in Astronomie are satisfied by the receiued Astronomie of the diurnall Motion, and the proper Motions of the Planets, with their *Eccentriques* and *Epicicles*, and likewise by the Theorie of *Copernicus*, who supposed the Earth to moue, & the Calculations are indifferently agreeable to both: So the ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by seuerall Theories & Philosophies, whereas to finde the reall truth requireth another manner of severitie and attention. For, as *Aristotle* saith that children at the first will call every woman mother: but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth: So Experience, if it be in childhood, will call every *Philosophie Mother*; but when it commeth to ripenesse, it will discerne the true Mother. So as in the meane time it is good to see the Severall Glosses & Opinions vpon Nature, whereof it may bee every one in some one point, hath scene clearer then his fellows; therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and vnderstandingly *de Antiquis Philosophijs* out of all the possible light which remaineth to vs of them. Which kinde of worke I finde deficient. But heere I must giue warning, that it bee done distinctly and seuerely; The Philosophies of euery one throughout by themselues; and not by titles packed, and fagotted vp together, as hath beene done by *Plutarch*. For it is the harmonie of a Philosophie in it selfe, which giueth it light and credence; whereas if it bee singled and broken, it will seeme more forraine and

*De Antiquis  
Philosophijs.*



dissonant. For as, when I read in *Tacitus*, the Actions of *Nero*, or *Claudius*, with circumstances of times, inducements and occasions, I finde them not so strange: but when I read them in *Suetonius Tranquillus* gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of time, they seeme more monstrous and incredible; So is it of any Philosophy reported entire, and dismembred by Articles. Neither doe I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise represented, in this Kalender of Sects of Philosophie, as that of *Theophrastus Paracelsus*, eloquently reduced into an harmonie, by the Penne of *Seuerinus the Dane*: And that of *Tylesius*, and his Scholler *Donus*, being as a Pastorall Philosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth. And that of *Fracastorius*, who though he pretended not to make any new Philosophy, yet did vse the absolutenesse of his own sense, vpon the old. And that of *Gilbertus*, our countreyman, who reuiued, with some alterations, and demonstrations, the opinions of *Xenophanes*, and any other worthy to be admitted.

Thus haue wee now dealt with two of the three beames of mans knowledge, that is *Radius directus*, which is referred to nature; *Radius Refractus*, which is referred to God, and cannot report truely because of the inequality of the *Medium*. There resteth *Radius reflexus*, whereby Man beholdeth and contemplateth himselfe.

**V**WE come therefore, now to that knowledge, wherevnto the ancient Oracle directeth vs  
which



which is, *the knowledge of our selues* : which deserueth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth vs more neerely. This knowledge as it is the end and Terme of naturall Philosophy *in the intention of Man*: So notwithstanding it is but a portiō of Naturall Philosophy *in the continent of Nature*: And generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges, be accepted rather for *lines and veines*, then for *sections and separations* : and that the continuance and entirenesse of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular Sciences, to become barren, shallow, and erroneous: while they haue not bin Nourished and Maintained from the common fountaine: So wee see *Cicero* the Orator complained of *Socrates* and his Schoole, that he was the first that separated Philosophy, and Rhetoricke, wherevpon Rhetoricke became an emptie and verball Art. So we may see that the opinion of *Copernicus* touching the rotation of the earth, which Astronomie it selfe cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the *Phainomena*, yet Naturall Philosophy may correct. So wee see also that the Science of *Medicine*, if it be destituted and forsaken by *Naturall Philosophy*, it is not much better then an Empeiricall practize: with this reseruation therefore we proceed to *Humane Philosophy* or *Humanitie*, which hath two parts: The one considereth Man *segregate, or distributively*: The other *congregate or in society*. So as *Humane Philosophy* is either *Simple and Particular*, or conjugate and Ciuill;



*Humanitie Particular* consisteth of the same parts, whereof Man consisteth, that is, of *Knowledges which Respect the Body*, and of *Knowledges that respect the Minde*. But before we distribute so farre, it is good to constitute. For I doe take the consideration in generall, and at large of *Humane Nature* to bee fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by it selfe; Not so much in regard of those delightfull and elegant discourses, which haue beene made of the dignity of Man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like *Adiuncts of his common and undivided Nature*, but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the *sympathies and concordances betweene the minde and bodie*, which being mixed, cannot bee properly assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches; for as all leagues and Amities consist of mutuall *Intelligence*, and mutuall *Offices*.: So this league of minde & body, hath these two parts, *How the one discloseth the other*, and *how the one worketh vpon the other*, *Discovery*, and *Impression*. The former of these hath begotten two Arts, both of *Prediction* or *Prenotion*, whereof the one is honoured with the enquirie of *Aristotle*, and the other of *Hyppocrates*. And although they haue of later time beene vsed to bee coupled with superstitious and fantastickall Arts; yet being purged and restored to their true state; they haue both of them a solide ground in nature, and a profitable vse in life. The first is *Physiognomie*, which



which discovereth the disposition of the minde, by the Lineaments of the bodie. The second is the *Exposition of Naturall Dreames*, which discovereth the state of the body, by the imaginations of the minde. In the former of these, I note a deficiency. For *Aristotle* hath very ingenuously, and diligently handled the fractures of the body, but not the gestures of the body; which are no lesse comprehensible by art, and of greater vse, and advantage. For the Lineaments of the bodie doe disclose the disposition and inclination of the minde in generall; but the Motions of the countenance and parts, doe not only so, but doe farther disclose the present humour and state of the minde and will. For as your Majestie saith most aptly and elegantly; *As the Tongue speaketh to the Eare, so the gesture speaketh to the Eye*. And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes doe dwell vpon the faces and fashions of men; doe well know the aduantage of this obseruation; as being most part of their abilitie; neither can it bee denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great direction in Businesse.

The latter Branch, touching *Impression* hath not bene collected into Art; but hath bene handled disperfedly, and it hath the same relation or *Antistrophe*, that the former hath. For the consideration is double, *Either how, and how farre the humours and effects of the Bodie, doe alter or worke vpon the minde*; or againe, *How and how farre*



*the passions, or Apprehensions of the minde, doe alter or worke vpon the Bodie.* The former of these, hath beene enquired and considered, as a part, and appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of Religion or superstition. For the Physitian prescribeth Cures of the minde in Phrensies, and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibite Medicines to exhilarate the minde, to confirme the courage, to clarifie the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of Diet, and other Regiment of the body in the sect of the *Pythagoreans*, in the Heresie of the *Manicheas*, and in the Law of *Mahumet* doe exceed; So likewise the ordinances in the Ceremoniall Law, interdicting the eating of the bloud, and the fat; distinguishing betweene beasts cleane and vncleane for meat; are many and strict. Nay, the faith it selfe, being cleere & serene from all cloudes of Ceremonie, yet retaineth the vse of fastings, abstinences, and other Macerations and humiliations of the body, as things reall, and not figuratiue. The root and life of all which prescripts, is (besides the Ceremonie,) the consideration of that dependencie, which the affections of the minde are submitted vnto, vpon the state and disposition of the body. And if any man of weake iudgement doe conceiue, that this suffering of the minde from the body, doth either question the Immortalitie, or derogate from the soueraigntie of the soule, hee may bee taught in easie instances, that the Infant in the mothers wombe



wombe, is compatible with the mother, and yet separable: And the most absolute Monarch is sometimes ledde by his seruants, and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocall knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the minde vpon the body; Wee see all wise Physitians in the prescriptions of their regiments to their Patients, doe euer consider *Accidentia animi*: as of great force to further or hinder remedies, or recoveries; and more specially it is an inquirie of great depth and worth concerning *Imagination*, how, and how farre it altereth the body proper of the Imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not, it hath the same degree of power to helpe; No more then a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent Ayres, able suddenly to kill a man in health; therefore there should bee soueraign ayres, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of this part is of great vse, though it needeth, as *Socrates* said, *A Delian diuer*, being difficult & profound. But vnto all this knowledge *De Communi vinculo*, of the Concordances betweene the Minde and the Body: that part of Enquirie is most necessary, which considereth of the *Seates*, and *Domiciles* which the seuerall faculties of the minde, doe take & occupate in the Organs of the bodie, which knowledge hath beene attempted, and is controverted, and deserueth to bee much better inquired. For the opinion of *Plato*, who placed *the Vnderstanding in the Braine*; *Animositie*,  
(which



(which he did vnfitly call *Anger*, hauing a greater mixture with *Pride*) in the *Heart*; and *Concupiscence* or *Sensualitie* in the *Liver*, deserueth not to bee despised, but much lesse to be allowed. So then wee haue constituted (as in our owne wish and advise) the enquiry *Touching humane nature entire*; as a iust portion of knowledge, to be handled apart.

The knowledge that concerneth mans body, is divided as the good of mans body is divided, vnto which it referreth. The good of mans body, is of foure kindes; *Health*, *Beautie*, *Strength*, & *Pleasure*: So, the knowledges are *Medicine*, or *Art of Cure*: *Art of Decoration*, which is called *Cosmetike*: *Art of Activitie*, which is called *Athletike*: and *Art Voluptuarie*, which *Tacitus* truely calleth *Eruditus Luxus*. This Subject of mans body, is of all other things in Nature, most susceptible of remedie: but then that Remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same subtiltie of the subject, doth cause large possibilitie, and easie fayling: and therefore the enquirie ought to be the more exact.

To speake therefore of *Medicine*, and to resume that wee haue said, ascending a little higher; The ancient opinion that *Man* was *Microcosmus*, an Abstract or Modell of the world, hath beene fantastically streyned by *Paracelsus*, and the Alchemists, as if there were to be found in *Mans body* certaine correspondences, and paralels, which should haue respect to all varieties of things, as *Starres*, *Planets*, *Minerals*, which are extant in the great World.

But



But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances, which Nature hath produced, mans body is the most extreemly compounded. For wee see hearbs & plants are nourished by earth and water; Beasts for the most part, by hearbs and fruits; Man by the flesh of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Hearbs, Graines, Fruits, Water, & the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these severall bodies, before they come to be his food & aliment. Adde herevnto that Beasts haue a more simple order of life, & lesse change of Affections to worke vpon their bodies, whereas man in his Mansion, sleepe, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations; and it cannot be denied, but that the *body of Man* of all other things is of the most compounded Masse. *The soule* on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed.

*Purumq; reliquit*

*Aethereum sensum, atq; Aurai simplicis ignem.*

So that it is no marvaile, though *the soule* so placed, enioy no rest, if that principle be true, that *Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, Placidus in loco.* But to the purpose, this variable composition of mans body hath made it as an Instrument easie to distemper; and therefore the Poets did well to conioyne *Musicke* and *Medicine* in *Apollo*, because the Office of *Medicine*, is but to tune this curious Harpe of mans body, and to reduce it to Harmonie. So then the *Subiect* being so *Variable*, hath made the *Art* by consequent more *coniecturall*, and *Art* being *Coniecturall*, hath made so much the more

Y

place



place to be left for imposture. For almost all other Arts and Sciences, are iudged by Acts, or Master-peeces, as I may tearme them, and not by the successes and events. The Lawyer is iudged by the vertue of his pleading, and not by issue of the cause: The Master in the Shippe, is iudged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the Voyage: But the Phisitian, & perhaps the Politique, hath no particular Acts demonstrative of his ability, but is iudged most by the event: which is ever but as it is taken, for who can tell if a Patient dy or recouer, or if a state be preserved, or ruined, whether it be Art or Accident? & therefore many times the Impostor is prized, and the man of vertue taxed. Nay wee see weaknesse and credulity of men, is such, as they will often preferre a Montabanke or Witch, before a learned Phisitian. And therefore the Poets were cleere sighted in discerning this extreame folly, when they made *Æsculapius*, & *Circe*, Brother and Sister, both Children of the Sunne, as in the verses.

*Ipse repertorem medicina talis & artis,  
Fulmine Phœbigenam stygias detrusit ad undas,  
And againe.*

*Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia Lucos, &c.*

For in all times in the opinion of the multitude, Witches, & old women, and Impostors haue had a Competition with Phisitians. And what followeth? Euen this, that Phisitians, say to themselues, as *Salomon* expresseth it vpon an higher occasion: *If it befall*



fall to mee, as befalleth to the fooles, why should I labour to be more wise? And therefore I cannot much blame Phisitians, that they vse commonly to intend some other Art or practise, which they fancy more then their profession. For you shall haue of them: Anti-quaries, Poets, Humanists, States-men, Marchants, Divines, and in every of these better scene, then in their profession, & no doubt, vpon this ground, that they find, that mediocrity and excellency in their Art, maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for the weaknesse of Pati-ents, and sweetnesse of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend vpon Phisitians, with all their defects. But neverthelesse, these things which wee haue spoken of, are courtes begotten betweene a little occasion, & a great deale of sloath and default: for if wee will excite and awake our obseruation, we shall see in familiar instances, what a predominant faculty, *The Subtilty of Spirit*, hath over the *Variety of Matter*, or *Forme*: Nothing more variable then faces and countenances: yet men can beare in memory the infinite distinctions of them. Nay, a Painter with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his Eye, and habite of his ima-gination can imitate them all that ever haue beene, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable then voices, yet men can likewise discerne the personally, nay you shall haue a *Buffon*, or *Pantomimus* willexpresse as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable, then the differing



found of words, yet men haue found the way to reduce the to a few simple Letters; so that it is not the *insufficiency or incapacity of mans mind*; but it is the *remote standing or placing thereof*, that breedeth these Mazes and incomprehensions; for as the sense a far off, is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so it is of the vnderstanding; The remedy whereof, is not to quicken or strengthen the Organ, but to goe nearer to the obiekt; and therefore there is no doubt, but if the Phisitians will learne, and vse the true approaches and *Auenues of Nature*, they may assume as much as the Poet saith;

*Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes,*

*Mille Mali species, mille Salutis erunt,*

Which that they should doe, the noblenesse of their Art doth deserue; well shadowed by the Poets, in that they made *Æsculapius* to be the sonne of the sun; the one being the fountaine of life, the other as the second streame; but infinitely more honored by the example of our Sauour, who made the body of man the obiekt of his miracles, as the soule was the obiekt of his Doctrine. For wee reade not that euer he vouchsafed to doe any miracle about honor, or money, (except that one for giuing Tribute to *Cesar*) but onely about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body of man.

*Medicine* is a Science, which hath beene (as we haue said) more professed, then labored, & yet more laboured, then advanced; the labour hauing beene, in my iudgement, rather in circle, then in progression.

For



For I finde much Iteration, but small Addition. It considereth *causes of Diseases, with the occasions or impulsions: The Diseases themselves, with the Accidents: and the Cures, with the Preservations.* The Deficiencies which I thinke good to note, being a few of many, & those such, as are of a more open & manifest nature, I will enumerate and not place.

The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of *Hippocrates*, which vsed to set downe a Narratiue of the speciall cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, & how they were iudged by recouery or death. Therefore hauing an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not neede to alledge an example forraigne, of the wisdom of the Lawyers, who are caretull to report new cases and decisions, for the direction of future iudgements. This continuance of *Medicinall History*, I find deficient, which I vnderstand neither to be so infinite as to extend to euery *Common Case*, nor so reserved, as to admit none but *Wonders*: for many things are new in the *Manner*, which are not new in the *Kinde*, & if men will intend to obserue, they shall finde much worthy to obserue.

In the inquirie which is made by *Anatomie*, I find much deficiency: for they enquire of the *parts*, and their *Substances, Figures, and Collocations*; But they enquire not of the *Diuersities of the parts; the Secretes of the Passages; & the seats or nestling of the humours*; nor much of the *Foot-steps, and impressions of Diseases*; The reason of which omissions, I suppose

*Narrationes  
Medicinales.*

*Anatomia  
comparata.*



to be, because the first enquiry may be satisfied, in the view of one or a few Anatomies: but the latter being comparative and casuall, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts, is as full of difference, as the outward, and in that, is the *Cause Continent* of many diseases, which not being observed, they quarrell many times, with the humors which are not in fault, the fault being in the very frame and Mechanicke of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be accommodate and palliate by dyets & medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that the more subtile of them appeare not in Anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they bee open and manifest in liue: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of *Anatomia viuorū* was by *Celsus* justly reprobued: yet in regard of the great vse of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so sleightly to haue beene relinquished altogether, or referred to the casuall practises of Surgery, but might haue beene well diverted vpon the dissection of beasts aliue, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfie this inquiry. And for the humours, they are commonly passed over in Anatomies, as purgaments, whereas it is most necessary to obserue, what cavities, nests and receptacles the humors doe finde in the parts, with the differing kinde of the humor



humor so lodged and receiued. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward part, impostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extentions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together with all preternaturall substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like: they ought to haue beene exactly obserued by multitude of Anatomies, and the contribution of mens seuerall experiences; and carefully set downe both historically according to the appearances, and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptomes which resulted from them, in case where the Anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now vpon opening of bodies, they are passed ouer slightly, and in silence:

In the inquiry of diseases, they doe abandon the cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, and others, as passed the period of cure; so that *Sylla* & the *Triumvirs* never proscribed so many men to dy, as they doe by their ignorant edicts, whereof numbers doe escape with lesse difficulty, then they did in the Romane proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt, to note as a deficiency, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases, but pronouncing them incurable, doe enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.

Nay farther, I esteeme it the office of a Phisitian not onely to restore health, but to mitigate paine  
and



and dolours, and not onely when such mitigation may conduce to recouery, but when it may serue to make a faire and easy passage: for it is no small felicity which *Augustus Caesar* was wont to wish to himselfe, that same *Euthanasia*, & which was specially noted in the death of *Antonius Pius*, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleepe. So it is written of *Epicurus*, that after his disease was iudged desperate, hee drowned his stomacke & senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; wherevpon the Epigram was made; *Hinc stygias Ebrius hausit aquas*: He was not sober enough to tast any bitternesse of the stygian water. But the Phisitians contrariwise doe make a kinde of scruple and Religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored, whereas in my judgement they ought both to enquire the skill, and to giue the attendances for the facilitating and asswaging of the paines and agonies of death.

In the consideration of the Cures of diseases, I finde a deficiency in the Receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases: for the Physitians haue frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralties, in adding and taking out and changing *Quid pro quo*, in their receipts, at their pleasures, commanding so ouer the medicine, as the medicine cannot command over the disease: For except it be Treacle and Mythridentum, and of late *Diascoridum*, and a few more, they tye themselves to no receipts seuerely and religiously.



ously : for as to the confectiōs of sale , which are in the shoppes , they are for readinesse , and not for proprietic : for they are vpon generall intentions of purging , opening , comforting , altering , and not much appropriate to particular Diseases ; and this is the cause why Emperiques , & old womē are more happy many times in their Cures , then learned Phisitians ; because they are more religious in holding their Medicines. Therefore here is the deficiency which I finde , that Phisitians haue not partly out of their owne practize ; partly out of the constant probations reported in bookes ; and partly out of the traditions of Emperiques ; set downe and deliuered ouer , certaine *Experimentall Medicines* for the Cure of particular Diseases ; besides their owne *Coniecturall* and *Magistrall descriptions*. For as they were the men of the best Composition in the State of *Rome* , which either being Consuls inclined to the people ; or being Tribunes inclined to the Senate : so in the matter we now handle , they be the best Phisitians , which being learned incline to the traditions of experience ; or being Emperiques , incline to the methods of learning.

*Imitatio Natura in Balneis & Aquis Medicinalibus.*

In preparation of Medicines , I doe finde strange , specially , considering how minerall Medicines haue beene extolled ; and that they are safer , for the outward , then inward parts , that no man hath sought , to make an Imitation by Art of Naturall Bathes , and Medicinable Fountaines : which neuerthelesse are confessed to receaue their vertues from Mineralls:



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rals: and not so only, but discerned and distinguished from what particular Minerall they receaue Tincture, as Sulphure, Vitriol, Steele, or the like: which Nature if it may be reduced to compositions of Art, both the variety of them will be encreased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.

*Filum Medicinale, siue de vicibus Medicinatum.*

But least I grow to be more particular, then is agreeable, either to my intention, or to proportion; I will conclude this part with the note of one deficiency more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence, which is, that the prescripts in vse, are too compendious to attaine their end: for to my vnderstanding, it is a vaine and flattering opinion, to thinke any Medicine can bee so soueraigne, or so happy, as that the Receit or vse of it, can worke any great effect vpon the body of man; it were a strange speech, which, spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaime a man from a vice, to which hee were by nature subject: it is order, pursuite, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in obseruing, yet is recompenced with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would thinke by the daily visitations of the Physitians, that there were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man looke into their prescripts and ministrations, and hee shall finde them but inconstancies, and euery dayes deuises, without any settled prouidence or proiect; Not that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript



script is effectuall, no more then euery streight way, is the way to heaven, but the *truth of the direction* must precede *seueritie of obseruance*.

For *Cosmetique*, it hath parts Ciuill, and parts Ef-feminate: for cleannesse of body, was euer esteemed to proceed from a due reuerence to God, to socie-tie, and to our selues. As for artificiall decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiencies which it hath: being neither fine enough to deceiue, nor handsome to vie, nor wholsome to please.

For *Athletique*, I take the subject of it largely; that is to say, for any point of ability, wherevnto the body of man may be brought, whether it bee of *Activitie*, or of *Patience*: whereof *Activitie* hath two parts, *Strength*, and *Swiftnesse*: And *Patience* likewise hath two parts, *Hardnesse against wants and extremities*; and *Indurance of paine, or torment*; whereof wee see the practises in Tumblers, in Saua-ges, and in those that suffer punishment: Nay, if there be any other facultie, which falls not within any of the former diuisions, as in those that diue, that obtaine a strange power of containing respira-tion and the like, I referre it to this part. Of these things the practises are knowne: but the Philoso-phie that concerneth them is not much enquired: the rather I thinke, because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptnesse of Nature, which cannot bee taught; or onely by continuall custome; which is soone prescribed; which though it be not true: yet I forbear to note any deficien-



ces: for the Olympian Games are down long since: and the mediocritie of these things is for vse: As for the excellency of them, it serueth for the most part, but for mercenary ostentation.

For *Arts of pleasure sensuall*, the chiefe deficiency in them, is of Lawe to repress them. For as it hath beene well obserued, that the Arts which flourish in times, while vertue is in growth, are *Militarie*: and while vertue is in State, are *Liberall*: and while vertue is in declination, are *voluptuarie*: so I doubt, that this age of the world, is somewhat vpon the descent of the wheele; with Arts *voluptuarie*, I couple practises *Iocularie*; for the deceauing of the senses, is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for Games of recreation, I hold them to belong to Ciuill life, and education. And thus much of that particular *Humane Philosophie*, which concernes the body, which is but the Tabernacle of the minde,

**F**OR *Humane knowledge*, which concernes the minde, it hath two parts, the one that enquireth of *The substance, or nature of the soule or minde*; The other, that enquireth of the *Faculties or functions thereof*: vnto the first of these, the considerations of the *Originall of the soule*, whether it be *Native or Adventiue*; and how farre it is exempted from *Lames of Matter*; and of the *Immortalitie thereof*; and many other points doe appertaine, which haue beene not more laboriously enquired, then variously reported; so as the trauaile therein taken, seemeth



seemeth to haue beene rather in a Maze, then in a way. But although I am of opinion, that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired even in Nature, then it hath beene; yet I hold, that in the end it must be bounded by Religion; or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for as the substance of the soule in the Creation, was not extracted out of the Masse of heauen and earth, by the benediction of a *Producat*; but was immediatly inspired from God; so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise then by accident) subiect to the *Laws of Heauen and Earth*; which are the subiect of *Philosophie*; And therefore the true knowledge of the nature, and state of the soule, must come by the same inspiration, that gaue the substance. Vnto this part of knowledge touching the soule, there be two appendices, which as they haue beene handled, haue rather vapoured forth fables; then kindled truth; *Divination*, and *Fascination*.

*Divination*, hath beene anciently and fitly divided into *Artificiall* and *Naturall*; whereof *Artificiall* is, when the minde maketh a prediction by argument, concluding vpon signes and tokens: *Naturall* is, when the mind hath a presention by an internall power, without the inducement of a signe. *Artificiall* is of two sorts, either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is *rationall*; or when it is onely grounded vpon a Coincidence of the effect, which is *Experimentall*; whereof the latter for the most part, is superstitious.



ous: Such as were the Heathen obseruations, vpon the inspection of Sacrifices, the flights of Birds, the swarming of Bees; and such as was the *Chaldean Astrologie*, and the like. For *Artificiall Divination*, the feuerall kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The *Astronomer* hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, Eclipses, and the like. The *Physitian* hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of Diseases. The *Politique* hath his predictions; *O urbem venalem, & cito perituram, si emptorem inuenerit*; which stayed not long to bee performed in *Sylla* first, and after in *Cesar*. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred ouer. But the *Divination*, which springeth from the internall nature of the soule, is that which wee now speake of; which hath beene made to be of two sorts; *Primitiue* and by *Influxion*. *Primitiue* is grounded vpon the supposition, that the minde when it is withdrawne and collected into it selfe, and not diffused into the Organes of the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotiō; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in extasies, and neere death; and more rarely in waking apprehensions, and is induced and furthered by those abstinences, and obseruances, which make the minde most to consist in it selfe. By *influxion*; is grounded vpon the conceit, that the minde, as a mirror or glasse, should take illumination from the fore-knowledge of God, and spirits, vnto which the same Regiment doth likewise conduce. For  
the



the retyring of the minde within it selfe, is the State which is most susceptible of divine influxions; saue that it is accompanied in this case with a feruencie and eleuation, ( which the ancients noted by *Furie*) and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

*Fascination* is the power and act of Imagination, intensiue vpon other bodies, then the body of the Imaginant; for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the Schoole of *Paracelsus*, and the Disciples of pretended Naturall Magicke, haue beene so intemperate, as they haue exalted the power of the imagination, to bee much one with the power of *Miracle-working* faith: others that drawe neerer to Probabilitie, calling to their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the Contagion that passeth from body to body, doe conceiue it should likewise be agreeable to Nature, that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the senses, whence the conceits haue growne, ( now almost made ciuill) of the Mastering Spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like: Incident vnto this, is the enquire how to raise and fortifie the imagination; for if the Imagination fortified haue power, then it is materiall to know how to fortifie and exalt it. And herein comes incrookedly & dangerously, apalliation of a great part of *Ceremoniall Magicke*. For it may be pretended that *Ceremonies, Characters, & Charms* doe worke, not by any *Tacite* or *Sacramental*



all contract with euill Spirits; but serue onely to strengthen the imagination of him that vseth it; as Images are said by the *Romane Church*, to fixe the cogitations, and raise the deuotions of them that pray before them. But for mine owne judgement, if it be admitted that Imagination hath power; and that *Ceremonies* fortifie Imagination, and that they be vsed sincerely and intentionally for that purpose: yet I should hold them vnlawfull, as opposing to that first edict, which God gaue vnto man; *In sudore vultus comedes Panem tuum*. For they propound those noble effects which God hath set forth vnto man, to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easie and sloathfull obseruances. Deficiencies in these knowledges I will report none, other then the generall Deficiency, that it is not knowne, how much of them is veritie, and how much vanitie.

The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, is of two kinds: The one respecting his *understanding* and *Reason*, and the other his *will*, *appetite*, and *Affection*, whereof the former produceth *Position* or *Decree*, the latter *Action* or *Execution*. It is true that the *Imagination* is an *Agent*, or *Nuntius* in both Prouinces, both the *Iudiciall*, & the *Ministeriall*. For *Sense* sendeth ouer to *Imagination*, before *Reason* haue iudged: and *Reason* sendeth ouer to *Imagination*, before the *Decree* can bee acted. For *Imagination* euer precedeth *Voluntary Motion*. Sauiug that this *Ianus* of *Imagination* hath differing



differing faces ; for the face towards *Reason* hath the print of Truth. But the face towards *Action*, hath the print of *Good*, which neverthelesse are faces.

*Quales decet esse sororum.* Neither is the *Imagination* simply and onely a Messenger ; but is invested with, or at leastwise vsurpeth no small authority in it selfe ; besides the duty of the Message. For it was well said by *Aristotle*: That the minde hath over the Body that Commandement, which the Lord hath over a Bond-man ; But that Reason hath over the Imagination that Commandement, which a Magistrate hath over a free Cittizen ; who may come also to rule in his turne. For wee see, that in matters of Faith and Religion, wee raise our *Imagination* above our Reason, which is the cause why Religion sought ever access to the minde by *Similitudes*, *Types*, *Parables*, *Visions*, *Dreames*. And againe in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impression of like Nature, which doe paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chiefe recommendation vnto Reason, is from the *Imagination*. Neverthelesse, because I finde not any Science, that doth properly or fitly pertaine to the *Imagination*, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for Poesy it is rather a pleasure, or play of imagination, then a worke or duty thereof. And if it bee a worke ; we speake not now of such parts of Learning, as the *Imagination* produceth, but of such Sciences, as handle



and consider of the *Imagination*. No more then wee shall speake now of such *Knowledges*, as reason produceth, (for that extendeth to all Philosophy) but of such knowledges, as doe handle and enquire of the faculty of *Reason*; So as *Poesy* had his true place. As for the power of the *Imagination* in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, wee haue mentioned it in the Doctrin *De Anima*, wherevnto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for *Imaginative*, or *Insinuatue Reason*, which is the subiect of *Rhetoricke*, wee thinke it best to referre it to the *Arts of Reason*. So therefore wee content our selues with the former division, that Humane Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, hath two parts, *Rationall* and *Morall*.

The part of humane Philosophy, which is *Rationall*, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightfull: and seemeth but a Net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truely said, that Knowledge is *Pabulum animi*; So in the Nature of mens appetite to this foode, most men are of the tast and stomacke of the Israelites in the desert, that would faine haue returned *Ad ollas carnum*, and were weary of *Manna*, which though it were celestially, yet seemed lesse nutritiue and comfortable. So generally men tast well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, *Civile History*, *Morality*, *Policy*, about the which mens affections praises, fortunes doe turne and are conversant: But  
this



this same *Lumen siccum*, doth parch and offend most mens watry and soft natures. But to speake truly of things as they are in worth, *Rationall Knowledges*; are the keyes of all other Arts; For as *Aristotle* saith aptly and elegantly, *That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments; and the mind is the Forme of Formes*: So these be truly said to be the Art of Arts: Neither doe they onely direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen: even as the habite of shooting, doth not only inable to shoote a neerer shoote, but also to draw a stronger Bow.

The *Arts intellectuall*, are foure in number, divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for mans labour is to *invent* that which is *sought* or *propounded*: or to *iudge* that which is *invented*: or to *retaine* that which is *iudged*: or to *deliver* over that which is *retained*. So as the Arts must be foure: *Art of Enquiry* or *invention*: *Art of Examination* or *Iudgement*: *Art of Custody* or *Memory*: and *Art of Elocution* or *Tradition*.

*Invention* is of two kindes much differing; The one of *Arts and Sciences*, & the other of *Speech* and *Arguments*. The former of these, I doe report deficient: which seemeth to me to bee such a deficiency, as if in the making of an Inventory, touching the State of a defunct, it should bee set downe, *That there is no ready mony*. For as mony will fetch all other commodities; so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the *West Indies* had never beene discou-



ed, if the vse of the Mariners Needle, had not beene first discovered; though the one be vast Regions, and the other a small Motion. So it cannot bee found strange, if Sciences bee no farther discovered, if the Art it selfe of *Invention* and *Discovery*, had beene passed over.

That this part of Knowledge is wanting, to my Iudgement, standeth plainly confessed: for first *Logicke* doth not pretend to invent *Sciences* or the *Axiomes* of *Sciences*: but passeth it over with a *Cuiq; in sua arte credendum*. And *Celsus* acknowledgeth it grauely, speaking of the *Empiricall* and *Dogmaticall* Sects of *Physitians*, *That Medicines and Cures, were first found out, and then after the Reasons and causes were discoursed: and not the Causes first found out, and by light from them the Medicines and Cures discovered.* And *Plato* in his *Theætetus* noteth well, *That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities giue no sufficient direction: and that the pyth of all Sciences, which makeh the Arts-man differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from Tradition and Experience.* And therefore wee see, that they which discourse of the *Inventions* and *Originalls* of things, referre them rather to *Chance*, then to *Art*, and rather to *Beasts*, *Birds*, *Fishes*, *Serpents*, then to *Men*.

*Dictamnium genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida,  
Puberibus caulem folijs, & flore comantem*

*Purpureæ*



*Purpureo: non illa feris incognita Capris,  
Grammina cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.*

So that it was no marvaile, (the manner of *Antiquity* being to consecrate inventors) that the *Ægyptians* had so few humane Idols in their Temples, but almost all Brute:

*Omnigenumq; Deum monstra, & latrator Anubis  
Contra Neptunū & Venerem, contraq; Minervā, &c.*

And if you like better the tradition of the *Grecians*, and ascribe the first Inventions to Men, yet you will rather belceue that *Prometheus* first stroake the flints, and marvailed at the sparke, then that when he first stroake the flints, hee expected the sparke; and therefore wee see the *West Indian Prometheus*, had no intelligence with the *Europæan*, because of the rarenesse with them of flint, that gaue the first occasion: so as it should seeme, that hitherto men are rather beholding to a wild Goat for *Surgerie*, or to a *Nightingale* for *Musique*, or to the *Ibis* for some part of *Phisicke*, or to the *Potlidde*, that flew open for *Artillery*, or generally to *Chaunce*, or any thing else, then to *Logicke* for the Invention of Arts and Sciences. Neither is the forme of Invention, which *Virgill* describeth much other.

*Vt varias vsus meditando extunderet artes,  
Paulatim.*

For if you obserue the words well, it is no other methode, then that which bruit Beasts are capable of, and doe put in vre; which is a perpetuall intend-



ding or practising some one thing urged and imposed, by an absolute necessity of conservation of being; For so Cicero saith very truly; *Vsus uni rei deditus, & Naturam & Artem saepe vincit*: And therefore it is said of Men,

*Labor omnia vincit*

*Improbis, & duris vrgens in rebus egestas;*

It is likewise said of Beasts, *Quis Psittaco docuit suum xaupe?* who taught the Rauen in a drowth to throw pibbles into a hollow tree, where shee spied water, that the water might rise, so as shee might come to it? Who taught the bee to saile through such a vast Sea of aire, and to finde the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her Hiue? Who taught the Ant to bite every graine of Corne, that she buried in her hill, least it should take roote and grow? Adde then the word *Extundere*, which importeth the extreame difficulty, and the word *Paulatim*, which importeth the extreame slownesse; & we are where wee were, even amongst the *Egyptians Gods*, there being little left to the faculty of *Reason*, and nothing to the duty of *Art* for matter of *Invention*.

Secondly, the Induction which the *Logicians* speake of, and which seemeth familiar with *Plato*, whereby the *Principles of Sciences* may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the Principles; their forme of Induction, I say is vtterly vitious and incompetent: wherein their errour is the fouler, because



cause it is the dutie of *Art* to perfect and exalt Nature: but they contrariwise haue wronged, abused, and traduced Nature. For hee that shall attentiuely obserue how the minde doth gather this excellent dew of Knowledge, like vnto that which the Poet speaketh of *Aerei mellis celestia dona*, distilling and contriuing it out of particulars naturall and artificiall, as the flowers of the field and Garden, shall finde that the minde of herselfe by Nature both mannage, and Act an induction, much better then they describe it. For to conclude *upon an enumeration of particulars without instance contradictory*: is no conclusion, but a coniecture; for who can assure (in many subiects) vpon those particulars, which appeare of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appeare not? As if *Samuell* should haue rested vpon those sonnes of *Isay*, which were brought before him, and failed of *David*, which was in the field. And this forme (to say truth) is so grosse: as it had not beene possible for Wits so subtile, as haue mannaged these things, to haue offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their *Theories & Dogmaticals* and were imperious and scornfull toward particulars, which their manner was to vse, but as *Lictores* and *Viatores* for Sargeants and Whiffers, *Ad summovendam turbam*, to make way and make roome for their opinions, rather then in their true vse and service; certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wounder,



to see how the footsteps of seducement, are the very same in Divine and Humane truth: for as in Divine truth, Man cannot endure to become as a child; So in Humane, they reputed the attending the Inductions (whereof wee speake) as if it were a second Infancy or Child-hood.

Thirdly, allow some *Principles* or *Axiomes* were rightly induced; yet neverthelesse certaine it is, that *Middle Propositions*, cannot be deduced from them in *Subiect of Nature* by *Syllogisme*, that is, by *Touch and reduction of them to Principles in a Middle Tearme*. It is true, that the Sciences popular, as *Moralities*, *Lawes*, and the like, yea, and *Divinity* (because it pleaseth God to apply himselfe to the capacity of the simplest) that forme may haue vse, and in *Naturall Philosophy* likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory *Reason*, *Quæ assensum parit, Operis Effæta est*: But the subtilty of Nature and Operations will not bee chained in those bonds: For *Arguments* consist of *Propositions*, and *Propositions* of *Wordes*, and *Wordes* are but the *Current Tokens* or *Markes* of popular *Notions* of things: which *Notions* if they bee grossly and variably collected out of particulars; It is not the laborious examination either of *Consequence of Arguments*, or of the truth of *Propositions* that can euer correct that *Errour*, being (as the *Physitians* speake) in the first digestion; And therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent *Philosophers* became



came *Sceptiques* and *Academiques*, and denied any certainty of Knowledge, or Compréhension, and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended onely to Appearances, and Probabilities. It is true, that in *Socrates* it was supposed to bee but a forme of *Irony*, *Scientiam dissimulando simulavit*: For he vsed to disable his knowledge, to the end to inhanse his Knowledge, like the Humor of *Tiberius* in his beginnings, that would Raigne, but would not acknowledge so much; And in the latter *Academy*, which *Cicero* embraced; this opinion also of *Acatlipsia* (I doubt) was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in Copy of speech, seeme to haue chosen that Sect, as that which was fittest to giue glory to their eloquence, and variable discourses: being rather like Progresses of pleasure, then Iournies to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both *Academies*, did hold it in subtilty, and integrity. But here was their chiefe Errour; They charged the deceite vpon *The senses*; which in my Iudgement (notwithstanding all their Cavillations) are very sufficient to certify and report truth (though not alwaies immediatly, yet by comparison;) by helpe of Instrument; and by proceeding, and vrging such things, as are too subtile for the sense, to some effect comprehensible, by the sense; and other like assistance. But they ought to haue charged the deceit vpon the weaknesse of the intellectuall powers, and vpon the manner of collecting, and concluding



*vpon the reports of the senses.* This I speake not to disable the mind of man, but to stirre it vp to seeke helpe: for no man, bee hee neuer so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadinesse of hand, which may be easily done by helpe of a ruler or Compasse.

*Experientia li-  
terata, & in-  
terpretatio Na-  
ture.*

This part of *Invention*, concerning the *Invention* of *Sciences*, I purpose (if God giue mee leaue) hereafter to propound: hauing digested it into two parts: whereof the one I tearme *Experientia literata*, and the other *Interpretatio Nature*: The former, being but a degree and rudiment of the later. But I will not dwell too long, nor speake too great vpon a promise.

The *Invention* of speech or argument is not properly an *Invention*: for to *Inuent* is to discouer that we know not, and not to recouer or resummon that which wee already know; and the vse of this *Invention*, is no other; *But out of the Knowledge, whereof our mind is already possesse, to draw forth, or call before vs that which may bee pertinent to the purpose, which wee take into our consideration.* So as to speake truly, it is no *Invention*, but *Remembrance of Suggestion*, with an *Application*: Which is the cause why the Schooles doe place it after Iudgement, as subsequent and not precedent. Neverthelesse, because we doe account it a Chase, as well of Deere in an inclosed Parke, as in a Forrest at large: and that it hath already obtained the name: Let it bee called *Invention*; so as it bee perceiued



perceiued and discerned, that the Scope and end of this *Invention*, is readinesse and present vse of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this ready vse of Knowledge, there are two Courses: *Preparation* and *Suggestion*. The former of these, seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge; consisting rather of Diligence, then of any artificiall erudition. And herein *Aristotle* wittily, but hurtfully doth deride the *Sophists*, neere his time, saying; *They did as if one that professed the Art of Shooe-making, should not teach how to make up a shooe, but only exhibite in a readinesse a number of shooes of all fashions & sizes.* But yet a man might reply, that if a shooe-maker should haue no shooes in his shoppe, but only worke, as hee is bespoken he should be weakely customed. But our Saviour, speaking of Divine Knowledge, saith: *That the Kingdome of Heauen, is like a good Houholder, that bringeth forth both new and old store:* And wee see the ancient Writers of *Rhetoricke* doe giue it in precepts: That pleaders should haue the Places, whereof they haue most continuall vse, ready handled in all the variety that may bee, as that, To speake for the literall interpretation of the Law against Equity, and Contrariety: and to speake for Presumptions and Inferences against Testimony; and Contrary: And *Cicero* himselfe, being broken vnto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly; That whatsoeuer a man shall haue



occasion to speake of, (if he will take the paines) he may haue it in effect premeditate, and handled in these. So that when he commeth to a particular, he shall haue nothing to doe, but to put to Names, and times, and places; and such other Circumstances of Individualls. Wee see likewise the great exact diligence of *Demosthenes*, who in regard of the great force, that the entrance and accessse into causes hath to make a good impression; had ready framed a number of *Prefaces* for Orations and Speeches. All which Authorities and Presidents may over-weigh *Aristotles* opinion, that would haue vs change a rich Wardrobe for a paire of Sheares.

But the Nature of the Collection of this *Provision* or *Preparatory store*, though it be common, both to *Logicke*, and *Rhetoricke*; yea hauing made an entry of it here, where it came first to bee spoken of; I thinke fitte to referre ouer the farther handling of it to *Rhetoricke*.

The other part of *Invention*, which I terme *Suggestion*, doth assigne and direct vs to certaine *Markes* or *Places*, which may excite our Minde to returne and produce such knowledge, as it hath formerly collected: to the end we may make vse thereof. Neither is this vse (truly taken) onely to furnish argument, to dispute probably with others; But likewise to Minister vnto our Iudgement to conclude aright within our selues. Neither may these places serue onely to apprompt our *Invention*.



vention; but also to direct our enquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is halfe a knowledge; For as *Plato* saith; *Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for, in a generall Notion; Else how shall he know it when hee hath found it?* And therefore the larger your *Anticipation* is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same *Places* which will helpe vs what to produce, of that which wee know already; will also helpe vs, if a man of experience were before vs, what questions to aske; or if wee haue Bookes and Authors, to instruct vs what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report, that this part of *Invention*, which is that which the Schoole call *Topiques*, is deficient.

Neuerthelesse *Topiques* are of two sorts, *generall* and *speciall*. The *generall* wee haue spoken to; but the particular hath beene touched by some, but reiected generally, as inartificiall and variable. But leauing the humor which hath raigned too much in the Schooles (which is to be vainely subtile in a few things, which are within their command, and to reiect the rest) I doe receiue particular *Topiques*, that is, places or directions of *Invention* and *Inquiry* in every particular knowledge, as things of great vse; being Mixtures of *Logique* with the matter of Sciences: for in these it holdeth; *Ars inveniendi adolescit cum Inventis*: for as in going of a way, wee doe not onely gaine that part of the way which is passed, but wee gaine the better sight of



that part of the way which remaineth: So every degree of proceeding in a Science giueth a light to that which followeth; which light if wee strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we doe greatly advance our pursuit.

Now wee passe vnto the *Artes of iudgement*, which handle the natures of *Proofes* and *Demonstrations*; which as to *Induction* hath a Coincidence with *Invention*: For in all *Inductions* whether in good or vitious forme, the same action of the *Minde* which inventeth, Iudgeth, all one as in the sense: But otherwise it is in prooffe by *Syllogisme*: For the prooffe being not immediate but by meane: the *Invention of the Meane* is one thing: and the *Iudgement of the Consequence* is another. The one *Exciting* only: the other *Examining*: Therefore for the reall and exact forme of Iudgement, wee referre our selues to that which wee haue spoken of *Interpretation of Nature*.

For the other Iudgement by *Syllogisme*, as it is a thing most agreeable to the *Minde* of Man. So it hath beene vehemently and excellently laboured. For the Nature of Man doth extreamely covet, to haue somewhat in his *Vnderstanding* fixed and vnmoueable, and as a Rest, and Support of the *Minde*. And therefore as *Aristotle* endeavoureth to proue, that in all Motion, there is some point quiescent; and as hee elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of *Atlas*, (that stood fixed, and bare vp the Heauen from falling) to bee  
meant



meant of the Poles or Axel-tree of Heauen, where-vpon the Conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men haue a desire, to haue an *Atlas* or Axel-tree within: to keepe them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetuall perill of falling: Therefore men did hasten to set downe some Principles, about which the variety of their disputations might turne.

So then this Art of *Iudgement*, is but the *Reduction* of *Propositions*, to *Principles* in a *Middle Tearme*. The *Principles* to bee agreed by all, and exempted from argument; The *Middle tearme* to bee elected at the liberty of every Mans *Invention*: the *Reduction* to be of two kindes *Direct*, and *Inverted*; the one when the *Proposition* is reduced to the *Principle*, which they tearme a *Probation ostensiuæ*: the other when the contradictory of the *Proposition* is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is, that which they call *Per Incommodum*, or *pressing an absurdity*: the *Number* or *Middle tearme* to be, as the *Proposition* standeth, *Degrees* more or losse, remoued from the *Principle*.

But this Art hath two severall Methods of Doctrine: the one by way of *Direction*, the other by way of *Caution*: the former frameth and setteth downe a true forme of *Consequence*, by the variations and deflexions, from which Errors and Inconsequences may bee exactly iudged. Toward the Composition and structure of which forme, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are  
*Propositions*,



*Propositions*, and the parts of *Propositions*, which are *Simple words*. And this is that part of *Logicke* which is comprehended in the *Analitiques*.

The second Method of Doctrine, was introduced for expedite vse, and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile formes of *Sophismes*, and *Illaqueations*, with their *redargutions*, which is that which is tearmed *Elenches*. For although in the more grosse sorts of Fallacies it hapneth (as *Seneca* maketh the comparison well) as in jugling feats, which though wee know not how they are done; yet we know well it is not, as it seemeth to be: yet the more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answere, but doth many times abuse his Iudgement.

This part concerning *Elenches*, is excellently handled by *Aristotle* in *Precept*, but more excellently by *Plato* in *Example*: not onely in the persons of the *Sophists*, but even in *Socrates* himselfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the formes of obiection, fallace and redargution. And although wee haue said that the vse of this Doctrine is for *Redargution*: yet it is manifest, the degenerate and corrupt vse is for *Caption* and *Contradiction*, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt, is of very great advantage; though the difference bee good which was made betweene Orators and Sophisters, that the one is as the Greyhound, which hath his advantage



tage in the race, and the other as the Hare, which hath her aduantage in the turne, so as it is the aduantage of the weaker creature.

But yet farther, this Doctrine of *Elenches*, hath a more ample latitude and extent, then is perceiued: namely vnto diuers parts of Knowledge: whereof some are laboured, and other omitted. For first, I conceaue (though it may seeme at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to *Logicke*, sometimes to *Metaphysicke*, touching the *Common adiuncts of Essences*, is but an *Elench*: for the great *Sophisme of all Sophismes*, being *Æquivocation* or *Ambiguitie of Words and Phrase*, specially of such words as are most generall and interueine in euery Enquirie: It seemeth to mee that the true and fruitfull vses, (leauing vaine subtilities, and speculations) of the Enquirie of *Maioritie*, *Minoritie*, *Prioritie*, *Posterioritie*, *Identitie*, *Diversitie*, *Possibilitie*, *Act*, *Totalitie*, *Parts*, *Existence*, *Privation*, and the like, are but wise Cautions against Ambiguities of Speech. So againe, the distribution of things into certaine Tribes, which wee call *Categories* or *Predicaments*, are but Cautions against the confusion of *Definitions* and *Divisions*.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the Impression, and not by the subtiltie of the Illaqueation, not so much perplexing the Reason, as ouer-ruling it by power of the *Imagination*. But this part I thinke



202 *Of the aduancement of Learning,*

more proper to handle, when I shall speake of *Rhetoricke*.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kinde of Fallacies in the Minde of Man, which I finde not obserued or enquired at all, and thinke good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectifie *Iudgement*. The force whereof is such, as it doth not dazle, or snare the vnderstanding in some particulars, but doth more generally, and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the minde of Man is farre from the Nature of a cleare & equall glasse, wherein the beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence; Nay, it is rather like an enchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture, if it be not deliuered and reduced. For this purpose, let vs consider the false appearances that are imposed vpon vs by the generall Nature of the minde, beholding them in an example or two, as first in that instance which is the root of all superstition: Namely, *That to the Nature of the Minde of all Men it is consonant for the Affirmatiue, or Actiue to affect, more then the Negative or Priuatiue*. So that a few times hitting, or presence, countervailes oft-times fayling, or absence, as was well answered by *Diagoras*, to him that shewed him in *Neptunes Temple*, the great number of pictures, of such as had scaped Shippe. wracke, and had paid their Vowes to *Neptune*, saying: *Adwise nowe, you that thinke it*  
folly



folly to invoke Neptune in tempest : Yea, but (saith Diagoras) where are they painted that are drowned? Let vs behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of Man, being of an equall and uniforme substance, doth vsually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equality and uniformitie, then is in truth; Hence it commeth, that the Mathematicians cannot satisfie themselues, except they reduce the Motions of the Celestiall bodies, to perfect Circles, reiecting spirall lines, and labouring to bee discharged of Eccentriques. Hence it commeth, that whereas there are many things in Nature, as it were *Monodica: sui Iuris*; Yet the cogitations of Man, doe faine vnto them *Relatiues*, *Paralells*, and *Coniugates*, whereas no such thing is; as they haue fained an Element of fire to keep square with Earth, Water, and Ayre, and the like; Nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and phantasies, the similitude of humane Actions, and Arts, together with the making of Man *Communis Mensura*, haue brought into Naturall Philosophie: not much better, then the Heresie of the *Anthropomorphites* bred in the Celles of grosse and solitarie Monkes, and the opinion of *Epicurus*, answerable to the same in Heathenisme, who supposed the Gods to bee of humane Shape. And therefore *Velleius* the Epicurean needed not to haue asked, why God should haue adorned the Heauens with Starres, as if hee had beene an *Edilis*: One that should haue



set forth some magnificent shewes or plaies? For if that great Worke-master had beene of an Humane disposition, hee would haue cast the Starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the frettes in the Roofes of Houses, whereas one can scarce finde a Posture in square, or triangle, or streight line amongst such an infinite number; so differing an Harmonie, there is betweene the spirit of Man, and the spirit of Nature.

Let vs consider againe, the false appearances imposed vpon vs by euery Mans owne individuall Nature and Custome in that fained supposition, that *Plato* maketh of the Caue: for certainly, if a childe were continued in a Grotte or Caue, vnder the Earth, vntill maturitie of age, and came suddainely abroad, hee would haue strange and absurde Imaginations; So in like manner, although our persons liue in the view of Heauen, yet our spirits are included in the Caues of our owne complexions and Customes: which minister vnto vs infinite Errours and vaine opinions, if they bee not recalled to examination. But hereof wee haue giuen many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which wee ranne briefly ouer in our first Booke.

And lastly, let vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vpon vs by words, which are framed, and applied according to the conceit, and capacities of the Vulgar sort: And although we



we thinke we gouerne our wordes, and prescribe it well. *Loquendum vt Vulgus, sentiendum vt sapientes*: Yet certaine it is, that words, as a *Tartars* Bow, doe shoote backe vpon the vnderstanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle, and peruert the Iudgement. So as it is almost necessary in all controuersies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the *Mathematicians*, in setting downe in the very beginning, the definitions of our words and tearmes, that others may knowe how wee accept and vnderstand them, and whether they concurre with vs or no. For it commeth to passe for want of this, that wee are sure to ende there where wee ought to haue begunne, which is in questions and differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce our selues from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our Nature and Condition of life; So yet neuerthelesse the Caution of them (for all *Elenches* as was said, are but Cautions) doth extremely import the true conduct of Humane Iudgement. The particular *Elenches* or *Cautions* against these three false appearances, I finde altogether deficient.

*Elenchi magni,  
sive de Idolis a-  
nimæ humanæ,  
natiui & ad-  
ventitii.*

There remaineth one part of Iudgement of great excellencie, which to mine vnderstanding is so sleightly touched, as I may report that also deficient, which is the application of the differing kinds of Proofes, to the differing kindes of Sub-



jects: for there being but foure kindes of Demonstrations, that is by the immediate *Consent* of the *Minde* or *Sense*; by *Induction*; by *Syllogisme*; and by *Congruitie*, which is that which *Aristotle* calleth *Demonstration in Orbe*, or *Circle*, and not à *Notioribus*, every of these hath certaine Subjects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectiue they haue chiefeſt uſe; and certaine other, from which reſpectiue they ought to be excluded, and the rigour, and curioſitie, in requiring the more ſeuere proofes in ſome things, and chiefly the facilitie in contenting our ſelues, with the more remiſſe Proofes in others hath beene amongſt the greateſt cauſes of detriment and hinderance to Knowledge. The diſtributions and aſſignations of Demonstrations, according to the Analogie of Sciences, I note as deficient.

*De Analogia  
Demonstrationum.*

The Cuſtodie or retaining of Knowledge, is either in *Writing*, or *Memorie*; whereof *Writing* hath two parts; The Nature of the *Character*; and the order of the *Entrie*: for the Art of *Characters*, or other viſible notes of Words, or Things, it hath neereſt conjugation with Grammer, and therefore I referre it to the due place; for the *Diſpoſition* and *Collocation* of that Knowledge which wee preſerue in Writing; It conſiſteth in a good *Digeſt* of Common Places, wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the uſe of *Common-place Bookes*, as cauſing a retardation of Reading,  
and



and some floath or relaxation of Memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in Knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a Man bee deepe and full; I hold the Entrie of Common-places, to bee a matter of great vse and essence in studying; as that which assureth Copie of Invention, and contracteth Iudgement to a strength. But this is true, that of the *Methodes of Common-places*, that I haue seene, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying meerely the face of a *Schoole*, and not of a *World*, and referring to vulgar matters, and Pedanticall Diuisions without all life, or respect to Action.

For the other Principall part of the Custodie of Knowledge, which is *Memorie*; I finde that facultie in my Iudgement weakely inquired of; An Art there is extant of it; But it seemeth to mee that there are better Precepts, then that Art; and better practises of that Art, then those receiued. It is certaine, the Art (as it is) may bee raised to points of ostentation prodigious: But in vse (as it is now managed) it is barren, not burdensome, not dangerous to Naturall Memorie; as is imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to bee applied to the serious use of businesse and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of Names or Wordes vpon once hearing; or the powing forth of a number of Verses or Rimes *ex tempore*; or the making of a

*Satyricall*



208 *Of the advancement of Learning,*

*Satyrical Simile* of euery thing, or the turning of every thing to a iest, or the falsifying or contradicting of euery thing by *Cauill*, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the *Minde*, there is great *Copie*, and such, as by deuise and practise may be exalted to an extreame degree of wonder;) then I doe of the trickes of *Tumblers*. *Funambuloes*, *Baladynes*; the one being the same in the *Minde*, that the other is in the body; Matters of strangenesse without worthynesse.

This Art of *Memorie*, is but built vpon two Intentions: The one *Prænotion*; the other *Embleme*: *Prænotion* dischargeth the Indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth vs to seeke in a narrow *Compasse*: that is, somewhat that hath *Congruitie* with our *Place of Memorie*: *Embleme* reduceth conceits intellectuall to Images sensible, which strike the *Memory* more; out of which *Axioms* may be drawne much better *Practique*, then that in vse; and besides which *Axiomes*, there are diuers more, touching helpe of *Memory*, not inferiour to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but onely ill Managed.

There remaineth the fourth kinde of *Rationall Knowledge*, which is transitiue, concerning the expressing or transferring our Knowledge to others, which I will tearme by the generall name of *Tradition* or *Deliuerie*. *Tradition* hath three parts: the first concerning the *Organe of Tradition*: the second



cond, concerning the *Method of Tradition*: And the third, concerning the *Illustration of Tradition*.

For the *Organe of Tradition*, it is either *Speech or Writing*: For *Aristotle* saith well: *Words are the Images of Cogitations, and Letters are the Images of Words*: But yet is not of necessity, that *Cogitations* be expressed by the *Medium of Words*. For *whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense; is in Nature competent to expresse Cogitations*: And therefore wee see in the Commerce of barbarous People, that vnderstand not one anothers language, and in the practise of diuers that are dumbe and deafe, that mens minds are expressed in gestures though not exactly, yet to serue the turne. And wee vnderstand farther, that it is the vse of *Chyna*, and the Kingdomes of the High *Leuant*, to write in *Characters reall*, which expresse neither *Letters, nor words in grosse*, but *Things or Notions*: in so much as Countries and Provinces, which vnderstand not one anothers language, can neuerthelesse read one anothers writings, because the *Characters* are accepted more generally, then the *Languages* doe extend; and therefore they haue a vast multitude of *Characters*, as many (I suppose,) as Radicall words.

These *Notes of Cogitations* are of two sorts; The one when the Note hath some *Similitude*, or *Congruity* with the *Notion*; The other *Ad Placitum*



*titum*, hauing force only by *Contract* or *Acceptation*. Of the former sort are *Hieroglyphickes*, and *Gestures*. For as to *Hieroglyphickes*, (things of *Auncient* vse, and embraced chiefly by the *Aegyptians*, one of the most ancient Nations) they are but as continued *Impreases* and *Emblemes*. And as for *Gestures*, they are as *Transitory Hieroglyphickes*, and are to *Hieroglyphickes*, as words spoken are to *Wordes written*, in that they abide not; but they haue evermore as well, as the other an affinity with the things signified: as *Periander* being consulted with how to preferue a tyranny newly vsurped, bid the Messenger attend, and report what he saw him doe, and went into his Garden, and topped all the highest flowers: signifying that it consisted in the cutting off, and keeping low of the Nobility and *Grandes*; *Ad placitum*, are the *Charaēters* reall before mentioned, and *Wordes*: although some haue beene willing by curious Enquiry, or rather by apt faining, to haue deriued imposition of Names, from Reason and Intendment: a speculation elegant, and by reason it searcheth into *Antiquity* reuerent, but sparingly mixt with truth, and of small fruite. This portion of knowledge, touching the *Notes of Things*, and Cogitations in generall, I finde not enquired, but deficient. And although it may seeme of no great vse, considering that *Words*, and *Writings by letters*, doe far excell all the other wayes: yet because this part concerneth, as it were the Mint of knowledge



ledge (for wordes, are the tokens currant and accepted for conceits, as Monies are for values, and that it is fit men bee not ignorant, that Monies may bee of another kinde, then gold and siluer) I thought good to propound it to better Enquiry.

Concerning *Speech* and *Words*, the Consideration of them hath produced the Science of *Grammar*: for Man still striueth to reintegrate himselfe in those benedictions, from which by his fault hee hath beene depriued; And as hee hath striuen against the first generall Curse, by the Inuention of all other Arts: So hath hee sought to come forth of the second generall Curse, (which was the confusion of Tongues) by the art of *Grammar*; whereof the vse in mother tongue is small: In a forraigne tongue more: but most in such forraigne Tongues, as haue ceased to be *Vulgar Tongues*, and are turned onely to *learned Tongues*. The duty of it is of two Natures: The one *Popular*, which is for the speedy, and perfect attaining Languages, as well for intercourse of Speech, as for vnderstanding of Authors: The other *Philosophicall*, examining the power and Nature of Words, as they are the foot-steps and prints of reason: which kinde of *Analogy* betweene *Words*, and *Reason* is handled *Sparſim*, brokenly, though not intirely: and therefore I cannot reporte it deficient, though I thinke it is very worthy to be reduced into a Science by it selfe.



Vnto *Grammar* also belongeth, as an Appendix, the consideration of the Accidents of Words, which are Measure, Sound, and Elevation, or Accent, and the sweetnesse and harshnesse of them: whence hath issued some curious obseruations in *Rhetoricke*, but chiefly *Poesy*, as wee consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the Argument: wherein though men in learned Tongues, doe tie themselues to the Ancient Measures, yet in moderne Languages, it seemeth to mee, as free to make new Measures of Verses, as of Daunces: For a Daunce is a measured pace, as a Verse is a measured speech. In these things the Sense is better Iudge, then the Art.

*Cæna fercula nostra;  
Mallem canvivis, quàm placuisse Cocis.*

And of the servile expressing *Antiquity* in an vnlike and an vnfit subiect, it is well said, *Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime novum.*

For *Cyphars*; they are commonly in Letters or Alphabets, but may bee in words. The kindes of *Cyphars*, (besides the *Simple Cyphars* with Changes, and intermixtures of *Nulles*, and *Non-significants*) are many, according to the Nature or rule of the infoulding: *Wheele-ciphers*, *Key-ciphers*, *Doubles*, &c. But the vertues of them, whereby they are to bee preferred, are three; that they



they bee not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to discipher; and in some cases, that they bee without suspicion. The highest Degree whereof, is to write *Omnia per omnia*; which is vndoubtedly possible, with a proportion Quintuple at most, of the writing in foulding, to the writing in folded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of *Cyphering*, hath for Relative, an Art of *Disciphering*; by supposition vnprofitable, but, as things are, of great vse. For suppose that *Cyphers* were well mannaged, there be multitudes of them which exclude the *Discipherer*. But in regard of the rawnesse and vnskilfulnesse of the hands, through which they passe, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest *Ciphers*.

In the Enumeration of these private and retyred Artes it may bee thought I seeke to make a great Muster-Rowle of Sciences; naming them for shew and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilfull in them iudge, whether I bring them onely for appearance, or whether in that which I speake of them (though in few Markes) there bee not some seede of proficiencie. And this must bee remembered, that as there bee many of great account in their Countries and Provinces, which when they come vp to the Seate of the Estate, are but of meane Ranke and scarcely regarded: So these Arts being here placed with the principall, and supreme



preame Sciences, seeme petty things: yet to such as haue chosen them to spend their labours, studies in them, they seeme great Matters.

For the *Method of tradition*, I see it hath moued a Controversy in our time. But as in Civill businesse, if there be a meeting and men fall at Wordes, there is commonly an end of the Matter for that time, and no proceeding at all: So in Learning, where there is much controuersy, there is many times little enquiry. For this part of knowledge of *Method* seemeth to mee so weakely enquired, as I shall report it deficient.

*Method* hath beene placed, and that not amisse in *Logicke* as a part of *Iudgement*; For as the Doctrine of *Syllogismes* comprehendeth the rules of *Iudgement* vpon that which is invented; So the Doctrine of *Method* containeth the rules of *Iudgement* vpon that which is to bee deliuered, for *Iudgement* precedeth *Deliuery*, as it followeth *Invention*. Neither is the *Method*, or the *Nature of the Tradition* materiall onely to the *Vse* of Knowledge, but likewise to the *Progreßion* of Knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man, cannot attaine to perfection of Knowledge; the *Wisdom* of the *Tradition*, is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance, and proceeding. And therefore the most reall diversity of *Method*, is of *Method* referred to *vse*, and *Method* referred to *progreßion*, whereof the one may bee tearmed  
Magistrall



*Magistrall*, and the other of *Probation*.

The latter whereof seemeth to bee *Via deserta & interclusa*. For as Knowledges are now deliuered, there is a kinde of Contract of Errour, betweene the Deliuerer and the Receiuer: for hee that deliuereth knowledge; desireth to deliuer it in such forme, as may be best beleecued; and not as may be best examined: and hee that receiueth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, then expectant Enquiry, and so rather not to doubt, then not to erre: glory making the Author not to lay open his weaknesse, and sloth making the Disciple not to know his strength.

But knowledge, that is deliuered as a thread to bee spunne on, ought to bee deliuered and intimated, if it were possible, *In the same Method wherein it was invented*; & so is it possible of knowledge induced. And in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge; no man knoweth how hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtained. But yet neverthelesse *Secundum maius & minus*, a man may reuise, and descend vnto the foundations of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plants; if you meane to vse the Plant, it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to remoue it to grow, then it is more assured to rest vpon rootes, then Slippes: So the deliuey of Knowledges (as it is now vsed) is as of faire bodies



De Methodo  
 Sincera, siue  
 ad filios Scien-  
 tiarum.

bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter. But if you will haue Sciences grow; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or body of the Tree, so you looke well to the taking vp of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliury the *Method* of the *Mathematicques*, in that Subiect, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in vre, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversity of *Method* there is, which hath some affinity with the former, vsed in some cases, by the discretion of Auncients: but disgraced since by the Impostures of many vaine persons, who haue made it as a false light for their counterfeite Merchandizes; and that is Enigmaticall and Disclosed. The pretence whereof, is to remoue the vulgar Capacities from being admitted to the secrets of Knowledges, and to reserue them to selected Auditors: or wittes of such sharpenesse as can peice the veile.

Another diversity of *Method*, whereof the consequence is great, is the deliury of knowledge in *Aphorismes*, or in *Methodes*; wherein wee may obserue, that it hath beene too much taken into Custome, out of a few *Axiomes* or Observations, vpon any subiect, to make a solemne, and formall Art; filling it with some Discourses, and illustrating it with examples; & digesting



ing it into a sensible *Method*: But the writing in *Aphorismes*, hath many excellent vertues, whereto the writing in *Method* doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the Writer, whether hee bee superficiall or solide: For *Aphorismes*, except they should be ridiculous, cannot bee made but of the pyth and heart of Sciences: for discourse of illustration is cut off, Recitalls of examples are cut off: Discourse of Connexion, and order is cut off; Descriptions of praetize, are cut off; So there remaineth nothing to fill the *Aphorismes*, but some good quantity of Observation: And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write *Aphorismes*, but he that is sound and grounded. But in *Methods*.

*Tantum Series iuncturaq; Pollet,  
Tantum de Medio sumptis, accedit honoris.*

As a Man shall make a great shew of an Art which if it were disioynted, would come to little. Secondly, *Methods* are more fit to winne Consent, or beleefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carry a kinde of Demonstration in Orbe or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore satesfie. But particulars being dispersed, doe best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly *Aphorismes*, representing a Knowledge  
E c broken,



broken, doe invite men to inquire farther; whereas *Methodes* carrying the shew of a Totall, doe secure men; as if they were at farthest.

Another Diuersity of *Method*, which is likewise of great weight, is, The handling of knowledge by *Affertions*, and *their Proofes*, or by *Questions*, and *their Determinations*: The latter kinde whereof, if it bee immoderately followed, is as prejudiciall to the proceeding of Learning, as it is to the proceeding of an Army, to goe about to besiege every little forte, or Holde. For if the Field be kept, and the summe of the Enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves; Indeede a Man would not leaue some important peece Enemy at his backe. In like manner, the vse of Confutation in the delivery of Sciences ought to be very sparing; & to serue to remoue strong Preoccupations and Prejudgements, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diversity of *Methodes*, is, *According to the Subiect or Matter, which is handled*. For there is a great difference in Deliuery of the *Mathematiques*, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and *Policy*, which is the most immersed; And howsoever contention hath beene mooued, touching an *uniformity* of *Method* in *Multiformity* of matter: Yet wee see how that opinion, besides the weaknesse of it, hath beene  
of



of ill desert, towards Learning, as that which taketh the way, to reduce Learning to certaine empty and barren Generalities; being but the very Huskes, and Shales of Sciences, all the kernell being forced out and expulsed, with the torture and presse of the *Method*: And therefore as I did allow well of *particular topiques* for *Invention*: so I doe allow likewise of *particular Methods* of *Tradition*.

Another Diuersity of *Iudgement* in the deliuery and teaching of knowledge, is, *According vnto the light and presuppositions of that which is deliuered*: For that knowledge, which is new and forreine from opinions receiued, is to bee deliuered in another forme, then that that is agreeable and familiar; And therefore *Aristotle*, when hee thinkes to taxe *Democritus*, doth in truth, commend him; where he saith: *If wee shall indeede dispute, and not follow after Similitudes, &c.* For those, whose conceits are seated in popular opinions neede onely but to proue or dispute: but those, whose Conceits are beyond popular opinions, haue a double labour; the one to make themselues conceiued, and the other to proue and demonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to haue recourse to similitudes, and translations, to expresse themselues. And therefore in the Infancy of Learning, and in rude times, when those Conceits, which are now triuiall, were then new, the World was ful of *Parables* and *Similitudes*; for else would



men either haue passed ouer without Marke, or else reiected for Paradoxes, that which was offered; before they had vnderstood or judged. So, in Di-  
vine Learning wee see how frequent *Parables*  
and *Tropes* are; For it is a Rule, *That whatsoeuer*  
*Science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray*  
*in aide of similitudes.*

There bee also other diuersities of *Methods*  
vulgar and receiued: as that of *Resolution*, or *Ana-*  
*lysis*, of *Constitution*, or *Systasis*, of *Concealement*, or  
*Cryptique*, &c. which I doe allow well of; though  
I haue stood vpon those which are least handled &  
observed. All which I haue remembered to this pur-  
pose, because I would erect and constitute one ge-  
nerall Enquiry (which seemes to mee deficient)  
touching the *Wisdom* of *Tradition*.

*De prudentia*  
*Traditionis.*

But vnto this part of Knowledge, concerning  
*Method*, doth farther belong, not only to the  
*Architect*ure of the whole frame of a Worke,  
but also the feuerall beames & Columnes thereof;  
not as to their stuffe, but as to their quantity,  
and figure: And therefore, *Method* considereth,  
not onely the disposition of the *Argument* or *Sub-*  
*iect*, but likewise the *Propositions*: not as to their  
*Truth* or *Matter*, but as to their *Limitation* and  
*Manner*. For hercin *Ramus* merited better a great  
deale, in reuiuing the good Rules of *Propositions*,  
*καὶ δὲ λεπτὸν κατὰ παντός. &c.* then he did in intro-  
ducing the Canker of *Epitomes*: And yet, (as it is  
the Condition of Humane things that according  
to



to the ancient Fables, *The most pretious things haue the most pernicious Keepers*) It was so, that the attempt of the one, made him fall vpon the other. For he had neede be well conducted, that should designe to make *Axiomes Conuertible*: If he make them not withall *Circular*, and *Non promouent*, or *Incurring into themselves*: but yet the Intention was excellent.

The other Considerations of *Method*, concerning *Propositions*, are chiefly touching the vtmost propositions, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for every knowledge may bee fitly said, besides the *Profundity* (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it *solide*) to haue a *Longitude*; & a *Latitude*: accounting the latitude towards other Sciences: and the Longitude towards Action: that is, from the greatest Generality, to the most particular precept: The one giueth rule how farre one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Province of another, which is the rule they call *Kαθ' ὅσον*. The other giueth rule, vnto what degree of particularity, a knowledge should descend: which latter I finde passed ouer in silence; being in my Iudgement, the more materiall. For certainly, there must bee somewhat left to practise, but how much is worthy the Enquiry: wee see remote and superficiall Generalities, doe but offer Knowledge, to scorne of practicall men: and are no more aiding to practise, then an *Ortelius* vniuersall Mappe, is to direct the



De Productione  
Axiomatum.

way betweene *London* and *Yorke*. The better sort of Rules, haue beene not vnfitly compared to glasses of Steele vnpolished; where you may see the Images of things, but first they must bee filed: So the rules will helpe, if they bee laboured and polished by practise. But how Christalline they may bee made at the first and how farre forth they may bee polished afore-hand, is the question; the Enquiry whereof, seemeth to me deficient.

There hath beene also laboured, and put in practise a *Method*, which is not a lawfull *Method*, but a *Method* of *Imposture*; which is to deliuer knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make shew of Learning, who haue it not; such was the travaile of *Raymundus Lullius*, in making that *Art*, which beares his name; not vnlike to some Bookes of *Typocosmy*, which haue beene made since; being nothing but a Masse of words of all Arts; to giue men countenance, that those which vse the tearmes, might be thought to vnderstand the Art; which Collections are much like a Frippers or Brokers shoppe; that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.

Now wee descend to that part, which concerneth the *Illustration of Tradition*, comprehended in that Science which wee call *Rhetoricke*, or *Art of Eloquence*; A Science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For although in true value, it is inferiour to Wisdome, as it is said by God to  
Moses,



Moses, when he disabled himselfe, for want of this Faculty, *Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt bee to him as God*: Yet with people it is the more mighty; For so Salomon saith: *Sapiens Corde appellabitur Prudens, sed dulcis Eloquio Maiora reperiet*: Signifying that profoundnesse of Wisdome, will helpe a Manto a Name or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that preuaileth in an actiue life; And as to the labouring of it, the Emulation of *Aristotle*, with the *Rhetoricians* of his time, and the experience of *Cicero*, hath made them in their Workes of *Rhetorickes*, exceede themselves. Againe, the excellency of examples of *Eloquence*, in the Orations of *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, added to the perfection of the Precepts of *Eloquence*, hath doubled the progression in this Art: And therefore, the Deficiencies which I shall note, will rather be in some Collections, which may as hand-maides attend the Art, then in the rules, or vse of the Art it selfe.

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little about the Rootes of this Science, as wee haue done of the rest; The duty and Office of *Rhetoricke* is, *To apply Reason to Imagination*, for the better mouing of the will; For wee see *Reason* is disturbed in the administration thereof by three meanes; by *Illaqueation*, or *Sophisme*, which pertaines to *Logicke*; by *Imagination* or *Impression*, which pertaines to *Rhetoricke*, and by *Passion* or *Affection*, which pertaines to *Morality*. And as in negotiation with others,  
men



men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; So in this negotiation within our selves; men are vndermined by *Inconsequences*, solicited & importuned, by *Impressions and observations*; and transported by *Passions*: Neither is the Nature of Man so vnfortunately built, as that those Powers & Arts should haue force to disturbe reason, & not to establish and advance it: For the end of *Logicke*, is to teach a forme of argument, to secure Reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of *Morality*, is to procure the affections to obey Reason, and not to invade it. The end of *Rhetoricke* is, to fill the Imagination to second Reason, & not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but *Ex obliquo*, for Caution.

And therefore it was great Iniustice in *Plato*, though springing out of a iust hatred of the *Rhetoricians* of his time, to esteeme of *Rhetoricke*, but as a voluptuary Art, resembling it to Cookery, that did marre wholesome meates, and helpe vnwholesome by variety of sawces, to the pleasure of the taste. For wee see that speech is much more conuersant in adorning that which is good, then in colouring that which is euill: for there is no man but speaketh more honestly, then hee can doe or thinke; and it was excellently noted by *Thucydides* in *Cleon*, that because he vsed to hold on the bad side in Causes of estate; therefore hee was ever inueying against Eloquence, and good speech; knowing that no man can speake faire of Courses for-  
didde



dide and base. And therefore as *Plato* said elegantly: *Thvt vertue, if she could be seene, would moue great loue and affection* : So seeing that shee cannot bee shewed to the *Sense*, by corporall shape, the next degree is, to shew her to the *Imagination* in liuely representatiō : for to shew her to *Reason*, only in subtiltie of Argument, was a thing euer derided in *Chrysippus*, and many of the *Stoickes* , who thought to thrust Vertue vpon men by sharpe Disputations and Conclusions, which haue no Sympathy with the will of Man.

Againe, if the affections in themselues were plyant & obedient to Reason, it were true, there should be no great vse of perswasions and insinuations to the will, more then of naked proposition & proofes; but in regard of the continuall Mutinies and Seditiōs of the Affections.

*Video meliora, Proboque; Deteriora sequor;*

Reason would become Captiue and Seruile, if *Eloquence of perswasions* , did not practise and winne the *Imagination*, from the *affections* part, and contract a Confederacie betweene the *Reason* and *Imagination* , against the *Affections* : For the Affections themselues, carry ever an Appetite to good as Reason doth : The difference is, *That the Affection beholdeth meerely the present ; Reason beholdeth the future, and summe of time.* And therefore, the *Present* , filling the *Imagination* more; Reason is

Ff

commonly



commonly vanquished; But after that force of *Eloquence* and *Perswasion*, hath made things *future*, and *remote*, appeare as *present*, then vpon the revolt of the *Imagination*, Reason preuaileth.

We conclude therefore, that *Rhetoricke* can bee no more charged, with the colouring of the worse part, then *Logicke* with *Sophistrie*, or *Morality* with *Vice*. For we knowe the Doctrines of Contraries are the same, though the vse be opposite: It appeareth also, that *Logicke* differeth from *Rhetoricke*, not onely as the *fist* from the *pawlmee*, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that *Logicke* handleth Reason exact, and in truth; and *Rhetoricke* handleth it, as it is planted in popular opinions and Manners: And therefore *Aristotle* doth wisely place *Rhetoricke*, as betweene *Logicke* on the one side, & *Morall* or *Ciuill Knowledge* on the other, as participating of both: for the *Proofes* and *Demonstrations* of *Logicke*, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the *Proofes* and *perswasions* of *Rhetoricke*, ought to differ according to the *Auditors*.

*Orpheus in Sylvis, inter Delphinas Arion;*

Which application, in perfection of *Idea*, ought to extend so farre: that if a man should speake of the same thing to seuerall persons: he should speake to them all respectiuelly and seuerall waies: though  
this



this *Politique part of Eloquence in priuate Speech*, it is easie for the greatest Orators to want : whilest by the obseruing their well graced formes of speech, they leese the volubilitie of Application: and therefore, it shall not bee amisse to recommend this to better enquirie , not being curious, whether wee place it here, or in that part which concerneth Politic.  
*De prudentia sermonis priuati.*

Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which (as I said) are but Attendances : and first, I do not finde the Wisedome and diligence of *Aristotle* well pursued, who beganne to make a Collection of the popular signes and colours of good and euill, both simple and comparatiue, which are as the *Sophismes of Rhetoricke*, (as I touched before.) For Example.  
*Colores boni & mali, simplices & comparatiui.*

SOPHISMA.

*Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vituperatur, malum.*

REDARGVTIO.

*Laudat vanales, qui vult extrudere merces.*

*Malum est, Malum est (inquit Emptor) sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur.* The defects in the labour of *Aristotle* are three : One, that there be but a few of many: another, that their *Elenches* are not annexed; and the third, that hee conceiued but a part of the vse of them: for their vse is not onely in pro-



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bation, but much more in Impression. For many formes are equall in *Signification*, which are differing in *Impression*: as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharpe, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussioe bee the same: for there is no man, but will bee a little more raised by hearing it said: *Your enimies will bee glad of this.*

*Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atrida,*

Then by hearing it said only, *This is evill for you.*

Secondly, I doe resume also, that which I mentioned before, touching *Provision* or *Preparatorie store*, for the Furniture of speech, and readinesse of Invention; which appeareth to be of two sorts; The one in resemblance to a shoppe of peeces vnmade vp; the other to a shoppe of things ready made vp, both to be applied to that which is frequent, and most in request; The former of these I will call *Antitheta*, and the latter *Formula*.

*Antitheta rerum.*

*Antitheta* are *Theses* argued, *pro & contra* wherein men may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to doe it) to auoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the seuerall Arguments to be cast vp into some brieve and accute sentences: not to be cited; but to be as Skaines or Bottomes of thread to be vnwinded at large, when they come to bee vfed: supplying authorities, and Examples by reference.

*Pro*



*Pro verbis legis.*

*Nō est interpretatio sed divinatio, quæ recedit à litera  
Cum receditur à litera Iudex transit in legislatorem.*

*Pro sententia Legis.*

*Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur singula:*

*Formula* are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, which may serue indifferently for differing subjects, as of *Preface, Conclusion, Digression, Transition, Excusation, &c.* For as in buildings there is great pleasure and vse in the well casting of the stayre cases, Entries, Doores, Windowes, and the like, so in speech, the conueniences and passages are of speciall ornament and effect.

*A conclusion in a Deliberatiue.*

*So may we redeeme the faults passed and preuent the inconueniences future.*

There remaine two Appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, The one *Criticall*; the other *Pedanticall*. For all knowledge is either deliuered by Teachers, or attained by mens proper endeavours: And therefore as the principall part of Tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly in *writing of Bookes*; So the Relatiue part thereof concerneth *Reading of Bookes*. Wherevnto appertaine incident-



ly these considerations. The first is concerning the true Correction and Edition of Authors, wherein neverthelesse rash diligence hath done great preiudice. For these *Critiques* haue often presumed that that which they vnderstand not, is false set downe; As the Priest, that where he found it written of S. Paul, *Demissus est per sportam*, mended his booke, and made it *Demissus est per portam*, because *Sporta* was an hard word, and out of his reading; & surely their errors, though they bee not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kinde. And therefore as it hath beene wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the Exposition and explication of Authors, which resteth in Annotations and Commentaries, wherein it is ouer vsuall to blaunch the obscure places, and discourse vpon the plaine.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases giue great light to true Interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brieue Censure and iudgement of the Authors, that men thereby may make some election vnto themselves, what Bookes to read.

And the fift is concerning the Syntax and disposition of studies, that men may knowe in what order or pursuite to read.

For *Pedanticall* knowledge, it containeth that difference of *Tradition* which is proper for youth: Wherevnto appertaine diuers considerations of great fruit,

As



As first the tyming and seasoning of knowledges, as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refraine them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult, And in what courses to presse the more difficult, and then to turne them to the more easie: for it is one Methode to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heauie shooes.

A third is the application of learning according vnto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectuall, but seemeth to haue a proper cure contained in some studies; As for example, If a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the facultie of attention, the Mathematiques giue a remedy therevnto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as Sciences haue a propriety towards faculties for Cure and helpe; So faculties or powers haue a Sympathy towards Sciences for excellency or speedy profitting: And therefore it is an enquirie of great wisdom what kinds of Wits & Natures are most apt and proper for what Sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or helpe; For as is well obserued by *Cicero*, men in exercising their faculties if they be not well aduised doe exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great iudgement to bee had in the continuance and intermission.



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intermission of Exercises. It were too long to particularize a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of meane appearance, but of singular efficacie. For as the wronging or cherishing of seedes or young plants, is that, that is most important to their thriving. And as it was noted, that the first six Kings, being in truth as Tutors of the State of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principall cause of the immense greatnesse of that State which followed. So the Culture and manurance of Mindes in youth, hath such a forcible (though vnseene) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervaille it afterwards. And it is not amisse to obserue also, how smal and meane faculties gotten by Education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, doe worke great and important effects: whereof we see a notable example in *Tacitus* of two Stage-players, *Percennius* and *Vibulenus*, who by their facultie of playing, put the *Pannonian* Armies into an extreame tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutinie amongst them, vpon the death of *Augustus Caesar*, *Blæsus* the Lieutenant had committed some of the Mutiners which were suddenly rescued: wherevpon *Vibulenus* got to bee heard speake, which he did in this manner, *These poore innocent wretches appointed to cruell death, you haue restored to behold the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life vnto my brother? that was sent hither in message frõ the legions of Germany, to treat*  
of



of the common Cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners vpon Souldiours: Answer *Blesus*, what is done with his body: The mortallest Enemies doe not deny buriall: when I haue performed my last duties to the Corpses with kisses, with teares, commaund me to be slaine besides him, so that these my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the Legions may haue leaue to bury vs. With which speech hee put the army into an infinite fury and vpror, whereas truth was hee had no brother, neither was there any such matter, but he plaid it meerely as if hee had beene vpon the stage.

But to returne, we are now come to a period of *Rationall Knowledges*, wherein if I haue made the *divisions* other then those that are receiued, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions, which I doe not vse. For there is a double necessity imposed vpon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which are next in Nature, and those things which are next in vse. For if a secretary of Estate, should sort his papers, it is like in his study, or generall Cabinet, hee would sort together things of a Nature, as Treaties, Instructions, &c. But in his boxes, or particular Cabinet, he would sort together those that hee were like to vse together, though of seuerall Natures: So in this generall Cabynet of knowledge, it was ne-



cessary for me to follow the diuisions of the Nature of things, whereas if my selfe had beene to handle any particular knowledge, I would haue respected the *Diuisions fittest for vse*. The other, because the bringing in of the *Deficiences* did by Consequence alter the *Partitions* of the rest. For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be 15. Let the knowledge with the Deficiences be 20. the parts of 15. are not the parts of 20. for the parts of 15. are 3. and 5. the parts of 20. are 2. 4. 5. and 10. So as these things are without Contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

WE proceed now to that knowledg which considereth of the *Appetite* and *Will* of Man, whereof *Salomon* saith; *Ante omnia fili custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt actiones vite*. In the handling of this science, those which haue written seeme to me to haue done as if a man that professed to teach to write, did onely exhibite faire copies of *Alphabets*, and letters ioyned, without giuing any precepts or directions, for the cariage of the hand and framing of the letters. So haue they made good and faire Exemplars and coppies, carrying the draughts and pourtraitures of *Good, Vertue, Duty, Felicity*; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of mans will and desires: But how to attaine these excellent markes, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable

to



to these pursuits, they passe it over altogether, or slightly and vnprofitably. For it is not the disputing. That morall vertues are in the Minde of man by habite and not by nature: or the distinguishing, that generous spirits are wonne by doctrines and perswasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, & the like scattered glances and touches, that can excule the absence of this part.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden Rocke, wherevpon both this and many other Barques of knowledge haue beene cast away, which is, that men haue despised to bee conversant in ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof neverthelesse is the wisest doctrine; (for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties) but contrariwise they haue compounded Sciences chiefly of a certaine resplendent or lustrous masse of matter, chosen to giue glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But *Seneca*, giueth an excellent checke to eloquence, *Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit sed sui*, doctrines should be such as should make men in loue with the lesson, and not with the Teacher, being directed to the Auditors benefit, and not to the Authors commendation: And therefore those are of the right kinde which may bee concluded as *Demosthenes* concludes his counsell, *Quæ si feceritis non Oratorem duntaxat in præsentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiã non ita multo post statu rerum vestrarũ meliore.*



Neither needed men of so excellent parts to haue despaired of a fortune, (which the Poet *Virgil* promised himselfe, and indeede obtained) who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroicall acts of *Aeneas*.

*Nec sum animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum.*

*Quam sit & angustis his addere rebus honorem.*

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leasure that which men may read at leasure, but really to instruct and suborne Action and active life, these Georgickes of the minde concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no lesse worthy then the heroicall descriptions of *vertue*, *duty*, and *felicity*; wherefore the maine & primitiue division of *Morall* knowledg seemeth to be into the *Exemplar* or *Platforme* of *Good*, and the *Regiment* or *Culture of the Minde*; The one describing the nature of *Good*, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply & accomodate the will of man thereunto.

The Doctrines touching the *Platforme* or *nature of good* considereth it either *Simple* or *Compared*, either the kindes of *Good* or the degrees of *Good*: In the latter whereof those infinite disputations, which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they tearme *felicity*, *beatitude*, or the highest *Good*, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen *Divinity*, are by the christian



Christian faith discharged. And as *Aristotle* saith, *That young men may be happy, but not otherwise, but by Hope*; So we must all acknowledge our Minority, and embrace the felicity, which is by hope of the future world.

Freed therefore & deliuered from this doctrine of the Philosophers heauē, whereby they fained an higher elevation of Mans nature, then was; for wee see in what an height of stile *Seneca* writeth, *Vere Magnū, habere fragilitatē hominis, securitatem Dei.*) We may with more sobriety & truth receiue the rest of their Enquiries, & labours, wherein for the *Nature of good positive, or simple*, they haue set it downe excellently, in describing the formes of *virtue & Duty*, with their situatiōs & postures, in distributing thē into their kindes, parts, provinces, actions, & administrations, and the like; Nay farther, they haue commended them to mans Nature, and spirit, with great quicknesse of argument, & beauty of perswasions, yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can doe) against corrupt and popular opinions. Againe, *for the degrees, and Comparatiue Nature of Good*, they haue also excellently handled it in their triplicity of *Good*; in the comparisons betweene a Contemplatiue and an actiue life, in the distinctiō between vertue with reluctance, & vertue secured; in their encounters between honesty & profit, in their ballācing of vertue with vertue, and the like; so as this part deserueth to be reported for excellently laboured.



Notwithstanding, if before they had comen to the popular and receiued Notions of vertue and vice, pleasure and paine, & the rest, they had staied a little longer vpon the Enquiry, concerning the Rootes of good and evill, and the strings of those Rootes, they had giuen in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; & specially if they had consulted with Nature, they had made their doctrines lesse prolix, and more profound; which being by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much confusion, we will indeavour to resume, and open in a more cleere manner.

There is formed in euery thing a double Nature of Good; the one, as every thing is a Totall or substantiue in it selfe; the other, as it is a part or Member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the greater, and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conseruation of a more generall forme. Therefore wee see, the Iron in particular sympathy moueth to the Load-stone; But yet if it exceede a certaine quantity, it forsaketh the affectiō to the *Load-stone*, & like a good patriot moueth to the *Earth*, which is the Region and Country of Massie bodies; so may we goe forward, and see that *Water & massy bodies* moue to the *cēter of the earth*, But rather then to suffer a diuulsion in the continuance of Nature, they will moue vpwards from the Center of the earth: forsaking their duty to the *Earth* in regard of their duty to the *World*. This double nature of Good, and the comparatiue there-  
of



of is much more engrauen vpon man, if hee degenerate not: vnto whō the conversation of duty to the publike ought to be much more pretious then the conseruation of life & being: according to that memorable speech of *Pompeius Magnus*, when being in commission of purveiance for a famine at Rome, & being diffwaded with great vehemēce & instāce by his friends, that he should not hazard himselfe to sea in an extreimity of weather, he said only to the; *Necesse est vt eam, non vt viuam*: But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any Philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is *Communicatiue*, and depresse the good which is private & particular, as the holy faith: well declaring, that it was the same God that gaue the Christian law to men, who gaue thole Lawes of nature, to inanimate Creatures that wee speake of before; for wee read that the elected Saints of God haue wished themselves anathematized, and razed out of the booke of life, in an extasie of Charity, and infinite feeling of *Communion*.

This being set downe and strongly planted, doth judge and determine most of the Controversies, wherein *Morall Philosophy* is conversant: For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplatiue or actiue life, & decideth it against *Aristotle*: for all the reasons which he brings for the Contemplatiue are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a mans selfe (in which respects no question the contemplatiue life hath the  
pre-



preheminance) not much vnlike to that Compari-  
 son, which *Pythagoras* made for the gracing and  
 magnifying of Philosophy, & Contemplation, who  
 being asked what he was, answered, *That if Hiero*  
*were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the māner,*  
*that some came to try their fortune for the PriZes, and*  
*some came as Merchants to vtter their commodities,*  
*and some came to make good cheare, and meete their*  
*friends, & some came to looke on, and that he was one*  
*of them that came to looke on.* But men must know,  
 that in this theater of Mans life, it is reserued one-  
 ly for God and Angels to be lookers on: Neyther  
 could the like question euer haue beene receiued in  
 the Church, notwithstanding their (*Pretiosa in ocu-*  
*lis Domini mors sanctorū eius*) by which place they  
 would exalt their Ciuile death, and regular pro-  
 fessions, but vpon this defence, that the Monasticall  
 life is not simply Contemplatiue, but performeth  
 the duty either of incessant prayers and supplicati-  
 ons, which hath beene truly esteemed as an office in  
 the Church, or else of writing or taking instructi-  
 ons for writing concerning the law of God, as *Mo-*  
*ses* did, whē he abode so long in the Mount. And so  
 we see *Henoch* the 7. from *Adam*, who was the first  
 Contemplatiue and walked with God, yet did also  
 endow the Church with prophesy which *Saint*  
*Iude* citeth. But for contemplation which should  
 be finished in it selte without casting beames vpon  
 society, assuredly diuinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controversies betweene *Zeno*  
 and



and *Socrates*, and their Schooles and successions on the one side, who placed felicity in vertue simply or attended: the actions and exercises whereof doe chiefly imbrace and concerne society; and on the other side, the *Cirenaiques* and *Epicureans*, who placed it in pleasure, and made vertue, (as it is vsed in some comedies of errors, wherein the Mistres and the maid change habites) to be but as a servant, without which, pleasure cannot bee serued and attended, and the reformed schoole of the *Epicureans*, which placed it in serenity of minde and freedom from perturbation: as if they would haue deposed *Iupiter* againe, and restored *Saturne*, and the first age, whē there was no summer nor winter, spring nor Autumne, but all after one aire & season. And *Herillus*, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the minde; making no fixed nature of Good and euill, esteeming things according to the cleerenesse of the desires, or the relaxation: which opinion was reuiued in the heresy of the *Anabaptists*, measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, & the constancy or wauering of beleefe, all which are manifest to tend to private repose & contentment, & not to point of society. It censureth also the philosophy of *Epicetus* which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, least wee be liable to fortune, and disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to faile in good & vertuous ends for the publike, then to obtaine all that we can wish



to our selues in our proper fortune: as *Consaluo* saith to his souldiers, shewing them *Naples* & protesting, he had rather die one foot forwards; then to haue his life secured for long, by one foot of retrayt: Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly Leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that *A good Conscience is a continuall Feast*, shewing plainly that the conscience of good intentions howsoeuer succeeding, is a more continuall ioy to nature, then all the prouision, which can be made for security & repose.

It censureth likewise that abuse of Philosophy, which grew generall about the time of *Epicletus*, in conuerting it into an occupation or profession: as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to flie and auoid the causes of them, & to shape a particular kind & course of life to that end, introducing such an health of minde, as was that health of body, of which *Aristotle* speaketh of *Herodicus*, who did nothing all his life long, but intend his health, whereas if men refer themselves to duties of Society; as that health of Body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations & extremities: So likewise that health of Mind is most proper, which can goe through the greatest temptations & perturbations. So as *Diogenes* opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, & could refraine their Mind in *Precipitio*, and could giue vnto the mind (as is vsed in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turne.

Lastly



Lastly, it censureth the tenderneſſe and want of application in ſome of the moſt ancient and reuerend Philoſophers and Philoſophicall men, that did retire too eaſily from civile buſineſſe, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations, whereas the reſolution of men truly Morall, ought to be ſuch, as the ſame *Conſaluo* ſaid, the honor of a ſouldier ſhould be *E tela Craſſiore*, and not ſo fine, as that every thing ſhould catch in it, and endanger it.

To reſume *private* or *particular good*, it falleth into the diſiſion of *Good Actiue & Paſſiue*; For this difference of *Good*, (not vnlike to that which amongſt the Romans was expreſſed in the familiar or houſhold tearmes of *Promus*, & *Conduſ*) is formed alſo in all things, & is beſt diſcloſed in the two ſeuerall Appetites in creatures; the one to preſerue or continue themſelues; and the other to dilate or multiply themſelues, whereof the latter ſeemeth to be the worthier; For in Nature the heauens, which are the more worthy, are the *Agent*, and the earth, which is the leſſe worthy is the *Patient*. In the pleaſures of liuing creatures, that of generation is greater then that of food. In diuine Doctrinne, *Beatius eſt dare quàm accipere*: and in life there is no mans ſpirit ſo ſoft, but eſteemeth the effecting of ſomewhat that he hath fixed in his deſire, more thē ſenſuality; which priority of the *Actiue Good*, is much vpheld by the conſideration of our eſtate to be mortall and expoſed to fortune: for, if wee might haue a perpetuity and certainty in our plea-



lures, the *State* of them would advance their price. But when we see it is but *Magni aestimamus Mori tardiùs; & Ne glorieris de crastino; nescis Partum diei* it maketh vs to desire to haue somewhat secured & exempted from time, which are onely our deedes & workes; as it is said *Opera eorù sequuntur eos*. The preheminence likewise of this actiue good is vpheld by the affection, which is naturall in man towards variety & proceeding, which in the pleasures of the sense, which is the principall part of *Passiue* good, can haue no great latitude. *Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris, Cibus, Somnus, Ludus per hunc circulum curritur, mori velle non tantum fortis aut miser aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest*. But in enterprises, pursuits & purposes of life, there is much variety, whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoiles, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was well said: *Vita sine proposito languida & vaga est*. Neither hath this actiue good any identity with the good of Society, though in some case, it hath an incidence into it. for although it doe many times bring forth acts of *Beneficence*, yet it is with a respect private to a mans owne power, glory, amplification, continuance: as appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary Subiect. For that Gygantie state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was *Lucius Sylla* & infinite other in smaller model, who would haue all mē happy or vnhappy as they were their friends or enemies, & would giue forme



to the World according to their owne humours (which is the true *Theomachy*) pretendeth and aspi-  
reth to Actiue good, though it recedeth farthest  
from good of Society, which we haue determined  
to be the greater.

To resume *Passiue Good*, it receiueth a subdivision  
of *Conservative & Perfectiue*. For let vs take a brieft  
review of that which we haue said, we haue spoken  
first of the Good of Society, the intention whereof  
embraceth the Forme of Humane nature, whereof  
we are members & Portions: & not our owne pro-  
per & Indiuiduall forme: we haue spoken of actiue  
good & supposed it as a part of Priuate & particu-  
lar good. And rightly: For there is impressed vpon  
all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding frō  
loue to themselues, one of *preseruing & continuing*  
their forme, another of *Advancing & Perfecting*  
their forme, & a third of *Multipling & extending*  
their forme vpon other things: whereof the multi-  
plying or signature of it vpon other things, is that  
which we handle by the name of actiue good. So as  
there remaineth the conseruing of it & perfecting  
or raising of it: which later is the highest degree of  
passiue good. For to preserue in state is the lesse, to  
preserue with advancemēt is the greater. So in man.  
*Ignis est ollis vigor, & cælestis origo*. His approach  
or Assumption to diuine or Angelicall Nature, is  
the perfection of his forme; the error or false I-  
mitation of which good is that which is the tem-  
pest of humane life, while man vpon the instinct



of an advancement *Formall*, & *Essentiall* is carried to seeke an advancement *Locall*. For as those which are sicke, and finde no remedy, doe tumble vp and downe and change place, as if by a remoue locall, they could obtaine a Remoue Internall: So is it with men in ambition, whē failing of the meane to exalt their *Nature*, they are in a perpetuall estuation to exalt their *Place*. So then *passive Good*, is, as was said, either *Conservative* or *Perfective*.

To resume the good of *Conservation* or *Comfort*, which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures, it seemeth to bee the most pure & naturall of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And this also receiueh a difference, which hath neither bin well iudged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed either in the *sincerenesse of the fruition*, or in the *quicknesse & vigor of it*, the one superinduced by *Equality*, the other by *Vicissitude*: the one hauing lesse mixture of *Evill*, the other more impression of *Good*. Whether of these is the greater good, is a questiō controverted, but whether mans nature may not be capable of both, is a question not inquired.

The former question being debated betweene *Socrates*, & a *Sophist*, *Socrates* placing felicity in an equall & constant peace of mind, and the *Sophist* in much desiring, and much enioying: they fell from Argument to ill words: The *Sophist* saying that *Socrates* felicity, was the felicity of a block or stone  
and



and *Socrates* saying that the *Sophists* felicity, was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions doe not want their supports. For the opinion of *Socrates* is much vpheld by the generall consent, even of the *Epicures* themselves, that vertue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certaine it is, that vertue hath no more vse in cleering perturbations, then in compassing desires. The *Sophists* opinion is much favoured, by the assertion wee last speake of, that *good of advancement*, is greater then *good of simple preservation*: because, euery obtaining a desire, hath a shew of advancement, as motion though in a Circle, hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former superfluous. For, can it be doubted, but that there are some, who take more pleasure in enioying pleasures, then some other; and yet neverthelesse, are lesse troubled with the losse or leauing of them: So as this same; *Non uti ut non appetas: Non appetere, ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli & diffidentis*. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the Philosophers are more fearfull and cautionary then the Nature of things requireth. So haue they encreased the feare of death, in offering to cure it. For when they would haue a mans whole life, to be but a discipline or preparation to dye: they must needs make men thinke, that it is a terrible Enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

*Qui*



*Qui finem vitae extremum inter Munera ponat*

*Natura:*

So haue they sought to make mens minds too vniforme & harmonically, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason whereof, I suppose to be, because they themselues were men dedicated, to a private, free, and vnappplied course of life. For, as we see, vpon the lute, or like instrument, a *Ground*, though it bee sweet, and haue shew of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stoppes and passages, as a *Set song*, or *Voluntary*: much after the same Manner was the diuersity betweene a Philosophicall & a ciuile life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of Iewellers, who, if there be a graine, or a cloud, or an ise which may be ground forth, without taking too much of the stone, they helpe it: but, if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: So ought men, so to procure *Serenity*, as they destroy not magnanimity.

Hauiug therefore deduced the *Good of Man*, which is priuate and particular, as far as seemeth fit: we will now returne to that *Good of man*, which respecteth and beholdeth Society, which wee may tearme Duty; because the tearme of duty is more proper to a minde well framed and disposed towards others, as the tearme of vertue is applyed to a minde well formed and composed in it selfe, though neither can a man vnderstand vertue without some relation to Society, nor duty without  
an



an inward disposition. This part may seeme at first to pertaine to Science Ciuill and Politique: but not if it be well obserued, For it concerneth the Regiment and gouernment of every man, ouer himselfe, and not ouer others. And as in Architecture, the direction of framing the posts, beames, & other parts of building; is not the same with the manner of ioyning them, and erecting the building: And in Mechanicalls, the direction how to frame an Instrument or Engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on worke and imploying it: and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one, you incidently expresse the Aptnesse towards the other: So the Doctrine of Conjugation of men in Society differeth from that of their conformitie therevnto.

This part of Duty is subdiuided into two parts: the common duty of euery man, as a Man or member of a State: The other the respectiue or speciall duty of euery man in his profession, vocation and place: The first of these, is extant and well laboured, as hath beene said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed then deficient: which manner of dispersed writing in this kinde of Argument, I acknowledge to be best. For who can take vpon him to write of the proper dutie, vertue, challenge & right, of every seuerall vocation, profession, & place. For although sometimes a Looker on may see more then a gamester & there be a prouerb more arrogant then sound, *That the vale best discouereth the*



*bill*: yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and materially in their owne professions: and that the writing of speculative men of Active Matter, for the most part doth seeme to men of Experience as *Phormioes* Argument of the warres seemed to *Hannibal*, to be but dreames and dotage. Onely there is one vice which accompanieth them, that write in their owne professions, that they magnifie them in excesse. But generally it were to be wished, (as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitfull) that Active men would or could become Writers.

In which kinde I cannot but mention *Honoris causa* your Maiesties excellent Booke touching the duty of a King: a worke richly compounded of *Divinity, Morality, and Policy*, with great aspersions of all other Arts: and being in mine opinion one of the most sound and healthfull writings that I haue read: not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the Coldnesse of negligence: not sicke of Businesse as those are who leese themselves in their order; nor of Convulsions as those which Crampe in matters impertinent: not fauoring of perfumes and paintings as those doe who seeke to please the Reader more then Nature beareth, and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for actions: and farre remoued from that Naturall infirmitie, wherevnto I noted those, that write in their owne professions to bee subiect, which is, that they exalt it aboue measure.

For



For your Maiestie hath truely described, not a king of *Assyria*, or *Persia*, in their externe glory: but a *Moses*, or a *David*, Pastors of their people. Neither can I euer leese out of my remembrance, what I heard your Maiesty, in the same sacred spirit of Government, deliuer, in a great caule of Iudicature, which was: *That Kings ruled by their Lawes, as God did by the laws of Nature, and ought as really to put in vse their supream Prerogatiue, as God doth his power of working Miracles.* And yet notwithstanding, in your booke of a free Monarchy, you doe well giue men to vnderstand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the Circle of his office and dutie. Thus haue I presumed to alleage this excellent writing of your Maiestie, as a prime or eminent example of *Tractates*, concerning speciall and respectiue duties: wherein I should haue said as much, if it had bin written a thousand yeares since: Neither am I moued with certaine Courtly decencies, which esteeme it flattery to praise in presence. No; it is flattery to praise in absence: that is, when either the Vertue is absent, or the occasion is absent: and so the praise is not Naturall, but forced, either in truth, or in time. But let *Cicero* bee read in his *Oration pro Marcello*, which is nothing but an excellent Table of *Cæsars* vertue, and made to *his face*; besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deale then such obseruers and we will neuer doubt, vpon a full occasion, to giue iust praises to present or absent.



But to returne, there belongeth farther, to the handling of this part touching the duties of professions and vocations, a *Relative or opposite* touching the fraudes, cautels, impostures, and vices of euery profession, which hath beene likewise handled. But how? rather in a Satyre & Cinically, then seriously and wisely: for men haue rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, then with Iudgement to discouer and seuer that which is corrupt. For as *Solomon* saith, He that commeth to seeke after knowledge with a minde to scorne and censure, shall be sure to finde matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction. *Quarenti derisori Scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed studioso fit obviam.* But the managing of this argument with integrity & truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty & vertue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the *Basiliske*, that if he see you first you die for it: but if you see him first, he dieth. So is it with deceits and evill arts: which if they be first espied, they leese their life, but if they preuent, they indanger. So that we are much beholden to *Machianell* & others that write what men doe, and not what they ought to doe. For it is not possible to ioyn serpentine wisdom with the Columbine Innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the *Serpent*: his basenesse and going vpon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest, that is, all formes & natures of evill. For without this, ver-

tue.



tue lieth open and vnfenced. Nay an honest man can doe no good vpon those that are wicked to reclaime them, without the helpe of the knowledge of euill. For men of corrupted mindes presuppose that honesty groweth out of Simplicity of manners, and beleeuing of Preachers, Schoolmasters, & mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceiue, that you knowe the vrmost reaches of their owne corrupt opinions, they despise all Moraltie, *Non recipit Stultus verba prudentiae, nisi ea dixeris, quae versantur in Corde eius.*

Vnto this part touching *Respectiue duty*, doth also appertaine the duties betweene husband and wife, parent and childe, Master and Servant: So likewise, the lawes of friendshippe and Gratitude, the Ciuill bond of Companies, Colleges, and Politike bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties: not as they are parts of Government and Society, but as to the framing of the minde of particular persons.

The knowledge concerning *good respecting Society* doth handle it also not *simply* alone, but *Comparatiuely*, wherevnto belongeth the weighing of duties, betweene person and person, Case and Case, particular and publike: As we see in the proceeding of *Lucius Brutus*, against his owne Sonnes, which was so much extolled; yet what was said?

*Infelix utcunq; ferent ea fata Minores.*

So the case was doubtfull, and had opinion on both sides: Againe, we see, when *M. Brutus* and



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*Cassius* invited to a supper certaine, whose opinions they meant to feele, whether they were fit to be made their Associates, and cast forth the question touching the *Killing of a Tyrant* being an vsurper; they were diuided into opinion, some holding, that Servitude was the extreame of Evills; and others that Tyranny was better then a Civill warre: and a number of the like cases there are, of comparative duty. Amongst which, that, of all others, is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deale of good to ensue of a small Iniustice. Which *Iason of Theſſalia* determined against the truth; *Aliqua sunt iniuste facienda, ut multa iuste fieri possint.* But the reply is good; *Authorem presentis Iustitiae habes, sponsorem futura non habes;* Men must pursue things which are iust in present, and leaue the future to the divine providence. So then we passe on from this generall part touching the Exemplar and description of Good.

Now therefore, that we haue spoken of this fruit of life, it remaineth to speake of the Husbandry that belongeth therevnto, without which part, the former seemeth to be no better then a faire Image, or *statua*, which is beautifull to contemplate, but is without life and motion: wherevnto *Aristotle* himselfe subscribeth in these words: *Neceſſe est scilicet de virtute dicere, & quid sit, & ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim fere fuerit, virtutem quidem nosse, acquirenda autem eius modos & vias ignorare: Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, querendum est, sed*

*De cultura  
anmi.*



*sed & quomodo sui copiam faciat, utrunq; enim volumus, & rem ipsam nosse & eius compotes fieri: Hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus & ex quibus & quomodo.* In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: So saith Cicero in great Commendation of Cato the second, that hee had applied himselfe to Philosophy; *Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi.* And although the neglect of our times wherein few men doe hold any Consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith *De partibus vite quisq; deliberat, de summa nemo*) may make this part seeme superfluous: yet I must conclude with that *Aphorisme of Hypocrates, Qui graui morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, ijs mens egrotat.* They need medicine not onely to assuage the disease but to awake the sense. And if it bee said, that the cure of mens mindes belongeth to sacred Divinity, it is most true: But yet Morall Philosophy may be preferred vnto her as a wise seruant, and humble hand-maid. For as the Psalme saith, *That the eyes of the handmaid looke perpetually towards the Mistresse*, and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of the Mistresse will: So ought Morall Philosophy to giue a constant attention to the doctrines of Divinity, & yet so as it may yeeld of her selfe (within due limits) many found and profitable directions.

This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange, that it is not  
reduced



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reduced to written enquirie, the rather because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech & action is often conversant, and such wherein the common talke of men: (which is rare, but yet commeth sometimes to passe) is wiser then their Bookes: It is reasonable therefore that wee propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthinesse, and because we may acquite our selues for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves; that haue written. Wee will therefore enumerate some heads or Points thereof, that it may appeare the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

First therefore in this, as in all things, which are practically, we ought to cast vp our account, what is in our power, & what not: for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application onely. The husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the seasons of the wether: no more can the Physitian the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of Accidents. So in the Culture and Cure of the minde of Man, two things are without our command: Points of Nature, and points of Fortune. For to the Basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our worke is limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is left vnto vs, to proceed by application,

*Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:*  
and so likewise

*Vincenda*



*Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo.*

But, when that wee speake of suffering, wee doe not speake of a dull, and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth, and contriueth vse & advantage out of that which seemeth aduerse & contrary; which is that properly which we call, Accommodating or Applying. Now the wisdome of Application resteth principally in the exact & distinct knowledge of the precedent state, or disposition, vnto which we doe apply: for wee cannot fit a garment, except wee first take measure of the Body.

So then the first Article of this knowledge is to set downe sound and true distributions & descriptions of the seuerall Characters and tempers of mens natures and dispositions, specially hauing regard to those differences which are most radicall in being the fountaines and Causes of the rest, or most frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the Mediocrities of vertues, that can satisfy this intention; for it it deserue to be considered, *That there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and others to small*, (Which Aristotle handleth or ought to haue handled by the name of Magnanimity) doth it not deserue aswell to be considered, *That there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, & others to few*? So that some can diuide themselues, others can perchance doe exactly well, but it must be but



in few things at once; And so there cometh to be a *Narrownesse of minde* as well as *Pusillanimity*. And againe, *That some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once or within a short returne of time: others to that which beginnes a farre off, and is to be won with length of pursuite,*

——— *Iam tum tenditq; fovetq;*

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly also ascribed to God as a *Magnanimity*: So farther deserued it to be considered, by Aristotle, *That there is a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which doe in no sort touch or concerne a mans selfe) to sooth and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict & crosse: And deserueth it not much better to be considered, That there is a disposition, not in conversation or talke, but in matter of more serious Nature) & supposing it still in things meereley indifferent) to take pleasure in the good of another, & a disposition contrariwise, to take distast at the good of another; which is that properly, which wee call good nature, or ill nature, benignity or malignity: And therefore I cannot sufficiently marvell, that this part of knowledge touching the severall Characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in Morality and Policy, considering it is of so great ministry & suppeditation to them both. A man shall finde in the traditions of Astrology, some pretty and apt divisions of mens natures, according to the predominances of the Planets, louers of quiet, louers of action, louers*

of



of Victory, louers of Honour, louers of Pleasure, louers of Arts, louers of Change, and so forth. A man shall finde in the wisest sort of these Relations which the Italians make touching *Conclaves*, the natures of the seuerall Cardinalls, handsomely & liuely painted forth: a man shall meet with in every daies conference, the denominatiōs of *Sensitiue*, *dry*, *formall*, *reall*, *humorous*, *certaine*, *Humo di prima impressione*, *Huomo di ultima impressione*, and the like: and yet neverthelesse this kinde of observations wandreth in words, but as not fixed in Enquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them) but wee conclude no precepts vpon them; wherein our fault is the greater, because both History, Poesy, and daily Experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow, whereof we make a few Poesies, to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the Confectionary, that Receipts might bec made of them for vse of life.

Of much like kinde are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed vpon the mind *by the Sex*, *by the Age*, *by the Region*, *by health*, *and sicknesse*, *by beauty and deformity*, and the like, which are inherent, and not externe: and againe, those which are caused by externe fortune: as *Soveraignty*, *Nobility*, *obscure birth*, *riches*, *want*, *magistracy*, *privatenesse*, *prosperity*, *adversity*, *constant fortune*, *variable fortune*, *rising per saltum*, *per gradus*, and the like. And therefore we see that *Plautus* maketh it a wonder, to see an old man beneficent, *Benignitas huius ut ado-*



*lescentuli est.* Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be vsed to the Cretans, *Increpa eos durè*, vpon the disposition of their country, *Cretenses semper mendaces, malæ Bestiæ; ventres pigri.* Salust noteth, that it is vsuall with Kings to desire contradictories, *sed plerunq; Regia voluntates, vt vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sepeq; ipsæ sibi aduersæ.* Tacitus obserueth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, *solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius.* Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and suddaine fortune for the most part defea- teth men, *Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt:* So the Psalme sheweth it is more easy to keepe a measure in the enioying of fortune, then in the increase of fortune, *Diuitiæ si affluant, nolite Cor apponere:* These observations and the like, I deny not, but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorickes, and are handled in some scattered discourses, but they were neuer incorporate into Morall Philosophy, to which they doe essentially appertaine: as the knowledge of the diuersity of Grounds and Moulds doth to Agriculture, and the knowledge of the diuersity of Complexions & Constitutions doth to the Physitian; except we meane to follow the indiscretion of Emperiques, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

Another Article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections: for as in Medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the diuerse  
Com-



Complexions and Constitutions; secondly the diseases, and lastly the cures: So in medicining of the Minde, after knowledge of the divers characters of mens natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the minde, which are no other then the perturbations and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient Politiques in popular Estates, were wont to compare the people to the Sea, and the Orators to the windes; because as the sea would of it selfe be calme and quiet, if the winds did not moue and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here againe I finde strange, as before, that *Aristotle* should haue written diuers volumes of *Ethiques*, and neuer handled the affections, which is the principall subiect thereof, and yet in his *Rhetoricks* where they are considered but collaterally, & in a second degree, (*as they may be moued by speech*) he findeth place for the, & handleth them well for the quantity, but where their true place is, hee pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and paine that can satisfie this enquiry, no more then he that should generally handle the nature of light, can be said to handle the nature of *Colours*: for pleasure & paine are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours: Better tra-



vels I suppose had the *Stoickes* taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which wee haue at second hand: But yet it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtilty of definitions, (which in a subiect of this nature are but curiosities) then in actiue and ample descriptions and obseruations: so likewise I finde some particular writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections, as of *Anger*, of *Comfort vpon aduerse accidents*, of *Tendernesse of countenance*, and other. But the Poets & writers of Histories are the best Doctors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited: and how pacified and refrained: and how againe contained from act, and farther degree: how they disclose themselves, how they worke, how they vary, how they gather and fortify, how they are inwrapped one within another, and how they doe fight and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of speciall vse in Morall and Civile matters: how I say to set affection against affection, and to master one by another, even as we vse to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase wee could not so easily recouer: vpon which foundation is erected that excellent vse of *Premium* and *pæna*, whereby Civile states consist, imploying the predominant affections of *feare* and *hope*, for the suppressing and brideling the rest. For as in the government of states, it is sometimes  
necessary



necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within.

Now come we to those points which are within our owne command, and haue force and operation vpon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners; wherein they ought to haue handled custome, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproofe, exhortation, fame, lawes, booke, studies: these as they haue determined vse in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receits and regiments compounded and described, as may serue to recouer or preserue the health and good estate of the minde, as far as pertaineth to humane medicine: of which number wee will insist vpon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; & therefore we doe resume Custome and Habite to speake of.

The opinion of *Aristotle* seemeth to mee a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custome, vsing for example; That if a stone bee throwne ten thousand times vp, it will not learne to ascend, and that by often seeing or hearing, we doe not learne to see or heare the better. For though this principle bee true in things wherein nature is *peremptory* (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a *latitude*. For hee might see that a strait gloue will come more easily on with vse, and that a wand will  
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by vse bend otherwise then it grew; and that by vse of the voyce we speake louder and stronger; & that by vse of enduring heat and cold, we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort haue a nearer resemblance vnto that subiect of manners he handleth, thē those instances which he alledgeth; but allowing his conclusion *that vertues & vices consist in habit*, he ought so much the more to haue taught the manner of superinducing that habite: for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof wee will recite a few.

The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either too *High* a straine or too *weake*: for if too *High* in a diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature, you breed an opiniō of facility, & so a sloth, and in all natures you breed a farther expectation then can hold out, & so an insatisfaction in the end; if too *weake* of the other side: you may not looke to performe and overcome any great taske.

Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two seuerall times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed: that by the one you may giue a great step, by the other you may worke out the knots and stones of the minde, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.

Another precept is, that which *Aristotle* mentioneth by the way, which is to beare ever towards the



the contrary extreame of that, wherevnto we are by Nature inclined :like vnto the Rowing against the streame,or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his naturall crookednesse.

Another precept is,that the minde is brought to any thing better and with more sweetnesse and happinesse,if that wherevnto you pretend,bee not first in the intention, but *Tanquam aliud agendo*, because of the Naturall hatred of the minde against necessity and constraint. Many other Axiomes there are touching the managing of *Exercise* and *Custome*: which being so conducted ,doth proue indeed another nature: but being gouerned by chance, doth commonly proue but an ape of nature,and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit.

So if we should handle *bookes* and *studies* & what influence and operation they haue vpon manners, are there not diuers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining therevnto? did not one of the Fathers in great indignation call *Poesy*, *vinum Daemonum*, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations and vaine opinions? Is not the opinion of *Aristotle* worthy to be regarded wherein he saith That young men are no fit auditors of Morall Philosophy, because they are not setled from the boyling heat of their affections; nor attempered with *Time* and experience? And doth it not hereof come that those excellent bookes and discourses of the ancient Writers, (whereby they haue perswaded vnto *vertue* most effectually,representing her in *state* & *Maiestie*,and *popular opinions* against vertue



in their *Parasites Coates*, fit to be scorned and derided, are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read, and reuolued by men in their mature and settled yeares, but confined almost to boyes and beginners: But is it not true also, that muchlesse, young men are fit auditors of Matters of Policy, till they haue beene thoroughly seasoned in religion and Morality, least their Iudgements bee corrupted, and made apt to thinke that there are no true differences of things, but according to *utility* and *fortune*, as the verse describes it. *Prosperum & Felix scelus virtus vocatur*: And againe, *Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, Hic diadema*: which the Poets doe speak satyrically & in indignation on vertues behalfe: But bookes of pollicie doe speake it seriously, and positiuely; for so it pleaeth *Machiauell* to say, *That if Caesar had beene overthrowne, hee would haue beene more odious then euer was Catiline*; as if there had beene no difference but in fortune, betweene a *very fury of lust and bloud*, and the *most excellent spirit* (his ambition reserued) *of the world*? Againe is there not a Caution likewise to bee giuen of the doctrines of Moralities themselues (some kinds of them) lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible, as *Cicero* saith of *Cato in Marco Catone*, *Hæc bona quæ videmus divina & egregia ipsius scitote esse propria: quæ nonnunquam requirimus, ea, sunt omnia, non à natura sed à Magistro*? Many other Axioms and aduises there are touching those proprieties and effects, which studies doe infuse and instill into manners: and so likewise is there touch-  
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ing the vse of all those other points of Company, fame, lawes, & the rest, which wee recited in the beginning in the doctrine of Morallitie.

But there is a kinde of *Culture* of the *Minde*; that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate then the rest, and is built vpon this ground: That the mindes of all men are sometimes in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state more deprived. The purpose therefore of this practise, is to fixe and cherish the good howres of the minde, & to obliterate and take forth the evill. The fixing of the good hath beene practised by two meanes, vowes or constant resolutions, and obseruances, or exercises, which are not to bee regarded so much in themselves, as because they keepe the minde in continuall obedience. The obliteration of the Evill hath been practised by two Meanes; some kinde of Redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an Inception or account *de Nouo*, for the time to come: but this part seemeth sacred and religious, and iustly: for all good Morall Philosophy (as was said) is but an handmaid to Religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last point which is of all other meanes the most compendious and summary, & againe, the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the minde vnto Vertue and good Estate: which is the electing and propounding vnto a mans selfe good and vertuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compasse to attaine. For if these two things bee



supposed: that a man set before him honest and good ends, and againe that hee bee resolute, constant, and true vnto them; it will follow that hee shall mould himselfe into all Vertue at once: and this is indeed like the worke of Nature, whereas the other course, is like the worke of the hand. For as when a Caruer makes an Image, hee shapes onely that part wherevpon he worketh, as if hee bee vpon *the face*, that part which shall be *the body*, is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when Nature makes a *flower* or *living creature*, shee formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining vertue by *habite*, while a man practiseth Temperance, hee doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; But when hee dediceth and applieth himselfe to *good ends*, looke what vertue soeuer the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend vnto him, hee is inuested of a precedent disposition to conforme himselfe therevnto: which state of minde *Aristotle* doth excellently expresse himselfe, that it ought not to bee called *vertuous*, but *Divine*: his words are these, *Immanitati autem consentaneum est, opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, heroicam siue diuinã virtutem*. And a little after; *Nam vt fera, neq; vitium, neq; virtus est, sic neq; Dei. Sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam à vitio*. And therefore we may see what Celsitude of honor *Plinius secundus* attributeth to *Traiane* in his fune-  
rall oration, where hee said, *That men needed to make*



no other prayers to the Gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to them, as Traiane had beene: as if he had not beene onely an Imitation of divine nature, but a patterne of it. But these bee heathen and prophane passages, hauing but a shadow of that diuine state of minde, which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men vnto; by imprinting vpon their soules *Charity*, which is excellently called the bond of *Perfection*: because it comprehendeth and fastneth all vertues together. And as it is elegantly said by *Menander* of vaine loue, which is but a false Imitation of divine loue, *Amor melior Sophista, Leuo ad humanam vitam*, that Loue teacheth a man to carry himselfe better, then the *Sophist* or *Præceptor*, which he calleth *Left-handed*, because with all his rules and preceptions hee cannot forme a man so *Dexteriously*, nor with that facilitie to prize himselfe and gouerne himselfe as loue can doe: So certainly if a mans mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection thē all the doctrine of morality can doe, which is but a *Sophist* in comparison of the other. Nay farther as *Xenophon* obserued truely, that all other affections though they raise the minde, yet they doe it by distorting, and vncomlineesse of extasies or excesses; but onely Loue doth exalt the minde, and neuerthelesse, at the same instant doth settle and compose it. So in all other excellencies, though they aduance nature, yet they are subiect to excess. Onely Charity admitteth no *excesse*; for so wee



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see, aspiring to be like God in power, the Angells transgressed and fell: *Ascendam, & ero similis altissimo*: By aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell, *Eritis sicut Dii scientes bonum & malum*; But by aspyring to a similitude of God in goodnesse or loue; neither Man nor Angell ever transgressed or shall transgresse. For vnto that imitation we are called; *Diligite inimicos vestros, Benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, & orate pro persequentibus & calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filij patris vestri qui in caelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos & malos, & pluit super iustos & iniustos*. So in the first platforme of the diuine Nature it selfe, the heathen Religion speaketh thus, *Optimus Maximus*, and the sacred Scriptures thus, *Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius*.

Wherefore I doe conclude this part of Morall knowledge concerning *the Culture and Regiment of the Mind*, wherein if any man considering the parts thereof, which I haue enumerated, doe iudge, that my labour is but to Collect into an *Art or Science*, that which hath beene pretermitted by others, as matter of common *Sense and experience*, he iudgeth well: But as *Philocrates* sported with *Demosthenes*: you may not maruell (*Athenians*) that *Demosthenes* and I doe differ, for he drinketh water, and I drinke Wine: and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleepe;

*Sunt geminae somni porta, quarum altera fertur  
Cornea,*



*Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:  
Altera Candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto,  
Sed falsa ad cælum mittunt insomnia manes.*

So if we put on sobrietie and attention, wee shall finde it a sure Maxime in knowledge: that the more pleasant Liquor (of Wine) is the more vaporious, and the brauer gate of Ivory, sendeth forth the falser dreames.

But we haue now concluded *That generall part of Humane Philosophy, which contemplateth man segragate, and as hee consisteth of Body and Spirit;* Wherein wee may farther note, that there seemeth to be a Relation or Conformity betweene the good of the Minde, and the good of the Body. For as we divided the good of the body into *Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure,* so the good of the minde inquired in Rationall and Morall knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the minde sound, without perturbation, *Beautifull* and graced with decencie: and *Strong* and *Agill* for all duties of life. These three as in the body, so in the minde seldome meet, and commonly seuer: For it is easie to obserue, that many haue Strength of wit and Courage, but haue neither Health from perturbations, nor any Beauty or Decencie in their doings: some againe haue an Elegancy and finenesse of Carriage, which haue neither soundnesse of honestie, nor substance of sufficiency: And some againe haue honest and reformed Mindes that can neither become them-



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themselues, nor manage Businesse, and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three: As for pleasure, we haue likewise determined, that the minde ought not to be reduced to stupide, but to retaine pleasure: Confined rather in the subiect of it, then in the strength and vigor of it.

**C***iuill Knowledge* is conuersant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to Axiome. Nevertheless, as *Cato* the Censor said, *That the Romanes were like sheepe, for that a man were better driue a flock of them, then one of them; For in a flocke, if you could get but some few goe right, the rest would follow:* So in that respect Morall Philosophy is more difficile then Pollicie. Againe, Morall Philosophy propoundeth to it selfe the framing of Internall goodnesse: But ciuill knowledge requireth onely an External goodnesse: for that as to society sufficeth: and therefore it commeth oft to passe that there be Euill Times in good gouernments: for so we finde in the holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, *Sed adhuc populus non dixerat cor suum ad dominum Deum patrum suorum.* Againe, States as great Engines moue slowly, and are not so soone put out of frame: for as in *Egypt* the seauen good yeares sustained the seauen bad: So gouernments for a time well grounded, doe beare out errours following. But the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly



suddainly subverted. These respects doe somewhat qualify the extreame difficulty of civile knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society, which are, Conversation, Negotiation, & Government. For man seeketh in society, comfort, vse and protection: and they be three wisdomes of divers natures, which doe often sever: wisdom of the behauour; wisdom of businesse; and wisdom of state.

The wisdom of conversation ought not to bee ouer-much affected, but much lesse despised: for it hath not only an honour in it selfe, but an influence also into businesse and gouernment; The poet saith.

*Nec vultu destrue verba tuo.* A man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may hee of his deeds saith *Cicero*, recommending to his brother affability and easy accessse.

*Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.*

It is nothing wonne to admitte men with an open doore, and to receiue them with a shut & reserued countenance. So we see *Atticus*, before the first interview betweene *Cæsar* and *Cicero*, the warre depending, did seriously advise *Cicero* touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the gouernment of the countenance bee of such effect, much more is that of the

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speech,



speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true modell whereof seemeth to me well expressed by *Livie*, though not meant for this purpose; *Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius, quorum alterum est aliena libertatis obliti, alterum suae*: The summe of behauiour is to retaine a mans owne dignity, without intruding vpon the liberty of others: on the other side, if behauiour and outward carriage bee intended too much, first it may passe into affectation, and then *Quid deformius quam Scenam in vitam transferre*, to act a mans life? But although it proceede not to that extreame, yet it consumeth time, and imployeth the minde too much. And therefore as wee vse to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, *Amici, fures Temporis*: So certainly the Intending of the discretion of behauiour is a great Theefe of Meditation: Againe, such as are accomplished in that houre of vrbanity, please themselues in name, and seldome aspire to higher vertue: whereas those that haue defect in it, doe seeke *Comelinesse* by Reputation: for where reputation is, almost euery thing becometh: But where that is not, it must bee supplied by *Puntos* and Complements: Againe, there is no greater impediment of Action, then an over-curious obseruance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as *Solomon* saith, *Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat, & qui respicit ad nubes, non metet*: A man must make his opportunity, as oft as finde it. To conclude; Behauiour seemeth



seemeth to me as a Garment of the Mind, and to haue the conditions of a Garment. For it ought to be made in fashion: it ought not to be too curious: It ought to be shaped so, as to set forth any good making of the mind: and hide any deformity; and aboue all, it ought not to be too straight, or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of Civile knowledge hath beene elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.

The wisdom touching negotiation or businesse hath not bin hitherto collected into writing to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning. For from this roote springeth chiefly that note or opinion which by vs is expressed in Adage, to this effect: That there is no great concurrence betweene learning and Wisdome. For of the three wisdomes, which wee haue set downe to pertaine to civile life, for wisdom of Behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised. as an Inferiour to Vertue, and an Enemy to Meditation, for wisdom of Governement they acquite themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few. But for the wisdom of Businesse wherein mans life is most conversant, there bee no Bookes of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that haue no proportion to the magnitude of this subiect. For if bookes were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with meane experience, would farre excell men of long experience, without learning,



and out shoot them in their owne bow.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable, as it falleth not vnder precept; for it is much lesse infinite then science of Government, which wee see is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romanes in the saddest and wisest times were professors: for *Cicero* reporteth, that it was then in vse for Senators, that had name and opinion for generall wise men, as *Coruncanius*, *Curius*, *Laelius*; and many others; to walke at certaine houres in the *Place*, and to give audience to those that would vse their advise, and that the particular Cittizens would resort vnto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the imploying of a sonne, or of a purchase or bargaine, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to mans life: so as there is a wisdom of Counsell and advise euen in private Causes, arising out of an vniversal insight into the affaires of the world, which is vsed indeede vpon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by generall observation of causes of like nature. For so wee see in the Booke which *Q. Cicero* writeth to his brother *De petitione consultatus*, (being the only booke of businesse that I know written by the ancients) although it concerned a particular action then on foote, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politique Axiomes, which containe not a temporary, but a perpetuall direction in the case of popular



popular Elections; But chiefly we may see in those Aphorismes, which haue place amongst Divine writings composed by *Solomon* the King, of whom the scriptures testify, that his heart was as the sands of the sea, in compassing the world and all worldly matters; we see I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending too much variety of occasions; wherevpon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of Examples.

*Sed & cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur, ne accom-  
modes aurem tuam, nè fortè audias servum tuum ma-  
ledicentem tibi.* Here is concluded the provident stay of enquiry of that which we would bee loath to finde: as it was iudged great wisdom in *Pompeius Magnus* that he burned *Sertorius* papers unpersed.

*Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, siue irascatur, siue rideat, non inveniet requiem.* Here is described the great disadvantage, which a wise man hath in vndertaking a lighter person then himselfe, which is such an ingagement, as whether a man turne the matter to ieast, or turne it to heat; or howsoever he change copy, hee can no waies quit himselfe well of it.

*Qui delicatè à pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem.* Here is signified that if a man beginne too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in vnkindnesse, and vnthankfulnesse.



*Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo, coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles.* Here is obserued that of all vertues for rising to honour, quicknesse of dispatch is the best; for superiours many times loue not to haue those they employ, too deepe, or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.

*Vidi cunctos viuentes, qui ambulant sub sole cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo.* Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; *Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occidentem vel meridianum.*

*Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima.* Here caution is giuen that vpon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the vnfittest; for a man leaueth things at worst, and depriueth himselfe of meanes to make them better.

*Erat Civitas parua & pauci in ea viri; venit contra eam rex magnus, & vadavit eam, instruxitq; munitiones per Gyrum, & perfecta est obsidio, inventusq; est in ea vir pauper & sapiens, et liberauit eam per sapientiam suam, et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis;* Here the corruption of states is let forth; that esteeme not vertue or merit longer then they haue vse of it.

*Mollis responsio frangit iram.* Here is noted that silence or rough Answer, exasperateth: but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

*Iter pigrorum, quasi sepes spinarum.* Here is liuely represented how laborious sloth proueth in the  
end;



end; for when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing prepared before hand, every step findeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

*Melior est finis orationis quam principium.* Here is taxed the vanity of formall speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, then vpon the conclusions and issues of speech.

*Qui cognoscit in iudicio faciem, non bene facit, iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem.* Here is noted that a iudge were better be a briber, then a respecter of persons: for a corrupt Iudge offendeth not so highly as a facile.

*Vir pauper calumnians pauperes, similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames;* here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the auncient fable of the full and hungry horse-leech.

*Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est iustus cadens coram impio.* Here is noted that one judicall & exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountaines of Iustice more, then many particular injuries passed over by connivence.

*Qui subtrahit aliquid à patre et à matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidij;* Here is noted that whereas men in wronging their best friends, vse to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold vpon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from Injury to impiety.

*Noli*



*Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso;* Here caution is giuen that in the election of our friends wee doe principally a-voide those which are impatient, as those that will espouse vs to many factions and quarels.

*Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum:* Here is noted that in domesticall separations and breaches, men doe promise to themselues quieting of their minde and contentment, but still they are deceiued of their expectation, and it turneth to winde.

*Filius sapiens latificat patrem, filius vero stultus mæstitia est matri suæ.* Here is distinguished that fathers haue most comfort of the good prooffe of their sonnes; but mothers haue most discomfort of their ill prooffe, because women haue little discerning of vertue, but of fortune.

*Qui celat delictum, querit amicitiam, sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat fœderatos;* Here caution is giuen that reconcilment is better managed by an Amnesty & passing ouer that which is past, then by Apologies and excusations.

*In omni opere bono erit abundantia, ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas:* here is noted that words & discourse abound most, where there is idlenesse and want.

*Primus in sua causa iustus, sed venit altera pars, & inquit in eum;* Here is obserued that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in such sort, that the preiudice thereby wrought will bee hardly remo-ued



ved, except some abuse or falsitie in the Information be detected.

*Verba linguis quasi simplicia, & ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris;* there is distinguished that flattery and insinuation which seemeth set and artificially, sinketh not farre, but that entereth deepe, which hath shew of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

*Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi iniuriam facit, & qui arguit Impium, sibi maculam gerit,* Here caution is giuen how weetender reprehension to arrogant and scornefull natures, whose manner is to esteeme it for contumely, and accordingly to returne it.

*Da sapienti occasionem & addetur ei sapientia,* Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verball and swimming onely in conceit: for the one vpon occasion presented, is quickned and redoubled: the other is amazed and confused.

*Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus.*

Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glasse wherein the Images of all diversitie of Natures and Customes are represented, from which representation proceedeth that application,

*Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit.*

Thus haue I staied somewhat longer vpon these sentences politique of Solomon, then is agreeable to the proportion of an example: ledde with a desire to giue authority to this part of knowledge, which



I noted as deficient by so excellent a president: and haue also attended them with brieve obseruations, such as to my vnderstanding, offer no violence to the sense, though I knowe they may be applyed to a more diuine vse: But it is allowed euen in Diuinity, that some interpretations, yea and some Writings, haue more of the *Eagle*, then others: But taking them as Instructions for life, they might haue receiued large discourse, if I would haue broken them and illustrated them by diducements and examples.

Neither was this in vse only with the Hebrews, But it is generally to bee found in the wisdome of the more ancient times: that as men found out any obseruation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and expresse it in parable, or Aphorisme, or fable. But for fables they were Vicegerents and supplies, where Examples failed: Now that the times abound with history, the ayme is better when the marke is aliue. And therefore the forme of writing, which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of Negotiation and occasions, is that which *Machiauel* chose wisely and aptly for Gouvernment: *namely discourse vpon Histories or Examples*. For knowledge drawne freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars againe. And it hath much greater life for practise, when the discourse attendeth vpon the Example, then when the example attendeth vpon the discourse. For this is no point of order as

is



it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the Example is the ground, being set downe in an history at large, it is set downe with all circumstances: which may sometimes controule the discourse therevpon made, and sometimes supply it; as a very patterne for action; whereas the Examples alleaged for the discourses sake, are cited succinctly, & without particularity, and carry a seruile aspect towards the discourse, which they are brought in to make good.

But this difference is not amisse to bee remembered, that as History of *Times* is the best ground for discourse of *Gouernment*, such as *Machiauel* handleth; so Histories of *Liues* is the most proper; for discourse of businesse is more conuersant in priuate Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose, fitter then them both, which is *discourse vpon Letters*, such as are wise & weightie, as many are of *Cicero ad Atticum*, and others. For letters haue a great and more particular representation of businesse, then either *Chronicles* or *Liues*. Thus haue wee spoken both of the matter and forme of this part of Civill knowledge touching Negotiation, which wee note to bee deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that, whereof wee haue spoken, as *sapere*, and *sibi Sapere*: the one mouing as it were to the circumference, the other to the Center: for there is a wisdom of counsell, and againe there



is a wisdom or pressing a mans owne fortune ; and they doe sometimes meet, and often seuer. For many are wise in their owne waies , that are weake for gouernment or counsell, like Ants which is a wise creature for it selfe , but very hurtfull for the garden. This wisdom the Romanes did take much knowledge of, *Nam pot sapiens* (saith the Comickall Poet) *singit fortunam sibi*, and it grew to an Adage, *Faber quisq, fortunæ propriæ* : and *Linie* attributeth it to *Cato* the first, *in hoc viro tanta vis animi & ingenij inerat, ut quocunq, loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturum videretur.*

This conceit or position if it bee too much declared and professed , hath beene thought a thing impolitique and vnlucky, as was obserued in *Timotheus* the *Athenian* : who hauing done many great seruices to the Estate in his gouernment and giuing an account thereof to the people , as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this Clause, and in this fortune had no part. And it came so to passe that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards : for this is too high and too arrogant, sauouring of that which *Ezechiel* saith of *Pharaoh* : *Dicis: fluvius est meus & ego feci memet ipsum* : or of that which another Prophet speaketh : That men offer Sacrifices to their Nets and Snares , and that which the Poet expresseth,

*Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod inutile libro  
Nunc adsint :*

For these confidences were ever vnhalloved,  
and



and vnbleſſed. And therefore thoſe that were great Politiques indeed ever aſcribed their ſucceſſes to their felicitie: and not to their ſkill or vertue. For ſo Sylla ſurnamed himſelfe *Felix*, not *Magnus*. So *Cæſar* ſaid to the Maſter of the ſhip, *Cæſarem portas & fortunam eius*.

But yet nevertheleſſe theſe Poſitions, *Faber quiſque fortunæ ſuæ, Sapiens dominabitur aſtris: In via virtuti nulla eſt via*, and the like, being taken & uſed as ſpurs to induſtry, and not as ſtirrops to inſolency, rather for reſolution then for preſumption or outward declaration, haue beene ever thought ſound & good, and are (no queſtion) imprinted in the greateſt mindes: who are ſo ſenſible of this opinion, as they can ſcarce containe it within. As we ſee in *Auguſtus Cæſar* (who was rather diuerſe from his Vnkle, then inferior in vertue) how when he died, he deſired his friends about him to giue him a *Plaudite*; as if hee were conſcient to himſelfe that hee had played his part well vpon the ſtage. This part of knowledge wee doe report alſo as deficient: not but that it is practiſed too much, but it hath not beene reduced to writing. And therefore leaſt it ſhould ſeeme to any that it is not comprehenſible by Axiome, it is requiſite as we did in the former, that wee ſet downe ſome heads or paſſages of it.

Wherein it may appeare at the firſt a new and vnwonted Argument to teach men how to raiſe and make their fortune; a doctrine, wherein every man perchance will be ready to yeeld himſelfe a diſciple



till he seeth the difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as *vertue*, and it is as hard & seuerer a thing to be a true *Politique*, as to bee truly *morall*. But the handling hereof, concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: In honour, because pragmaticall men may not goe away with an opinion that learning is like a Larke that can mount, and sing, and please her selfe, and nothing else; but may knowe that shee holdeth as well of the Hauke that can soare aloft, and can also descend and strike vpon the prey. In substance, because it is the perfect law of enquiry of truth. *That nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of Chrystall, or Forme*, that is, that there bee not any thing in being & action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine: Neither doth learning admire or esteeme of this Architecture of fortune, otherwise then as of an inferior worke; For no mans fortune can be an end worthy of his being, & many times the worthiest men doe abandon their fortune willingly for better respects; but neuerthelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserueth the consideration.

First therefore the precept, which I conceaue to bee most summarie, towards the prevailing in Fortune; is to obtaine that windowe which *Momus* did require, who seeing in the frame of mans heart, such angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to looke into them: that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their



their natures, their desires and ends, their customes and fashions, their helps and advantages, & whereby they chiefly stand; so againe their weaknesse and disadvantages, and where they lye most open and obnoxious, their friends, factions, & dependances; & againe their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, *Sola viri molles aditus, & tempora noras*; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like; And this not onely of persons, but of actions: what are on foot from time to time: and how they are conducted, fauoured, opposed; and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present Actions, is not onely materiall in it selfe, but without it also, the knowledge of persons is verry erronious: for men change with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuit, they are one, and when they returne to their Nature, they are another. These Informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the *Minor* propositions in every actiue Syllogisme, for no excellency of observations (which are as the *Major* propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the Minors.

That this knowledge is possible, *Solomon* is our surety who saith, *Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud*: And although the knowledge it selfe falleth not vnder precept, because it is of Individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.

Wee will begin therefore with this precept, according



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cording to the ancient opinion, that the Sinewes of wisdom, are slownesse of beliefe and distrust: That more trust be giuen to Countenances and Deedes, then to words: and in words, rather to suddaine passages, and surprized words, then to set and purposed words: Neither let that bee feared which is said, *fronti nulla fides*, which is meant of a generall outward behauiour, and not of the priuate and subtile motions and labours of the countenance and gesture, which as *Q. Cicero* elegantly saith, is *Animi Ianua*, the gate of the Minde: None more close then *Tyberius*, & yet *Tacitus* saith of *Gallus*, *Etenim vultu offensionem coniectauerat*. So againe noting the differing Character and manner of his commending *Germanicus* and *Drusus* in the *Senate*; he saith, touching his fashion wherein hee carried his speech of *Germanicus*, thus: *Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quàm ut penitus sentire crederetur*, but of *Drusus* thus, *Paucioribus sed intentior, & fida oratione*: and in another place speaking of this Character of speech, when he did any thing that was gracious and popular, he saith, That in other things hee was *velut elutantium verborum*: but then againe, *Solutius loquebatur, quando subveniret*. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation: nor no such commanded countenance (*vultus iussus*) that can seuer from a fained tale, some of these fashions, either a more sleight and carelesse fashion, or more set and formall, or more tedious and wandering, or comming from a man more drily and hardly.

Neither



Neither are *Deedes* such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a iudicious consideration of their magnitude and nature; *Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut maiore emolumento fallat*: and the Italian thinketh himselfe vpon the point to bee bought & sould, when he is better vsed then he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small favours, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to *Caution*, and as to *Industry*, and are as *Demosthenes* calleth them, *Alimenta socordie*. So againe wee see, how false the nature of some deeds are in that particular, which *Mutianus* practised vpon *Antonius Primus*, vpon that hollow & vnfaithfull reconcilement, which was made betweene them: whereupon *Mutianus* advanced many of the friends of *Antonius*: *Simul amicis eius præfecturas & tribunatus largitur*: wherein vnder pretence to strengthen him, hee did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.

As for *words* (though they be like waters to *Phisicians*, full of flattery and vncertainty) yet they are not to be despised, specially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see *Tyberius* vpon a stinging and incensing speech of *Agrippina*, came a step forth of his dissimulation when he said, *You are hurt, because you doe not raigne*; of which *Tacitus* saith, *Audita hæc, raram occulti pectoris vocem elicere: correptamque Græco versu admonuit: ideo ledi quia, non regnaret*, And therefore the Poet doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that vrge men to confesse their secrets.

*Vino tortus & ira.*

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And



And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselves, and so settled; but that sometimes vpon heate, sometimes vpon brauery, sometimes vpon kindenesse, sometimes vpon trouble of minde and weakenesse, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the prouerb of Spain, *Di mentira, y sacaras verdad: Tell a lye and find a truth.*

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from Reports: mens weakenesses and faults are best knowne from their Enemies; their vertues, and abilities from their freinds; their customes and Times from their seruants: their conceits and opinions from their familiar freinds, with whom they discourse most: Generall fame is light, and the opinions conceiued by superiors or equals are deceitfull: for to such, men are more masked, *Verior fama è domesticis emanat.*

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their Natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I thinke very vntruly) by a Nuntio of the Pope, returning from a certaine Nation, where hee serued as *Lidger*: whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to goe in his place, hee wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise: because no very wise man would euer imagine, what they in that country were like to doe:



doe: And certainly, it is an errour frequent, for men to shoot ouer, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compasse reaches then are: the Italian pro-uerbe being elegant, and for the most part true.

*Di danari, di senno, è di fede,  
C'n è manco che non credi:*

There is commonly lesse mony, lesse wisdome, and lesse good faith; then men doe accompt vpon:

But Princes vpon a farre other reason are best interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their ends: For Princes being at the toppe of humane desires, they haue for the most part no particular ends, whereto they aspire: by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires: which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable: Neither is it sufficient to informe our selues in mens ends and natures of the variety of them onely, but also of the predominancy what humor reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, when *Tigellinus* saw himselfe out stripped by *Petronius Turpilianus* in *Neroes* humours of pleasures, *Metus eius rimatur*, hee wrought vpon *Neroes* tears, whereby hee bracke the other necke.

But to all this part of enquiry, the most compendious way resteth in three things: the first to haue generall acquaintance and inwardnesse with



those which haue generall acquaintance, and looke most into the world: and specially according to the diversity of businesse and the diversity of persons, to haue privacy and conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and well intelligenced in every severall kinde. The second is to keepe a good mediocrity in liberty of speech, and secrecy: in most things liberty, secrecy where it importeth: for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to bee vsed againe: and so bringeth much to a mans knowledge: and secrecy of the other side induceth trust and inwardnesse. The last is the reducing of a mans selfe to this watchfull and serene habite, as to make accompt and purpose in euery conference and action, as well to obserue as to act. For as *Epictetus* would haue a Philosopher in every particular actiō to say to himselfe, *Et hoc volo; & etiam institutum seruare*: so a politique man in euery thing should say to him selfe, *Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere*. I haue staied the longer vpon this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a maine part by it selfe, which answereth to all the rest. But aboue all things, caution must be taken, that men haue a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much knowing doe not draw on much meddling: For nothing is more vnfortunate then light and rash intermedling in many matters: So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but onely to this, to make a better and freer choise of those actions, which may concern vs, and  
to.



to conduct them with the lesse error and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is for men to take good information touching their owne persons and well to vnderstand themselves: knowing that as *S. James* saith, though men looke oft in a glasse, yet they doe suddenly forget themselves, wherein as the diuine glasse is the word of God, so the politique glasse is the state of the world, or times wherein we liue: In the which wee are to behold our selues.

For men ought to take an vnpartiall view of their owne abilities and vertues: & againe of their wants & impediments; accounting these with the most, and those other with the least, and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following.

First to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the generall state of the times: which if they finde agreeable and fit, then in all things to giue themselves more scope and liberty, but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close, retired and reserved: as we see in *Tyberius*, who was never seene at a play: and came not into the Senate in 12 of his last yeares: whereas *Augustus Caesar* liued ever in mens eyes, which *Tacitus* obserueth.

*Alia Tyberio morum vita.*

Secondly to consider how their Nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, & accordingly



to make election if they be free, and if ingaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was done by Duke *Valentine*, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotall profession, but quitted it soone after in regard of his parts and inclination, being such neverthelesse, as a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a Prince or for a Priest.

Thirdly to consider how they sort with those, whom they are like to haue Competitors and Concurrents, and to take that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as *Cæsar Iulius* did, who at first was an Orator or Pleader, but when he saw the excellency of *Cicero*, *Hortensius*, *Catullus*, and others for eloquence, and saw there was no man of reputation for the warres but *Pompeius*, vpon whom the State was forced to rely; he forooke his course begunne toward a civile and popular greatnesse; and transferred his designes to a marshall greatnesse.

Fourthly in the choise of their friends, and dependances, to proceed according to the Composition of their owne nature, as wee may see in *Cæsar*, all whose friends & followers were men active and effectually, but not solemne or of reputation.

Fiftly to take speciall heed how they guide themselves by examples, in thinking they can doe as they see others doe: whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are farre differing; in which Error, it seemeth *Pompey* was, of whom *Cicero* saith, that hee  
was



was wont often to say : *Sylla potuit; Ego non potero?* wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of himselfe and his example, being the vnlikest in the world, the one being feiree, violent and pressing the fact; the other solemne, and full of Majesty and circumstance, and therefore the lesse effectuall.

But this precept touching the politicke knowledge of our selues, hath many other branches wherupon wee cannot insist.

Next to the well vnderstanding & discerning of a mans selfe, there followeth the well opening and reuealing a mans selfe, wherein we see nothing more vsuall then for the more able man to make the lesse shew. For there is a great aduantage in the well setting forth of a mans vertues, fortunes, merits, & againe in the artificiall couering of a mans weaknesses, defects, disgraces, staying vpon the one, sliding from the other, cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like; wherein wee see what *Tacitus* saith of *Mutianus*, who was the greatest politique of his time, *Omnium quæ dixerat feceratq̃, arte quadam ostentator*: which requireth indeed some art, least it turne tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in Manners, then in Policy; for as it is said, *Audaacter calumniare, semper aliquid hæret*, So except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity *Audaacter te vendita re semper aliquid hæret*. For it  
will



will sticke with the more ignorant & inferiour sort of men, though men of wisdom & ranke doe smile at it and despise it, and yet the authority wonne with many, doth countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and gouernement, as with a naturall pleasant and ingenious fashion, or at times when it is mixt with some perill and vn-safety, (as in Military persons) or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and carelesse passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious: or with an equall freedom of taxing a mans selfe, aswell as gracing him selfe, or by occasion of repelling or putting downe others iniury or insolency: It doth greatly adde to reputation; and surely not a few solide natures, that want this ventosity, and cannot saile in the height of the windes, are not without some preiudice and disadvantage by their moderation.

But for these flourishes & inhansements of vertue, as they are not perchance vnneccessary: So it is at least, necessary that vertue be not disvaiewed and imbased vnder the just price: which is done in three manners, by offering & obtruding a mans selfe; wherein men thinke he is rewarded when hee is accepted. By doing too much, which will not giue that which is well done leaue to settle, and in the end induceth satiety: and by finding too soone the fruit of a mans vertue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour, wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him heare what is truly said, *Cave*



*ne insuetus rebus maioribus videaris, si hac te res par-  
va sicuti magna delectat.*

But the couering of defects is of no lesse importance, then the valuing of good parts, which may be done likewise in three manners, by *Caution*, by *Colour*, and by *Confidence*. *Caution* is, when men doe ingenuously and discretely avoid to bee put into those things for which they are not proper: whereas contrariwise bold and vnquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaime all their wants; *Colour* is when men make a way for themselves, to haue a construction made of their faults, or wants: as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one, it is well said;

*Sape latet vitium proximitate boni.*

And therefore whatsoeuer want a man hath, he must see, that hee pretend the vertue that shadoweth it, as if he be *Dull*, he must affect *Grauitie*, if a *Coward*, *Mildnesse*, and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not doe his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities: and for that purpose must vse to dissemble those abilities: which are notorious in him to giue colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations: for *Confidence*, it is the last, but surest remedie: namely to depresse and seeme to de-



spise whatſoeuer a man cannot attaine, obſeruing the good principle of the Merchants, who endeauor to raiſe the price of their owne commodities, and to beat downe the price of others. But there is a confidence that paſſeth this other: which is to face out a mans owne defects, in ſeeming to conceaue that he is beſt in thoſe things wherein he is fayling; and to helpe that againe, to ſeeme on the other ſide that he hath leaſt opinion of himſelfe, in thoſe things wherein he is beſt; like as wee ſhall ſee it commonly in Poets, that if they ſhew their verſes, and you except to any, they will ſay, *That that line coſt them more labor then any of the reſt*: and preſently will ſeeme to diſable, and ſuſpect rather *ſome other line*, which they know well enough to be the beſt in the number. But aboue all, in this righting & helping of a mans ſelfe is his owne carriage, he muſt take heed he ſhew not himſelfe diſmantled and expoſed to ſcorne and injury, by too much dulceneſſe, goodneſſe, & facility of nature, but ſhew ſome ſparkles of liberty, ſpirit, & edge. Which kinde of fortified carriage with a ready reſcuing of a mans ſelfe from ſcornes, is ſometimes of neceſſity impoſed vpon men by ſomewhat in their perſon or fortune, but it ever ſucceedeth with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is by all poſſible endeauour, to frame the minde to bee pliant, and obedient to occaſion; for nothing hindereth mens fortunes ſo much as this: *Idem manebat: neque idem dicebat*: Men are where they were, when  
occasions



occasions turne, and therefore to *Cato*, whom *Livie* maketh such an Architect of fortune, hee addeth, that he had *Versatile Ingenium*: and thereof it cometh, that these graue solemne wits which must bee like themselves, and cannot make departures, haue more dignitie then felicity: But in some it is nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easie to turne: In some it is a conceit, that is almost a nature, which is that men can hardly make themselves beleue that they ought to change their course, when they haue found good by it in former experience. For *Machiauel* noteth wisely how *Fabius Maximus* would haue beene temporizing still, according to his old biasse, when the nature or the warre was altered, and required hot pursuit; In some other it is want of point and penetration in their iudgement, that they doe not discern when things haue a period, but come in, too late after the occasion: As *Demosthenes* compareth the people of *Athens* to countrey fellowes, when they play in a Fence-schoole, that if they haue a blow, then they remoue their weapon to that warde, and not before: In some other it is a loathnesse to leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their plie, & yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, they come to it with disadvantage, as *Tarquinius* that gaue for the third part of *Sibyllaes* bookes the treble price, when hee might at first haue had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever roote or cause this Restiuenesse of minde



proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial, & nothing is more politike thē to make the wheels of our mind concentricke & voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, *fatis accede Deisq;*, that men doe not only turne with the occasions, but also runne with the occasions, & not straine their credit or strength to ouer hard or extreame points: but choose in their actions that which is passable: for this will preferue men from foile, not occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, & make a shew of a perpetuall felicitie in all they vndertake, which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to haue some repugnancy with the formertwo, but not as I vnderstand it, and it is that which *Demosthenes* vttereth in high tearmes: *Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat Imperator: sic & à cordatis viris res ipsa ducenda, ut quæ ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, & non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur.* For if wee observe, we shall finde two differing kinds of sufficiency, in managing of businesse: some can make vse of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little: some can vrge and pursue their owne plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in: either of which is very vnperfect without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the obseruing a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring



a mans selfe, for although depth of secrecie, and making way (*qualis est via nauis in Mari*, which the French calleth *Sourdes Mencees*, when men set things in worke without opening themselues at all) bee sometimes both prosperous and admirable: yet many times *Disimulatio errores parit, qui disimulatorem ipsum illaqueant*. And therefore wee see the greatest politiques haue in a naturall and free manner professed their desires rather then beene reserved, and disguised in them. For so wee see that *Lucius Sylla* made a kinde of profession, *That hee wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies*. So *Cesar*, when hee went first into *Gaul*, made no scruple to professe, *That hee had rather be first in a village, then second at Rome*. So againe as soone as he had begunne the warre, wee see what *Cicero* saith of him, *Alter* (meaning of *Cesar*) *non recusat, sed quodam modo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur Tyrannus*. So wee may see in a Letter of *Cicero* to *Atticus*, that *Augustus Cesar* in his very entrance into affaires, when hee was a dearling of the Senate, yet in his haranges to the People, would sweare, *Ita parentis honores consequi liceat*, (which was no lesse then the Tyranny) saue that to helpe it, hee would stretch forth his hand towards a Statua of *Cesars*, the which was erected in the same place: whereat many men laughed and wondred and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever heare the like to this? And yet thought hee meant no hurt, hee did it so hand-



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somely and ingenuously, and all these were prosperous, whereas *Pompey* who tended to the same ends, but in a more darke and dissembling manner, as *Tacitus* saith of him, *Occultior non melior*, where- in *Salust* concurrerth, oreprobo, animo inuerecundo, made it his designe by infinite secret Engines, to cast the state into an absolute *Anarchy* and confusion, that the state might cast it selfe into his Armes for necessity and protection, and so the soueraigne power bee put vpon him, and hee neuer seene in it: and when hee had brought it (as hee thought) to that point, when hee was chosen *Consull*, alone; as neuer any was; yet hee could make no great matter of it, because men vnderstood him not: but was faine in the end to goe the beaten tracke of getting Armes into his hands, by colour of the doubt of *Cæsars* designs: so tedious, casuall, and vnfortunate are these deepe dissimulations, whereof it seemeth *Tacitus* made this iudgement, that they were a cunning of an inferiour forme in regard of true policy, attributing the one to *Augustus*, the other to *Tiberius*, where speaking of *Linia*, he saith: *Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filij bene composita*; for surely the continuall habit of dissimulation is but a weake and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politique.

Another precept of this Architecture of Fortune, is, to accustome our mindes to iudge of the proportion or valew of things, as they conduce, and are materiall to our particular ends, and that to doe  
sub-



substantially and not superficially. For we shall find the Logickall part (as I may tearme it) of some mens mindes good, but the Mathematicall part erroneous, that is, they can well iudge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, preferring things of shew and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in loue with excesse to Princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but matters of Envy, perill, and Impediment.

So some measure things according to the labour and difficultie, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and thinke if they bee euer moning, that they must needs advance and proceed, as *Cæsar* saith in a despising manner of *Cato* the second, when hee describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose: *Hæc omnia magno studio agebat*. So in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest meanes to bee best, when it should be the Fittest.

As for the true marshalling of mens pursuits towards their fortune, as they are more or lesse materiall, I hold them to stand thus; First the amendment of their owne Minds. For the Remoue of the Impediments of the minde will sooner cleare the passages of fortune, then the obtaining fortune will remoue the Impediments of the minde. In second place I set downe wealth and meanes, which I knowe most men would haue placed first: because  
of



of the generall vse which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as *Machiauel* doth that other: that monies were the sinewes of the warres, whereas (saith he) the sinewes of the warres are the sinews of mens Armes, that is, a valiant, populous and Military Nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of *Solon*, who when *Crasus* shewed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he would be Master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not monies that are the sinewes of fortune, but it is the sinewes and Steele of mens Mindes, Witte, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Temper, Industry, and the like: In the third place I set downe Reputation, because of the peremptory Tides and Currants it hath, which if they bee not taken in their due time, are seldome recouered, it being extreame hard to play an after-game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour, which is more easily wonne by any of the other three, much more by all, then any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in Matter, so is there in Time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest Errours: while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings: and doe not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshall them according to greatnesse. and not according to instance, not observing the good precept, *Quod nunc instat agamus*,  
Another



Another precept of this knowledge, is not to imbrace any matters, which doe occupy too great a quantity of time, but to haue that sounding in a mans cares,

*Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus*, and that is the cause why thole which take their course of rising by professions of Burden, as Lawyers, Orators, painefull divines, and the like, are not commonly so politrique for their owne fortunes, otherwise then in their ordinary way, because they want time to learne particulars, to waite occasions, and to devise plots.

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine, which surely a man may doe, if he doe well interlace his businesse, and bend not his mind too much vpon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action, so to carry the motions of his mind, & so to haue one thing vnder another, as if he cannot haue that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to haue it in a second, or so in a third, & if he can haue no part of that which he purposed, yet to turne the vse of it to somewhat else, & if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come, & if he can contriue no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like: so that he should exact account of himselfe of every action, to reape somewhat, & not to stand amazed & confused if he faile of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impoliticke then



to mind actions wholly one by one. For hee that doth so, leeseeth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper & propitious for somewhat, that he shall neede afterwards, then for that which he vrgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that rule: *Hec oportet facere, & illa non omittere:*

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to ingage a mans selfe perēptorily in any thing, though it seeme not liable to accident, but ever to haue a window to fly out at, or a way to retire; following the wisdome in the ancient fable, of the two froggs, which consulted when their plash was dry, whether they should goe: and the one moued to goe downe into a pit because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered; *True, but if it doe, how shall we get out againe?*

Another precept of this knowledge, is, that ancient precept of *Bias*, construed not to any point of perfidiousnesse, but onely to caution and moderation, *Et amataquam inimicus futurus, & odi tanquā amaturus:* For it vtterly betrayeth all vtility, for men to imbarque themselves too far into vnfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an example, led, because I would not haue such knowledges which I note as *deficiēt*, to be thought things Imaginatiue, or in the aire; or an obseruation or two, much made of, but things of bulke and masse:

whereof



whereof an end is hardlier made, then a beginning. It must be likewise conceiued that in these points which I mention and set downe, they are farre frō compleat tractates of them: but only as small peeces for patternes: And lastly, no man I suppose will thinke, that I meane fortunes are not obtained without all this adoe; For I know they come tumbling into some mens lappes, & a number obtaine good fortunes by diligence, in a plaine way: Little intermedling: and keeping themselues from grosse errors.

But as *Cicero* when he setteth downe an *Idea* of a perfect Orator, doth not meane that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a *Courtier* hath bin described by such as haue handled those subiects, the mould hath vsed to be made according to the perfection of the Arte, and not according to common practise: So I vnderstand it, that it ought to be done in the description of a *Politique* man: I meane politique for his owne fortune.

But it must be remembred all this while, that the precepts which we haue set downe, are of that kind which may be counted & called *Bonæ Artes*, as for euill arts, if a man would set downe for himselfe that principle of *Machiauell*: That a man seeke not to attain vertue it selfe: but the appearance only thereof, because the credit of vertue is a helpe, but the vse of it is cumber: or that other of his principles: That he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by feare, & therefore that he seeke to haue



man obnoxious, low, & in streight, which the *Italians* call *seminar spine*, to sowe thornes: or that other principle contained in the verse which *Cicero* citeth *cadant amici, dummodo Inimici intercidant*, as the *Trium-virs* which sold every one to other the liues of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of *L. Catilina* to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to vnwrap their fortunes. *Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam*, or that other principle of *Lysander*, *That children are to be deceiued with comfits, & men with othes*, & the like evill & corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number then of the good: Certainly with these dispensations from the lawes of charity & integrity, the pressing of a mans fortune, may be more hasty & compendious. But it is in life, as it is in waies, The shortest way is commonly the fowlest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their owne power, & doe beare and sustaine themselves, and be not caried away with a whirle-wind or tempest of ambition: ought in the pursuit of their owne fortune, to set before their eyes, not only that generall Map of the world, *That all things are vanity & vexation of spirit*, but many other more particular Cards & directions, chiefly that, *That being without well being, is a curse, and the greater being, the greater curse: And that all vertue is most rewarded, and all wickednesse*



kednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently;

*Quæ vobis quæ digna viri, pro laudibus istis  
Præmia posse reâr solui: pulcherrima primum  
Dij moresq; dabunt vestri:*

And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to looke vpto the eternall providence and divine judgement, which often subverteth the wisdom of evill plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, *He hath conceived mischief, & shall bring forth a vaine thing.* And although men should refrain themselves from iniury and evill artes, yet this incessant and Sabbathlesse pursuit of a mans fortune leaueth not tribute which we owe to God of our time, who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substance, & a seauenth, which is more strict, of our time: & it is to small purpose to haue an erected face towards heauen, & a perpetuall groueling spirit vpon earth, eating dust, as doth the serpent, *Atq; affigit humo Divina particulâ auræ:* & if any man flatter himselfe that hee will imploy his fortune well, though he should obtaine it ill, as was said concerning *Aug. Caesar*, and after of *Septimius Severus*, that either they should neuer haue beene borne, or else they should neuer haue died, they did so much mischief in the pursuite & ascent of their greatnes, & so much good when they were establisht, yet these compensations and satisfactions, are good to be vsed but never good to be purposed: And lastly, it is not amisse for mē in their race toward their fortune, to



coole themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor, *Charles the 5.* in his instructions to the King his sonne, *That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed, she is the farther off.* But this last is but a remedy for those, whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build vpon that foundation, which is as a corner-stone of Divinity & Philosophy, wherein they ioyne close, namely, that same *Primum querite.* For divinity saith, *primum querite regnum Dei, & ista omnia adiicientur vobis:* & Philosophy saith, *primum querite bona animi, cetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt:* And although the humane foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as wee see in *M. Brutus* when he brake forth into that speech;

---*Te colui (Virtus) ut rem: ast tu nomen inane es;*

Yet the divine foundation is vpon the Rocke. But this may serue for a tast of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge, secret and retyred in both these respects, in which things are deemed secret: for some things are secret because they are hard to know, & some because they are not fit to vtter: we see all governments are obscure and invisible.

---*Totamq, infusa per artus,  
Mens agit at molem, & magno corpore miscet.*

Such



Such is the description of governments; we see the gouernment of God over the world is hiddē; inso-much as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion; The government of the Soule in mouing the Body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Againe, the wisdom of Antiquity (the shadowes whereof are in the Poets (in the description of torments & paines, next vnto the crime of Rebellion which was the Giants offence, doth detest the offence of futility as in *Sisyphus* and *Tantalus*. But this was meant of particulars; Nevertheless even vnto the generall rules and discourses of pollicy, and government, there is due a reverent & reserued handling.

But contrariwise in the governours toward the governed, all things ought as farre as the frailty of Man permitteth, to be manifest, and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe which seemeth to vs a darke & shady body, is in the view of God, as Christall, *Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile Christallo*. So vnto Princes and States, specially towards wise Senates and Consuls, the natures & dispositions of the people, their conditions, and necessities, their factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents ought to be in regard of the variety of their Intelligence, the wisdom of their observations, & the height of their station, where they keepe Centinell, in great part  
cleare



cleare and transparent; wherefore, considering that I write to a King that is a maister of this Science, and is so well assisted, I thinke it decent to passe ouer this part in silence, as willing to obtaine the certificate, which one of the ancient Philosophers aspired vnto, who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, *that there was one that knew how to hold his peace.*

Notwithstanding for the more publike part of Gouernment, which is Lawes, I think good to note onely one deficiency, which is, that all those which haue written of Lawes, haue written either as Philosophers, or as Lawyers, & none as States-men. As for the Philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary commonwealths, & their discourses are as the Stars, which giue little light because they are so high. For the Lawyers, they write according to the States where they liue, what is received law, and not what ought to be Law; for the wisdom of a Law-maker is one, and of a Lawyer is another. For there are in Nature certaine fountaines of Iustice, whence all Civill Lawes are deriued, but as streames; and like as waters doe take tinctures and tastes from the soyles through which they run; so doe ciuill Lawes vary according to the Regions & gouernements where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountaines; againe, the wisdom of a Lawmaker consisteth not only in a platforme of Iustice; but in the application thereof, taking



king into consideration, by that meanes Lawes may be made certaine, & what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulnessse and *incertainty* of Law, by what meanes Lawes may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the impediments, and remedies in the *execution* of lawes, what influence lawes touching private right of *Meum & Tuum*, haue into the publike state, and how they may bee made apt and agreeable, how lawes are to be *penned* and *deliuered*, whether in *Texts* or in *Acts*, *briefe* or *large*, with *preambles*, or *without*; how they are to be *pruned* and *reformed* from time to time, and what is the best meanes to keepe thẽ from being too *vast in volumes*, or too full of *multiplicity & crosnesse*, how they are to be expounded, When *upon causes emergent*, and judicially discussed, & when *upon responses* and *conferences* touching generall points or questions, how they are to bee *pressed*, rigorously or tenderly, how they are to be mittigated by equity, and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict Law is to be *mingled in the same Courts*; or *kept apart in severall Courts*, Againe, how the practise, profession, and erudition of Law is to be censured and gouerned, & many other points touching the administration, and (as I may tearme it) animation of Lawes. Upon which I insist the lesse, because I purpose, (if God giue me leaue) hauing begun a worke of this Nature, in Aphorismes, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meane time for deficient.

*De prudentia  
legislatoria, siue  
de fontibus Iu-  
ris.*

R r

And



And for your Maiesties Lawes of *England*, I could say much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect: But they cannot but excell the civill Lawes in fitnesse for the government: for the civill Law was, *non hos quaesitum munus in usus*: It was not made for the Countries which it gouerneth: hereof I cease to speake, because I will not interminge matter of Action, with matter of generall Learning.

Thus haue I concluded this portion of learning touching *Civill knowledge*, & with civill knowledge haue concluded *Humane Philosophy*, and with *Humane Philosophy*, *Philosophy in Generall*; and being now at some pause, looking backe into that I haue passed through: This writing seemeth to mee (*si nunquam fallit Imago*) as far as a man can judge of his owne worke, not much better then that noise or sound which Musicians make while they are tuning their Instruments, which is nothing pleasant to heare, but yet is a cause why the Musique is sweeter afterwards. So haue I beene content to tune the Instruments of the Muses, that they may play, that haue better hands. And surely when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitatiō, or circuit in all the qualities thereof: as the excellency and viuacity of the wits of this age; The noble helps and lights which we haue by the trauailes of ancient writers: The Art of Printing, which communica-

te th



teth Bookes to men of all fortunes. The opennes of the world by nauigatiō, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, & a Masse of Naturall History: The leasure wherewith these times abound, not imploying men so generally in civill businesse, as the states of *Gracia* did, in respect of their popularity, & the state of *Rome* in respect of the greatnesse of their Monarchy: The present disposition of these times at this instant to peace: The consumption of all that ever can be said in controuersies of Religion, which haue so much diuerted men from other Sciences: The perfection of your Majesties learning, which as a *Phænix* may call whole volies of wits to follow you: & the inseparable propriety of Time, which is euer more & more to disclose truth: I cannot but be raised to this perswasion that this third period of time will farre surpasse that of the *Grecian* and *Romane* Learning: Onely if men will know their owne strength, & their owne weaknesse both: and take one from the other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction, and esteem of the Inquisitiō of truth, as of an enterprise, & not as of a quality or ornament, and imploy wit & magnificence to things of worth & excellency, and not to things vulgar, & of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himselfe, or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, *verbera, sed audi*. Let men reprehend them so they obserue and weigh them: For the appeale is lawfull (though it



may be, it shall not be needfull) from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the neerer times, to the times farther off. Now let vs come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to know, *Sacred and inspired Divinity*, the Sabbath and port of all mens labours and peregrinations.

**T**He prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason, as to the will of Man; So that as we are to obey his Law though we finde a reluctance in our will; So wee are to beleue his word, though we finde a reluctance in our reason: For if we beleue onely that which is agreeable to our sense, we giue consent to the matter, and not to the Author, which is no more then wee would doe towards a suspected and discredited witnesse: But that faith which was accounted to *Abraham* for righteousness, was of such a point, as whereat *Sarah* laughed, who therein was an Image of Naturall Reason.

Howbeit (if wee will truly consider it) more worthy it is to beleue, then to know as wee now know; For in knowledge mans mind suffereth from sense, but in beleefe it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised then it selfe, & so suffereth from the worthier agent; otherwise it is of the state of man glorified, for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are knowne.

Wherefore we conclude, that sacred Theology  
which



(which in our Idiome we call divinity) is grounded only vpon the word and oracle of God, and not vpon the light of nature: for it is written, *Celi enarrant gloriam Dei*: but it is not written *Celi enarrant voluntatem Dei*: But of that it is said, *Ad legem & testimonium si non fecerint secundum verbū istud &c.* This holdeth not only in those points of faith, which concerne the great mysteries of the Deity, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concerne the law Morall truly interpreted; *Loue your Enemies, doe good to them that hate you. Be like to your heauenly father, that suffereth his raine to fall vpon the Iust and Vniust.* To this it ought to be applauded, *Nec vox hominem sonat*, It is a voice beyond the light of Nature: So wee see the heathen Poets when they fall vpon a libertine passion, doe still expostulate with lawes & Moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to Nature: *Et quod natura remittit invida iura negant*: So said *Dendamis* the *Indian* vnto *Alexanders* messengers: That he had heard somewhat of *Pythagoras*, and some other of the wise men of *Gracia*, and that he held them for excellent Men: But that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called Law and Manners: So it must bee confessed that a great part of the Law Morall is of that perfection, wherevnto the light of Nature cannot aspire: how then is it, that man is said to haue by the light and Law of Nature some Notions, and conceits of ver-



true and vice, justice and wrong, good and evill: Thus, because the light of Nature is vsed in two severall senses: The one, that which springeth from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument, according to the Lawes of heauen and earth: The other that which is imprinted vpon the spirit of Man by an inward instinct, according to the Law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first Estate: In which latter sense only, he is participant of some light, and discerning, touching the perfection of the Morall Law, but how? sufficient to checke the vice, but not to informe the duty. So then the doctrine of Religion, as well Morall as Mysticall, is not to be attained, but by inspiration and reuelation from God.

The vse notwithstanding of Reason in spirituall things, & the latitude thereof, is very great and generall: for it is not for nothing, that the Apostle calleth Religion *our reasonable service of God*, in so much as the very Ceremonies and figures of the old Law were full of reason and signification, much more then the ceremonies of Idolatry and Magicke, that are full of *Non significant*s and *Surd Characters*; But most specially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this deserueth to be highly magnified, holding and preserving the golden Mediocrity in this point, betweene the Law of the *Heathen*, & the Law of *Mahumet*, which haue embraced the two extreames. For the Religion of the *Heathen* had no constant beleefe or confession, but  
left



left all to the liberty of argument: & the Religion of *Mahumet* on the other side, interdicteth argument altogether; the one hauing the very face of Errour: and the other of Imposture, whereas the Faith doth both admit and reiect Disputation with difference.

The vse of Humane Reason in Religion, is of two sorts: The former in the conception and apprehension of the Mysteries of God to vs revealed; The other, in the inferring and deriuing of Doctrine and direction thereupon: The former extendeth to the Mysteries themselves: but how? by way of Illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of Probation and Argument. In the former wee see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may bee sensible vnto vs: and doth graft his Revelations and holy doctrine vpon the Notions of our reason, and applyeth his Inspirations to open our vnderstanding, as the forme of the key to the ward of the locke; for the latter, there is allowed vs an vse of Reason, and argument, secundarie and respectiue; although not originall and absolute: For after the Articles and principles of Religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason; it is then permitted vnto vs to make derivations and inferences from, and according to the Analogy of them, for our better direction. In Nature this holdeth not, for both the principles are examinable by Induction, though not by a

*Medium*



*Medium* or *Syllogisme*: and besides, those principles or first positions, haue no discordance with that reason, which draweth downe and deduceth the inferiour positions. But yet it holdeth not in Religion alone, but in many knowledges both of greater & smaller Nature, namely wherein there are not only *Posita* but *Placita*, for in such there can be no vse of absolute reaso<sup>n</sup>, we see it familiarly in games of wit, as Chesse, or the like; The Draughts and first laws of the Game are positie; but how? meerely *ad placitum*, and not examinable by reason; But then how to direct our play therevpon with best advantage to winne the game, is artificiall and rationall. So in humane Lawes, there bee many grounds and Maxims, which are *Placita Iuris*, *Positue* vpon authority and not vpon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: But what is most iust, not absolutely, but relatiuely, and according to those Maxims, that affordeth a long field of disputati<sup>o</sup>n. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded vpon the *Placets* of God.

*De vsu legiti-  
mo rationis hu-  
mana in divi-  
nis.*

Heretherefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not beene to my vnderstanding sufficiently enquired & handled, *The true limits & vse of reason in spirituall things*: as a kind of diuine Dialectique, which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing vsuall, by pretext of true conceiuing that, which is reuealed, to search and mine into that which is not reuealed, and by pretext of enucleating inferences



inferences & cōtradictories, to examine that which is positue: The one sort falling into the Errour of *Nicodemus*, demanding to haue things made more sensible then it pleaseth God to reueale them; *Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex*: The other sort into the Error of the Disciples, which were scandalized at a shew of contradiction: *Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis, modicum, et non videbitis me, et iterum modicum, & videbitis me, &c.*

Vpon this I haue insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed vse thereof, for this point well laboured & defined of, would in my judgement be an *Opiate* to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schooles labour, but the fury of controuersies, wherewith the Church laboreth. For it cannot but opē mens eyes to see that many controuersies doe meerely pertain to that which is either not reuealed, or positue, and that many others doe grow vpon weake and obscure Inferences or derivations: which latter sort of men would reuiue the blessed stile of that great Doctor of the Gentiles, would bee carried thus: *Ego non Dominus*; and againe, *Secundum consilium meum*, in opinions and counsellis, and not in positions & oppositions. But men are now ouer ready to vsurpe the stile, *Non ego, sed Dominus*, & not so onely, but to bind it with the thunder of denunciation of *Curses*, and *Anathemaes*, to the terror of those which haue not sufficiently learned out of *Salomon*, that *The causelesse Curse shall not come.*

Sf

Diuinity



Divinity hath two principall parts: The matter informed or reuealed: and the nature of the Information or Revelation: and with the latter wee will beginne: becaule it hath most coherence with that which wee haue now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three branches: The limits of the information; the sufficiency of the information; and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Vnto the limits of the information belong these considerations: how farre forth particular persons continue to bee inspired: how farre forth the Church is inspired: and how farre forth reason may be vsed; the last point whereof I haue noted as deficient. Vnto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations, what points of Religion are fundamentall, and what perfectiue, being matter of farther building & perfection vpon one and the same foundation: & againe, how the gradations of light according to the dispensation of times are materiall to the sufficiencie of beleefe.

*De gradibus v-  
natis in Ciu-  
itate Dei.*

Here againe I may rather giue it in aduise, then note it as deficient, that the points fundamentall, and the points of further perfection onely ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a subiect tending to much like end, as that I noted before: for as that other were likely to abate the number of controuersies: So this is like to abate the heat of many of them. Wee see *Moses* when he saw the *Israelite* and the *Egyptian* fight, hee did not say, *Why strive you*, but drew his sword, and slew the



the *Egyptian*: But when hee saw the two *Israelites* fight, he said, *You are brethren why strive you?* If the point of doctrine be an *Egyptian*, it must bee slaine by the sword of the spirit, and not reconciled. But if it be an *Israelite*, though in the wrong: then *Why strive you?* We see of the fundamentall points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, *He that is not with vs is against vs*, but of points not fundamentall, thus *He that is not against vs, is with vs*. So we see the Coate of our Saviour was entire without seame, and so is the Doctrine of the Scriptures in it selfe: But the garment of the Church was of divers colours, and yet not divided: wee see the chaffe may and ought to be seuered frō the corne in the Eare: But the tares may not be pulled vp from the corne in the field: So as it is a thing of great vse well to define, what, and of what latitude those points are, which doe make men meerely aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth vpon the true & sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountaines of the water of life. The Interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: Methodicall, & Solute, or at large, for this diuine water which excelleth so much, that of *Iacobs Well*, is drawne forth much in the same kinde, as Naturall Water vseth to bee out of Wells and Fountaines: either it is first forced vp into a Cestern, and from thence fetcht and deriued for vse: or else it is drawne and receiued in Buckets and



Vessels immediatly where it springeth. The former sort whereof though it seeme to bee the more ready, yet in my iudgement is more subiect to corrupt. This is that Method which hath exhibited vnto vs the scholasticall divinity, whereby divinity hath bin reduced into an Art, as into a Cesterne, & the streames of doctrine or positions fetcht and deriued from thence.

In this, Men haue sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete perfection: whereof the two first they faile to finde, and the last they ought not to seeke. For as to breuity, wee see in all summary Methods, while men purpose to abridge, they giue cause to dilate. For the summe or abridgement by contraction becommeth obscure, the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is diduced into large commentaries, or into common places, and titles, which grow to bee more vast then the originall writings, whence the summe was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoole-men are greater much then the first writings of the Fathers, whence the Master of the sentēces made his summe or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the moderne Doctors of the Civil law exceed those of the ancient Iurisconsults, of which *Tribonian* compiled the Digest. So as this course of summes and commentaries is that which doth infallably make the body of Sciences more immense in quantity, & more base in substance.

And



And for strength, it is true, that knowledges reduced into exact Methods haue a shew of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and sustaine the other; but this is more satisfactory then substantiall, like vnto buildings, which stand by Architecture & compaction, which are more subiect to ruine, then those which are built more strong in their seuerall parts, though lesse compacted. But it is plaine, that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker doe you conclude; and as in nature, the more you remoue your selfe from particulars, the greater perill of Errour you doe incur: So, much more in Divinity, the more you recede frō the Scriptures by inferences & consequences, the more weak & dilute are your positions.

And as for perfection, or compleatnesse in Divinity, it is not to be sought, which makes this course of Artificiall divinity the more suspect: For hee that will reduce a knowledge into an Art, will make it round and vniforme: But in Divinity many things must be left abrupt & concluded with this: *O altitudo Sapientiae & scientiae Dei, quā incomprehensibilia sunt Iudicia eius, & non investigabiles viæ eius!* so againe the Apostle saith, *Ex parte scimus*, and to haue the forme of a totall, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition & presumptiō. And therefore I conclude, that the true vse of these Summes and Methods hath place in Institutions or Introductions, preparatory vnto knowledge: but in them, or by di-



ducement from them, to handle the maine body and substance of a knowledge, is in all Sciences prejudiciall, and in divinity dangerous.

As to the Interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, there haue beene divers kindes introduced and devised, some of them rather curious and vnsafe, then sober & warranted. Notwithstanding thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures being giuen by inspiration, and not by humane reason, doe differ from all other books in the Author: which by consequence doth drawe on some difference to be vsed by the Expositor. For the Inditer of them did know foure things which no man attaines to know, which are, the mysteries of the kingdome of Glory; the perfection of the Lawes of Nature; the secrets of the heart of Man; and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first, it is said, *He that presseth into the light, shall bee oppressed of the Glory.* And againe, *No man shall see my face & liue.* To the second, *When he prepared the heauens I was present, when by law & compasse he enclosed the deepe.* To the third, *Neither was it needfull that any should beare witnesse to him of Man, for hee knew well what was in man.* And to the last, *From the beginning are knowne to the Lord all his workes.*

From the former of these two haue bin drawne certaine senses & expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; The one *Anagogicall*, and the other *Philosophicall*. But as to the former, Man is not to prevent his time;



time; *Videmus nunc per speculum in Ænigmate*, *tunc autē facie ad faciē*, wherein neverthelesse there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as farre forth as the polishing of this glasse, or some moderate explication of this *Ænigma*. But to presse too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receiue into it: *Aliment*, *Medicine* and *Poyson*; whereof *Aliment* is that which the Nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome: *Medicine* is that which is partly converted by Nature, and partly converteth nature: and *Poison* is that which worketh wholly vpon nature, without that, that nature can in any part worke vpon it. So in the minde whatsoeuer knowledge reason cannot at all worke vpon and convert, is a meere intoxication, and indangereth a dissolution of the mind and vnderstanding.

But for the latter, it hath beene extreamely set on foot of late time by the Schoole of *Paracelsus*, and some others, that haue pretended to finde the truth of all naturall Philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and traducing all other Philosophy: as Heathenish and prophane: But there is no such enmity betweene Gods word, and his workes. Neither doe they giue honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seeke heauen and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, *Heauen and Earth shall passe, but my word shall not passe*, is to seeke temporary things amongst eternall



eternall, And as to seeke Divinity in Philosophy, is to seeke the liuing amongst the dead; so to seeke Philosophy in Divinity is to seek the dead amongst the liuing; Neither are the *Pots* or *Lauers*, whose place was in the outward part of the Temple to bee sought in the holiest place of all, where the Arke of the testimony was seated. And againe, the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to expresse matters of Nature in the Scriptures, otherwise then in passage, and for application to mans capacity and to matters Morall or Divine. And it is a true Rule, *Authoris aliud agentis parua authoritas*. For it were a strange cōclusion, if a man should vse a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from Nature or history, according to vulgar conceit, as of a *Basiliske*, an *Vnicorne*, a *Centaure*, a *Briareus*, an *Hydra*, or the like, that therefore he must needs bee thought to affirme the matter thereof positively to be true; To conclude therefore these two Interpretations, the one by reduction of *Ænigmaticall*, the other Philosophicall or Physicall, which haue bin receiued and pursued in imitation of the *Rabbins* & *Cabalists*, are to be confined with a *Noli altum sapere, sed time*.

But the two latter points knowne to God, and vnknowne to man; touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, doth make a just and sound difference betweene the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures: and all other bookes. For it is an excellent obseruation which hath beene made



made vpon the answers of our Sauour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded, the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which knowes mans thoughts by his words, but knowing mans thoughts immediatly, hee neuer answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectiue towards that present occasion, wherevpon the words were vttered; or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principall scope of the place, but haue in them selues not only totally, or collectiue, but distributiue in clauses and words infinite springs & streames of doctrine to water the Church in every part, and therefore as the litterall sense is as it were the maine streame or Riuer: So the Morall sense chiefly, and sometimes the *Allegoricall* or *Typicall* are they whereof the Church hath most vse: not that I wish men to be bold in *Allegories*, or *indulgent* or light in Allusions: but that I doe much condemne that interpretation of the Scripture, which is only after the manner as Men vse to interpret a prophane booke.

In this part touching the exposition of the Scrip-

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tures



330 *Of the advancement of Learning,*

tures, I can report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will adde, In perusing bookes of Divinitie, I finde many Bookes of controuersies, and many of Common places and Treatises, a masse of positie Divinitie, as it is made an Art: a number of Sermons and Lectures, and many prolix commentaries vpon the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances: but that forme of writing in Divinitie, which in my iudgement is of all others most rich and precious, is positie Diuinitie collected vpon particular Texts of Scriptures in brieve observations, not dilated into common places: not chafing after controuersies, not reduced into Methode of Art, a thing abounding in Sermons, which will vanish, but defectiue in bookes which will remaine, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am perswaded, and I may speake it, with an *Ab sit invidia verbo*, and no waies in derogation of Antiquitie, but as in a good emulation betweene the Vine and the Oliue, That if the choice, and best of those observations vpon Texts of Scriptures which haue beene made disperfedly in Sermons within this your Majesties Iland of *Brittanie* by the space of these forty yeares and more (leauing out the largenesse of exhortations and applications therevpon) had beene set downe in a continuance, it had beene the best worke in Divinitie, which had been written since the Apostles times.

—  
Emanationes  
Scripturarum,  
in doctrinas  
Positiuas. +

The matter informed by Diuinity, is of two kinds, matter of beleefe, and truth of opinion: and matter of



of seruice, and adoration; which is also iudged and directed by the former: The one being as the internall soule of Religion, and the other as the externall body thereof: and therefore the heathen Religion was not onely a worship of Idols, but the whole Religion was an Idoll in it selfe, for it had no soule, that is, no certainty of beliefe or confession, as a man may well thinke, considering the chiefe Doctors of their Church, were the Poets, and the reason was, because the heathen Gods were no Iealous Gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the purenesse of heart, so they might haue externall honour & rites.

But out of these two doe result and issue foure maine branches of Divinity: *Faith, Manners, Lyrurgie, and Gouvernment*: *Faith* containeth the Doctrine of the Nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the workes of God; The nature of God consisteth of three persons in vnitie of Godhead; The attributes of God are either common to the Deitie, or respectiue to the persons; The workes of God summary are two, that of the *Creation*, and that of the *Redemption*; And both these workes, as in Totall they appertaine to the vnitie of the Godhead: So in their parts they referre to the three persons: That of the *Creation* in the Masse of the Matter to the father, in the disposition of the forme to the Sonne, and in the continuance and conseruation of the being to the Holy spirit: So that of the *Redemption*, in the election and counsell to the



Father, in the whole Act and consummation, to the Sonne: and in the application to the Holy spirit: for by the holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually in the Elect, or privately in the reprobate, or according to appearance in the visible Church.

For manners, the Doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which discloseth sinne. The law it selfe is diuided according to the edition thereof, into the law of Nature, the law Morall, and the law Positiue; and according to the stile, into Negatiue and Affirmatiue, Prohibitions and Commandements. Sinne in the matter and subject thereof, is diuided according to the Commandements, in the forme thereof it referreth to the three persons in Deitie. Sinnes of infirmitie against the Father, whose more speciall attribute is Power: Sinnes of Ignorance against the Sonne, whose attribute is wisdom: and sinnes of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or loue. In the motions of it, it either moueth to the right hand, or to the left, either to blinde devotion, or to prophane and libertine transgression, either in imposing restraint where God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees & progresse of it, it divideth it selfe into thought, word, or Act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the Law of God to cases of conscience, for that I take indeed to bee a breaking, and not exhibiting whole



whole of the bread of life. But that which quick-  
neth both these Doctrines of faith and Manners is  
the elevation and consent of the heart, whereunto  
appertaine bookes of exhortation, holy meditation,  
Christian resolution, and the like.

For the Lyturgie or seruice, it consisteth of the  
reciprocall Acts betweene Cod and Man, which  
on the part of God are the Preaching of the word  
and the Sacraments, which are seales to the cou-  
enant, or as the visible word: and on the part of Man,  
Invocation of the name of God: and vnder the  
Law, Sacrifices, which were as visible prayers or  
confessions, but now the adoration being in *spiritu*  
& *veritate* there remaineth onely *vituli labiorum*,  
although the vse of holy vowes of thankfulnessse  
and retribution, may bee accounted also as sealed  
petitions.

And for the Gouvernment of the Church, it con-  
sisteth of the patrimonie of the Church, the Fran-  
chises of the Church, and the offices, and iurisdic-  
tions of the Church, and the Lawes of the Church  
directing the whole: All which haue two conside-  
rations; the one in themselves: the other how  
they stand compatible and agreeable to the Civill  
Estate.

This matter of Divinity is handled either in  
forme of instruction of truth: or in forme of con-  
futation of falsehood. The declinations from Re-  
ligion, besides the priuative, which is Atheisme, and  
the Branches thereof, are three; *Hereses*, *Idolatrie*,

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and



and *Witch-craft*, *Heresies*, when wee serue the true God with a false worshippe. *Idolatrie*, when wee worship false Gods, supposing them to be true: and *Witch-craft*, when wee adore false Gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Maiestie doth excellently well obserue, that *Witch-craft* is the height of *Idolatrie*. And yet we see though these be true degrees, *Samuel* teacheth vs that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of God, for so he saith, *Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, & quasi scelus Idololatriæ nolle acquiescere.*

These things I haue passed ouer so briefly because I can report no deficiency concerning them: For I can finde no space or ground that lyeth vacant and vnsworne in the matter of Divinity, so diligent haue men beene, either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of Tares.

Thus haue I made as it were a small Globe of the intellectuall world, as truly and faithfully as I could discouer, with a note and description of those parts which seeme to me, not constantly occupate, or not well converted by the labour of Man. In which, if I haue in any point receded from that which is commonly receaued, it hath beene with a purpose of proceeding in *melius*, and not in *aliud*: a minde of amendment and proficiencie; and not of change and difference. For I could not bee true and constant to the Argument I handle, if I were not willing to goe beyond others, but yet not more willing,



willing, then to haue others goe beyond me againe, which may the better appeare by this, that I haue propounded my opinions naked and vnarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the libertie of mens iudgements by cōfutations. For in any thing which is wel set down, I am in good hope, that if the first reading moue an obiection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I haue erred, I am sure I haue not preiudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly haue this contrary effect and operation, that they adde authoritie to errour, and destroy the authority of that which is well invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falshood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claime and challenge to my selfe as mine owne. The good, if any

be, is due *Tanquam adeps sacrificij*, to bee incensed to the honour first of the


Divine Maiestie, and next of your Maiestie, to whom

on earth I am most bounden.





















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